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This book explores Australia’s prospective cyber-warfare requirements and
challenges. It describes the current state of planning and thinking within the
Australian Defence Force (ADF) with respect to Network Centric Warfare (NCW),
and discusses the vulnerabilities that accompany the use by Defence of the
National Information Infrastructure (NII), as well as Defence’s responsibility for
the protection of the NII. It notes the multitude of agencies concerned in various
ways with information security, and argues that mechanisms are required to
enhance coordination between them. It also argues that Australia has been
laggard with respect to the development of offensive cyber-warfare plans and
capabilities. Finally, it proposes the establishment of an Australian Cyber-warfare
Centre responsible for the planning and conduct of both the defensive and
offensive dimensions of cyber-warfare, for developing doctrine and operational
concepts, and for identifying new capability requirements. It argues that the
matter is urgent in order to ensure that Australia will have the necessary
capabilities for conducting technically and strategically sophisticated
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by Professor Kim C. Beazley
In 2002 I visited Afghanistan as part of a parliamentary delegation. At Bagram
base, while visiting our Special Air Service (SAS) contingent, we were hosted
at the headquarters of the 10th Mountain Division on one of the first of their
seemingly interminable deployments to the Afghanistan fight. There we saw
soldiers sitting behind banks of personal computers controlling everything from
the Division’s logistics to the units in the field.
We witnessed the interaction between US dominance of the electro-magnetic
sphere and its use of cyber-space. Satellites beamed in the ongoing battle and
communications relevant to the forces engaged. The Division Commander had
the exact location of his forces and those they engaged. We could see the practical
effects with orders for A-10 ground support or helicopter extraction as the base
responded instantly to requests and constantly added to the information of
company and platoon commanders in the field. I asked the Division’s Commander
how he resisted taking over platoon command in such a situation. “It’s difficult,”
he responded. We were witnessing what the Australian Defence Force described
in its 2020 vision statement as ‘network-enabled operations’.
It was clear from our subsequent conversations with SAS personnel how
much their small unit patrols were enveloped by the plethora of information on
their situation which came from a multiplicity of surveillance capabilities and
the array of responses and advice they could draw on from the levels of command
they were plugged into. It was a privileged view of warriors standing on the
bottom rung of future information age warfare.
Politics has distorted what is really important in the Australian debate on
our future defence needs. We are obsessed with platforms and personnel
numbers. Over the last decade, the Australian Government has burnished its
popular security credentials by junking any serious study of platform needs
and acquiring capabilities based on immensity with big dollar signs attached,
thereby seeking to impress public opinion with size and cost whilst saying little
of relevance about modern and future warfighting.
We are a clever and technologically capable people. Partly courtesy of our
allied relationship, we are deeply aware of the US ability to exploit the
possibilities of electro-magnetic waves and cyber-space. We host and participate
in the operation of cutting-edge installations such as those at Pine Gap.
Involvement in Iraq (and even more in Afghanistan) and collaboration in the
‘war on terror’ have given us access to the heart of frontier advances in
information operations. Through organisations like the Defence Signals
Directorate we make direct contributions. Scattered through Defence and security
related departments, like the Attorney-General’s, we have institutions responsible
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for exploiting electro-magnetic and cyber-space for information on those who
are our enemies or would be enemies, and using the same space to combat them.
George Orwell said during the Second World War that we sleep safe in our
beds because rough men do violence in the night to those who would wish us
harm. The rough men are now joined by the ‘geeks’ of both genders. Yet there
are gaps in capability, objectives and missions. As the Australian Government
sits down to contemplate its defence White Paper, we expect answers on extra
battalions of soldiers, the necessity for the Super Hornet, the value of the Canberra
class LHDs, and the timing of the next generation of submarines. No-one is
waiting with bated breath for what it will say about our ability to conduct
cyber-warfare or even on what is meant by our capabilities in network-enabled
operations. Certainly no-one is waiting to read about our intelligence services
transitioning to warfighting operations.
Except perhaps the authors of this study. I cannot begin to attest to the
veracity of the material which follows. Like most politicians I have been caught
up for a decade in the need for the quick fix in responses to the crises that have
emerged since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States.
Whatever emerges in the debate over the next few years on the White Paper,
one perception in the White Paper I was responsible for over 20 years ago remains
valid today. Our long-term survival depends on a clear understanding of
capabilities which may be used against us and on the clear need for a small nation
to sustain a technological edge in meeting them. We live in a broader region
which is, as one of the authors points out, a test-bed for future information
warfare. To this point the edge has been sought defensively; in the future it will
need to be sought aggressively.
The authors seek the establishment of an Australian Cyber-warfare Centre
to coordinate the development of capabilities that will decisively enhance our
forces in the field—but, more than that, ensure that the tools which enhance
our warriors are tools in the fight itself. This is a timely book which transcends
old debates on priorities for the defence of Australia or forward commitments.
It transcends debates about globalism and regionalism. These are global
capabilities, but with a multitude of effects in any part of geography that is vital.
This book will serve as an invaluable compendium for subsequent judgement
about official documents and commentaries that will deluge us as all sections of
the Australian Government rethink our national security priorities.
Kim C. Beazley
Professor of Social and Political Theory
University of Western Australia







Gary Waters and Desmond Ball
In 2005 Air Commodore (Ret’d) Gary Waters and Professor Desmond Ball
examined the key issues involved in ensuring that the Australian Defence Force
(ADF) could obtain information superiority in future contingencies.1 The authors
discussed force posture, associated command and control systems, information
support systems, operational concepts and doctrine. They discussed the ADF’s
approach to Network Centric Warfare (NCW); examined the command and
control aspects of dispersed military operations utilising networked systems;
outlined some of the principal strategic, organisational, operational, doctrinal
and human resource challenges; and discussed the information architecture
requirements for achieving information superiority.
Through its NCW developments, the ADF is aiming to obtain common
battlefield awareness and superior command decision-making, using a
comprehensive ‘information network’ linking sensors (for direction), command
and control (for flexible, optimised decision-making), and engagement systems
(for precision application of force).
The authors examined the twin notions of leveraging off indirect connections
and generating effects in unheralded ways to determine what advantages might
accrue to the dispersed and networked force and what paradigm shifts would
be needed to realise those advantages. They also argued that whatever
collaborative form of command and control might be used in future, it had to
preserve simplicity, unity of command and balance. This collaborative element
would be all about networking, interacting; sharing information, awareness and
understanding; and making collaborative decisions.
A number of hypothetical Information Operations (IO) scenarios were
presented, in which the ADF was able to defeat an adversary’s air assault by
cyber-attack; immobilise their naval fleet by electronic warfare (EW) attack; jam
and deceive their air defences; destroy or incapacitate their command, control
and communications systems; and corrupt their networks. An Information
Warfare (IW) architecture for Australia was sketched out and key related issues
canvassed.
1
The authors acknowledged that interrelationships and interdependencies
between weapons, sensors, commanders and the supporting network could form
the Achilles’ heel of the future ADF. Furthermore, as Australia moves down a
whole-of-nation approach to security, the way we cooperate and coordinate our
activities across government and with allies will extend that supporting network
and broaden the potential vulnerabilities.
Reliance on the network will mean enhancing the capability and survivability
of Defence’s and related networked infrastructures to ensure sustained and
protected flows of information. This becomes increasingly problematic as reliance
on commercial technologies increases.
Planned US programs offer an unprecedented level of access and availability
of information to forces in the field and Australia needs to develop equivalent
initiatives so it can ‘plug and play’ with the United States.
While the authors discussed the Defence Information Infrastructure (DII),
which they defined as an ‘interconnected, end-to-end set of information systems
and technologies that support the electronic creation, collation, processing,
protection and dissemination of Defence information’, they did not discuss the
national and global equivalents, nor how these might be protected. Furthermore,
Defence has published several documents since 2005, which underscore its
reliance on NCW and the underpinning networks. Hence, it is now timely to
examine the potential challenges to those networks and the information that
flows across them and how it might all be protected.
Chapter 2 of this volume, by Gary Waters, describes the recent developments
with respect to Defence planning for NCW. It examines what the ADF is hoping
to achieve through NCW, and outlines the key elements of the NCW Roadmap
released in 2005 and updated in 2007.
Notwithstanding Defence’s published view, the implementation of NCW is
being challenged by the demands on planners resulting from the extraordinary
tempo of current operations, and the focus on Coalition and regional operations.
Much needs to be done in ensuring that Australia will have the necessary
capabilities for achieving information superiority around 2020. The work carried
out prior to 2005 was fundamentally incomplete as it was mostly concerned with
enhancing and sharing battlefield awareness and with shortening decision cycles;
it essentially ignored the offensive opportunities and challenges of NCW, and
the offensive role of IW more generally. Furthermore, the NCW work since then
has continued to pay insufficient attention to the human and organisational
dimensions.
The ‘war on terror’ has stimulated some aspects of IO while further distracting
planners from the longer-term construction of an all-embracing NCW architecture
that also addresses the offensive and defensive aspects of IW. Recent
2
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achievements have been essentially defensive, involving investigative and
forensic activities, rather than exploiting cyber-space for offensive IO.
Chapter 3, by Gary Waters, starts by highlighting the value of information
to Australia and the ADF today, before discussing the potential forms of IW that
could be used against us. There are certain actions an adversary might take
against us and certain things we can do to protect ourselves. And there are
cyber-crime activities that need to be addressed, as well as critical information
infrastructure aspects. This discussion on cyber-attacks and broad network
defence sets the scene for the next two chapters on attacking and defending
information infrastructures.
Chapter 4, by Ian Dudgeon, discusses how information infrastructures
underpin and enable today’s information society, and national defence
capabilities, and how they shape and influence the way we, and others, live and
what we see, think, decide and how we act. It identifies the importance of these
infrastructures as targets in war, to achieve physical and psychological outcomes,
in order to weaken the military capability and national morale of an adversary,
and how psychological outcomes can also strengthen the morale of friends and
allies and influence the attitudes of neutral parties. It also discusses how, in
certain non-war circumstances, foreign infrastructures may also be targeted to
project national power and shape events to national advantage.
Chapter 5, by Gary Waters, discusses the twin challenges of balancing
information superiority and operational vulnerability, and security and privacy
in information sharing, before examining cyber-security and how we might best
secure the Defence and National Information Infrastructures (NIIs). Indeed, this
aspect is mentioned in the 2007 Defence Update, which stated that: ‘There is an
emerging need to focus on “cyber–warfare”, particularly capabilities to protect
national networks to deny information’.2
There is a myriad of complex and extremely difficult issues that require
resolution before radically new command and control arrangements can be
organised, new technical capabilities acquired and dramatically different
operational concepts tested and codified. These include the extent to which
complete digitisation and networking of the ADF will permit flatter command
and control structures; the availability of different sorts of Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs) and the timeframes for their potential acquisition; the role of
offensive operations and the development of doctrine and operational concepts
for these; the promulgation of new rules of engagement; and a plethora of human
resource issues, including the scope for the creative design and utilisation of
reserve forces and other elements of the civil community.3 These matters will
take many years to resolve and even longer, in some cases at least a decade, for
the ensuing decisions to be fully implemented.
3
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In chapter 6, Des Ball argues a critical deficiency is the lack of a net-war or
cyber-warfare centre. Australia has a plethora of organisations, within and
outside Defence, concerned with some aspects of cyber-warfare (including
network security), but they are poorly coordinated and are not committed to
the full exploitation of cyber-space for either military operations or IW more
generally.
A dedicated cyber-warfare centre is fundamental to the planning and conduct
of both defensive and offensive IO. It would be responsible for exploring the
full possibilities of future cyber-warfare, and developing the doctrine and
operational concepts for IO. It would study all viruses, Denial of Service (DS)
programs, ‘Trojan horses’ and ‘trap-door’ systems, not only for defensive
purposes but also to discern offensive applications. It would study the firewalls
around computer systems in military high commands and headquarters in the
region, in avionics and other weapons systems, and in telecommunications
centres, banks and stock exchanges, ready to penetrate a command centre, a
flight deck or ship’s bridge, a telephone or data exchange node, or a central
bank at a moment’s notice, and able to insert confounding orders and to
manipulate data without the adversary’s knowledge. It would identify new
capability requirements. It should probably be located in a building close to the
Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) in the Russell Hill complex and be run out of
the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPM&C).
ENDNOTES
1  Gary Waters and Desmond Ball, Transforming the Australian Defence Force (ADF) for Information
Superiority, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, no. 159, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,
The Australian National University, Canberra, 2005.
2  See Department of Defence, Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2007, Department of
Defence, July 2007, p. 53, available at <http://www.defence.gov.au/ans/2007/pdf/Defence_update.pdf>,
accessed 25 February 2008.









The global economy continues to be more networked through information and
communication technologies that are fast becoming ubiquitous. Decision-to-action
cycles are reducing to cope with the increasing pace of change, which is placing
a premium on innovation, information sharing and collaboration. At the same
time, national security is being broadened, large quantities of information are
flowing along with calls for better quality information, and connectivity is
increasing, all of which leads to an increase in the strategic value of information.
Ed Waltz expresses it well as:
the role of electronically collected and managed information at all levels
has increased to become a major component of both commerce and
warfare. The electronic transmission and processing of information
content has expanded both the scope and speed of business and military
processes.1
In June 2002, Defence released its doctrinal statement on Australia’s approach
to warfare.2  In looking at how the Australian Defence Force (ADF) would prepare
itself to cope with increasing and rapid change, the focus of the document turned
initially to what the Information Age heralded. Attacks on information systems
were cited as potential security threats to which the ADF would need to respond.3
Furthermore, the ADF should expect to find itself increasingly operating in
‘small, dispersed combat groups’,4  which would be facilitated in part through
technological advances in communications.
Defence also released its long-term vision statement in June 2002—known
as Force 2020. In articulating a vision of a seamless force—internally with each
other (the three Services) and externally with the range of providers, supporting
entities and the community5  —the ADF also highlighted the fundamental need
to transform from a platform-centric force to a network-centric one.
The ADF argued that ‘the aim of Network-Enabled Operations is to obtain
common and enhanced battlespace awareness, and with the application of that
5
awareness, deliver maximum combat effect’.6  Furthermore, the fundamental
building block of networked operations would be a comprehensive ‘information
network’ that linked the sensor grid (for detection), the command and control
(C2) grid (offering flexible, optimised decision-making), and the engagement
grid (for precision engagement).7
Through network-enabled operations, the ADF would be conferred with
what it termed ‘decision superiority’—‘the ability to make better, faster decisions,
based upon more complete information than an adversary’.8 The ADF cited
operations in Afghanistan where Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) passed
real-time targeting information (via video) to aircraft, epitomising the
effectiveness of Network Centric Warfare (NCW), through the direct
sensor-to-shooter link that allowed rapid engagement of targets. This is what
the ADF means by seamless integration of platforms through the information
network.9
In May 2003, the Chief of the Defence Force, General Peter Cosgrove, noted
to an NCW conference that
while it is likely that some type of crude kinetic effect will still be the
ultimate expression of violence in war, it is also likely that as information
and network-related war fighting techniques start to mature and to
predominate, outcomes will be swifter, as dramatic and paradoxically
less bloody than the classic force-on-force attritionist, paradigm of the
past.10
Indeed, Cosgrove cited the 2003 Iraq War, from which he observed that ‘in
the main, the Iraqi forces were beaten quickly, spectacularly and
comprehensively by a force using what were, on balance, mostly first generation
network-centric technologies and concepts’.11
The seamless integration called for in Force 2020 and inferred by Cosgrove
has necessitated the ADF moving away from a focus on individual weapon
platforms towards exploiting the effectiveness of linked, or networked, forces
and capabilities. Networking will allow the sharing of a common and current
relevant picture of the operational environment across all components of the
joint force. This will, in turn, improve a force’s situational awareness,
coordination, and importantly, decision-making ability. The joint force will
exploit this as it is able to prepare for and conduct operations more smoothly
and quickly.
Operations will rely on linking sensors, weapons and commanders, via an
appropriate information network, to enable the timely and precise application
of military force. By embracing a ‘networked’ approach to military operations,
the ADF will be able to generate greater combat effectiveness than belies its
relatively small size—be able to ‘punch well above its weight’.
6
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These notions have been reinforced through the release in 2007 of Defence’s
Future Joint Operating Concept (FJOC).12 The FJOC starts with Air Chief Marshal
Angus Houston’s vision for the ADF, which is to be ‘a balanced, networked and
deployable force, staffed by dedicated and professional people, that operates
within a culture of adaptability and excels at joint, interagency and coalition
operations’.13 The FJOC goes on to argue that the force must operate in the
seamless manner described in Force 2020, not only to maximise the ADF’s
collective warfighting capabilities but also its ability to operate with interagency
and coalition partners. Improved networking will enhance the ADF’s capability
advantage over potential adversaries as it also relies on its people to generate
the underlying capability advantage and the ‘knowledge edge’ needed for the
future.
Increasingly, the ADF must be capable of both executing effective combat
operations and providing military support to national responses in more complex
environments. The ADF must move to develop a hardened, networked,
deployable joint force that is characterised by adaptability and agility to handle
the full range of military operations across the full spectrum of conflicts.
In the information dimension, future adversaries will utilise informal
communications technologies that are cheap, ubiquitous and difficult to trace,
and increasingly secure and sophisticated networked C2 and intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems, leveraging commercial satellite
capabilities and improved geospatial information.
The FJOC adopts a national effects-based approach, which involves taking
a whole-of-nation view of security to find the most appropriate tool to achieve
national objectives—the military is but one of the tools. It is underpinned by
the NCW Concept that will help link ADF, Australian and coalition sensors,
engagement systems and decision-makers into an effective and responsive whole.
NCW seeks to provide the future force with the ability to generate tempo,
precision and combat power through shared situational awareness, clear
procedures, and the information connectivity needed to synchronise friendly
actions to meet the commander’s intent.
The ADF and Defence will work in cooperation with other government and
non-government agencies (where appropriate) to develop the capability for an
integrated multi-agency response capability, extending the network to other
agencies as appropriate.
In the Future Warfighting Concept,14  the ADF adopted Multidimensional
Manoeuvre (MDM) as its approach to future warfare. MDM seeks to negate the
adversary’s strategy through the intelligent and creative application of an
effects-based approach against an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities. It uses an
indirect approach to defeat the adversary’s will, seeking to apply tailored
strategic responses to achieve the desired effects.
7
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MDM operations are designed to focus on specific and achievable effects
through integrating joint warfighting functions (force application, force
deployment, force protection, force generation and sustainment, C2, and
knowledge dominance). A fundamental of MDM is the ability to employ NCW
and operate in joint task force, interagency and/or coalition arrangements to
conduct effective operations. The joint operational concept underlying MDM
are best described in terms of the ability to reach, know and exploit as follows:
• Reach—Reach describes the future force’s ability to operate in multiple
dimensions both inside and outside the operational area and across the
physical, virtual and human domains in order to understand and shape the
environment; deter, defeat and deny the adversary; and provide military
assistance in support of national interests. Reach is best accomplished as part
of an integrated whole-of-government approach across the spectrum of
military, diplomatic, economic and informational actions.15
• Know—The future force will build and sustain sufficient knowledge from
national and international sources to allow it to identify required actions
and assess the effects of those actions. It will understand itself and its
capabilities, those of its adversaries, as well as the operating environment,
which will enable the force to better carry out those actions that create
decisive effects. Information is at the base of knowledge dominance, and
knowing requires that the future force is able to utilise and integrate
information from strategic, operational and tactical sources, both military
and civilian. However, information must be turned into knowledge that is
timely, relevant and accurate. This knowledge must be acquired, prioritised,
refined and shared across the strategic, operational and tactical levels and
within the joint force and as part of multi-agency and multinational efforts.16
• Exploit—The future force will integrate its joint capabilities with other
elements of national power in order to achieve effects in support of national
strategic objectives. Effects are the outcomes of the actions taken to change
unacceptable conditions and behaviours, or to create freedom of action to
achieve desired objectives. The force will identify, create and exploit effects
through acquiring knowledge and establishing reach. To exploit its capability
to produce effects, the future force will continually assess its effects and
adjust its actions to take into account the iterative interaction of military,
diplomatic, economic and informational actions that are taken as part of
Australia’s whole-of-government approach.17
The following attributes define the ADF of the future:18
• Balanced—The future force must possess an appropriate mix of capabilities
in order to mount the range of operations envisaged. It must offer a
multiplicity of responses and not rely on ‘niche’ capability.
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• Networked—The future force will need assured access to other agency,
coalition and open-source information. The ability to operate effectively will
be contingent on the integrated forces’ networks and decision-making
infrastructures, early warning systems, communications, environmental
monitoring and positional data. Adversaries may exploit any vulnerability
in the nation’s network to undermine cohesion and effectiveness.
• Deployable—In the future, the ADF will need to operate at a distance from
established bases in Australia, either independently or with coalition forces,
potentially involving deployments with regional or global reach. Force
elements will need to be configured and prepared for short-notice
deployments that can be sustained with limited infrastructure support. This
will require either a capability to lift forces into the contingency area or
basing rights close to the contingency area. A forced-entry capability will
also be critical to the ADF’s ability to respond.
• Integrated and Interoperable—The ADF must continue the transition to a
force (with fully integrated services) that is interoperable with other agencies
of the government and its coalition partners and allies. Legacy systems
should, to the extent possible, be made to function in the integrated
environment until replaced. As the degree of integration and synchronisation
is increased, new training and systems will need to be established. Military
capabilities should be designed to be interoperable from conception, not as
an afterthought in the development process.
• Survivable and Robust—Each element of the future force must be able to
protect itself against the range of existing and evolving threats. Timely
investment in lower signatures, protection, countermeasures and redundancy
to match likely threats will be required.
• Ready and Responsive—The future ADF must observe, anticipate and be
prepared to serve Australia’s global interest in an evolving strategic and
geopolitical situation.
• Agile and Versatile—The future ADF must be able to respond rapidly to a
diverse range of missions and tasks. This will require versatile forces that
are tailored and scalable for deployment. They will need an ability, the extent
of which will be dictated by force structure, to re-form, reconstitute, regroup
and re-engage, especially during periods of concurrent operations.
• Precise and Discriminating—The goal for future operations is to achieve
precise effects, with minimum planning and response time, from a distance
if required. For the future ADF, precision must not be limited to the
application of kinetic force, but also be incorporated into executing
information operations (IOs) and minimising unintended consequences.
While traditional technology will initially provide the potential to improve
precision, emergent technology must be used to support widespread
cross-platform responses that ensure maximum flexibility and discrimination.
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Enhanced discrimination capabilities will permit high-value targets to be
struck with greater certainty.
• Lethal and Non-lethal—The ADF must increase its capability to produce
desired effects through the considered and coordinated use of both lethal
and non-lethal methods, using both kinetic and non-kinetic means. These
effects will be enhanced by leveraging technology advances which improve
precision and discrimination, and by employing a whole-of-nation approach.
• Persistent and Poised—Persistence ensures that the joint force has the required
endurance at all levels to generate and deploy forces for long periods, while
poise ensures that critical fighting elements are within range of a potential
target area. Persistence incorporates force protection, logistics, infrastructure
development and sustaining the capacity of ADF people to work and fight.
The persistence of the future ADF may necessitate a greater level of force
dispersal, leading to a requirement to generate effects from dispersed
locations, while at the same time being poised to project force at short notice.
Poise is achieved through either expanding deployability or securing basing
rights close to likely contingency areas.
• Sustainable—The increasing mobility, tempo and changeability of future
force operations will require an adaptive, modular, network-enabled logistic
system operating in a contiguous and non-contiguous mission space.
• Capable of Concurrency—The future force must be able to conduct operations
in more than one location simultaneously. The Defence Planning Guidance
provides guidance on the number and nature of deployed operations across
the maritime, land, air and space environments. The major capabilities
underpinning these operations will be the effective use of information to C2
forces, the ability to conduct strike operations, and the ability to generate
and sustain military forces.
• Legal and Ethical—In accordance with ADF core values, the ADF operates
within the Australian legal framework and the international Law of Armed
Conflict. The future ADF must continue to take pride in operating within
an ethical framework, derived from a strong warfighting tradition.
Armed with those insights into where the ADF is headed, this chapter
discusses the ADF’s NCW Concept, NCW Roadmap, and Information Superiority
and Support (IS&S) Concept in more detail to set the ensuing discussion in
subsequent chapters on the ‘cyber’ dimension, Information Warfare (IW), how
information infrastructures can be targeted, how they can be protected, and
how both offensive and defensive IOs can best be brought together via an
Australian cyber-warfare centre.
The ADF’S NCW Concept
In December 2003, the final NCW Concept Paper was produced by the Policy
Guidance and Analysis Division, within the Strategy Group.19 The Concept
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Paper argued that NCW involved the linkage of engagement systems to sensors
through networks and the sharing of information between force elements.
Information is only useful if it allows people to act more effectively: this makes
the human dimension fundamental to NCW. NCW thus has two closely related
and mutually reinforcing dimensions—the human dimension and the network
dimension. The NCW Concept argues that
the human dimension is based on professional mastery and mission
command, and requires high standards of training, education, doctrine,
organisation and leadership. This dimension is about the way people
collaborate to share their awareness of the situation, so that they can
fight more effectively. It requires trust between warfighters across
different levels, and trust between warfighters and their supporting
agencies.20
The Concept continues:
The second dimension, the network, connects major military systems,
including engagement, sensor and command systems. The network
dimension was the initial focus of development, but change here was
always expected to have a profound influence on the human dimension.21
NCW is seen by the ADF as a ‘means to realising a more effective warfighting
ability. New technology will change the character of conflict, but war’s enduring
nature—its friction, fog and chaotic features—will persist’.22 The Australian
NCW Concept accepts this enduring nature of war, but does seek to reduce the
effects of fog and friction.
The purpose of the NCW Concept was to provide a starting point for the
identification and exploitation of the opportunities of NCW. It would inform
and shape the conduct of Defence’s NCW-related research and experimentation
programs, which would further crystalise an understanding of the opportunities
and risks associated with NCW. The ADF would continually revisit the concept
in order to confirm its validity based on the lessons learned through research,
experimentation and operational experience.
The ADF’s NCW Concept is based on the following premises, which will be
tested through experimentation:23
• Professional mastery is essential to NCW.
• Mission command will remain an effective command philosophy into the
future.
• Information and intelligence will be shared if a network is built by connecting
engagement systems, sensor systems, and C2 systems.
• Robust networks will allow the ADF, and supporting agencies, to collaborate
more effectively and achieve shared situational awareness.
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• Shared situational awareness will enable self-synchronisation, which helps
warfighters to adapt to changing circumstances and allows them to apply
MDM more effectively.
The last two are fundamental in transforming the way in which information
is managed, used and exploited. These are expanded on below.
Networks
Robust networks involve sharing information and intelligence through a
connected network that also includes engagement, sensor and command systems.
While we might look at these systems separately, many of the ADF’s platforms
perform across all four grids. There is an expectation that NCW will offer an
ability to explore alternatives, whereby sensors may be separated from the
engagement system, or the ADF might be able to reduce the size of its deployed
force.
The ADF aims to develop and integrate an advanced sensor system, ranging
from space-based assets to humans, to gather widely disparate information. In
doing this, the ADF expects a certain amount of redundancy (without wasteful
duplication) to ensure persistent battlespace awareness. That said, the integration
of information from sensors will not provide complete understanding of the
battlespace, although greater analytic capacity to produce intelligence is
anticipated. In the end, commanders will still have to decide whether to fight
for more information or to work with the information and intelligence available.24
Advanced command support systems will bring together information about
the adversary, own and friendly forces, other parties, and the environment into
a Common Relevant Operating Picture (CROP). In addition, these systems will
allow different levels of the ADF, relevant government agencies, and coalition
partners to work together. Through these advanced command support systems,
the ADF would expect to enhance its capacity for mission rehearsal, wargaming
and development, and analysis of possible courses of action. Essential logistic
information between the warfighters and support bases should also be able to
be exchanged more effectively.25
In terms of its engagement systems, the ADF will aim for its decision-makers
to have timely access to the most useful engagement systems for the mission,
noting that different systems have different levels of mobility, firepower and
self-protection. The intent will be to shorten the time between detection,
identification, engagement and assessment. The network dimension of NCW
assists forces to:26
• collect relevant information;




• use the information and intelligence in a timely manner to achieve the
commander’s intent; and
• protect the network from external interference or technical failure.
The collect-connect-use-protect framework is the means through which the
ADF can organise its effort to develop the network. This framework, which
underpins the IS&S Concept, is discussed in more detail later.
The ADF will need to monitor carefully the way networks are progressing
in the commercial sector, where developments will have a strong influence on
what is available, noting that Defence will move increasingly to commercial
off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions for its hardware and software.
As networks and people come together and the notions of trust and
information sharing become integral to making decisions, the ADF will need to
be aware of interactions across the information, cognitive and physical domains:27
• In the information domain, connectivity allows people to share, access and
protect information.
• In the cognitive domain, connectivity allows people to develop a shared
understanding of the commander’s intent, and to identify opportunities in
the situation and vulnerabilities in the adversary.
• In the physical domain, selected elements of a force are equipped to achieve
secure and seamless connectivity and interoperability. This connectivity
will allow some sensor systems to pass target acquisition information directly
to engagement systems. Based on the shared understanding developed in
the other domains, forces are able to synchronise actions in the physical
domain.
These domains also apply to an adversary; hence, the NCW Concept also
seeks to influence an adversary by disrupting their ability to function effectively
within, and across, each of these domains.
Shared situational awareness
Shared situational awareness develops as people absorb information, collaborate
to understand its implications, and then acquire a shared view of the situation
at hand. Thus, shared situational awareness brings together both the network
and human dimensions of NCW.28
Collaboration is essential to shared situational awareness because it allows
widely dispersed forces to use their battlespace awareness for mutual advantage
in terms of analysis, decision-making, and application of force. The challenge
for the ADF will be to cope with a shift from sequential planning activities
through a hierarchy to an ongoing interaction between different levels, which
will save time and provide opportunities for simultaneous action. Again, both
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the network (technical means) and human dimensions (ability of people) are
important for collaboration.29
Collaboration requires a high degree of trust throughout the chain of
command. Hence, training and personnel development must provide
opportunities for different elements of the ADF to become familiar with one
another, the Defence organisation more broadly, and with other agencies.
Self-synchronisation
Another challenge of NCW will be for the ADF to evolve from its top-down way
of synchronising forces and actions. People will need to use their shared
situational awareness to recognise changes and opportunities themselves, and
to act without direction to meet the commander’s intent. Self-synchronisation
will thus lead to speedier decision-to-action cycles by capitalising on the shared
understanding and collective initiative of lower-level commanders and staffs.30
Balancing risks and opportunities
NCW will focus on warfighting through the concept of MCM. The network is
only an enabler to warfighting effectiveness; it supplements but cannot replace
the skill, intuition and willpower of the ADF’s people. The focus on training,
doctrine, leadership and organisation will balance the technical aspects that
often dominate discussion of NCW. The Concept identified five areas of potential
risk:31
• The failure to incorporate the human dimension into thinking about NCW.
• The potential for disruption—through an adversary exploiting
vulnerabilities, indirect attacks on networks, denial of communications, or
misleading information. Network integrity will need to be assured.
• Pursuit of a ‘transparent’ battlespace, which is almost certainly unachievable.
The ADF must not expect NCW to deliver an ‘unblinking eye’ across the
whole battlespace. Commanders must cope with, and thrive in, ambiguity.
• The potential exists to be overloaded with information, threatening friendly
forces with self-induced paralysis. Commanders may also become addicted
to information, causing hesitation while waiting for the key piece of evidence.
• Commanders could attempt to micro-manage operations.
The real opportunities presented by NCW offer priorities and benchmarks
for further development. These include people, operations, logistics,
decision-making, training, organisation, doctrine, and major systems as follows:




• NCW will help to make a small force like the ADF more efficient and effective
on operations. NCW should assist the ADF to operate in a more dispersed
manner, while permitting the concentration of combat power when required.
• NCW will allow technology to be used to automate logistic reporting, support
sophisticated self-diagnostic systems that improve equipment reliability,
and improve service delivery in areas such as medical support.
• NCW will help ADF commanders to make better decisions by improving their
ability to command operations, control forces and conduct planning.
• The improved ability to conduct training and education will help to increase
the confidence and skills of individuals, and enhance trust between
individuals, even when they work in dispersed organisations.
• The ADF will use NCW to improve the organisation’s ability to shape or react
to evolving situations, to collaborate better across organisational boundaries,
and to exploit collective knowledge.
• The ADF will need to respond to an NCW-induced fast rate of change by
adopting trial doctrine, which could leverage off lessons learned from
experimentation, training and operations.
• Adopting a network-centric approach is intended to reduce incompatibilities
between and within major systems, and allow each to be employed with
maximum effect. New systems will need to fit seamlessly within an
information infrastructure. Legacy systems that remain will need to be
adapted for NCW. This has implications for coalition operations and for
cooperation with other government agencies; hence clear standards will be
crucial.32
The NCW Concept clearly supports Force 2020 by teasing out these
implications of NCW on the Fundamental Inputs to Capability. Force 2020 argued:
Our strategic advantage will come from combining technology with
people, operational concepts, organisation, training and doctrine. We
must be careful to ensure that technology does not give an illusion of
progress—we cannot afford to maintain outdated ways of thinking,
organising and fighting.33
FJOC continues in this theme, adding the ability to reach, know and exploit (as
discussed earlier).
The NCW Roadmap
The 2020 networked force will be an exceptionally complex organisation with
a range of different relationships (machine and human) which will require careful
and thorough integration. Conducting rapid prototyping and development (RPD)
activities will allow Defence to mitigate the risks that are inherent in this
integration. It will support experimentation and provide the ability to simulate
future capabilities to aid in determining the optimum level of integration between
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engagement, sensor and C2 systems. RPD will reduce the risk of implementing
NCW and help accelerate change.34
The capacity to concurrently ‘learn by doing’35  is also important for
implementing NCW. Hence, the way ahead, or the NCW Roadmap, centres on
a ‘learn by doing’ strategy. A draft NCW Roadmap was also produced in
December 2003, to plan and coordinate the implementation of NCW, but was
not formally released until October 2005. This document set out the future
requirement for NCW, the current level of networked capability, and the steps
needed to realise a future networked force.36  Defence also released a short
document explaining NCW.37
The first step in ‘learn by doing’ involves constructing the foundation for
enhanced collaboration and shared situational awareness. This foundation will,
in the main, comprise the information infrastructure and the governance measures
needed to improve connectivity for selected force elements. As this underlying
infrastructure improves; so too will the collaborative ability of elements within
the ADF.
As stated earlier, the long-term aspiration is to link all ADF elements into a
‘single virtual network’, where information is assembled and passed through a
series of interlinked grids: sensor grids gather data; information grids fuse and
process it; and engagement grids (overlaid by an appropriate C2 grid) allow
warfighters to generate the desired battlespace effects.
NCW has the potential to facilitate the collaboration required for the ADF to
employ MDM more effectively. It will assist the force to generate the tempo,
agility and ultimately the warfighting advantage needed to prevail against a
wide variety of adversaries. However, the ADF will also need to enhance the
capacities of its people and its platforms for the future, ensuring they are
networked to better exploit the chaotic conditions of the battlespace. The fog,
friction and ambiguity will remain; the ADF must ensure that it is better able to
exploit this than an adversary.38
The 2005 NCW Roadmap provides the direction, and initial steps, to
implement the NCW Concept. It is Defence’s guide to discovering and exploiting
the opportunities of NCW; and identifies four key actions:39
• set the NCW-related targets for Defence to achieve;
• establish the Network to provide the underlying information infrastructure
upon which the networked force will be developed;
• explore the human dimensions of the networked force and initiate changes
in doctrine, education and training with appropriate support mechanisms;
and
• accelerate the process of change and innovation through the establishment
of a RPD capability in partnership with Industry.
16
Australia and Cyber-warfare
Subsequent to publication of the 2005 NCW Roadmap, Defence released a
publication entitled Explaining NCW. 40  Defence argues in this document that
‘NCW is a means of organising the force by using modern information technology
(IT) to link sensors, decision-makers and weapon systems to help people work
more effectively together to achieve the commander’s intent’.41  Furthermore,
NCW can ‘contribute significantly to producing a warfighting advantage’.42
The information network sits at the centre, linking the C2 systems, sensor
systems, and engagement systems.
Defence identified the key capability development projects that would deliver
the desired network capability and packaged them as a system, which also
provided a model for future systems planning and capability integration. This
included projects associated with communications in the maritime, land and air
environments; a wide area communications network; network management and
defence; satellite communications (SATCOM); tactical information exchange;
information exchange in a coalition environment; and other information
protection measures.43
Indeed, General Peter Cosgrove had already presaged some of these projects
when he said, in May 2003,44  that Defence would look at how it could harmonise
sophisticated technology with people in networked systems, noting that the
future maritime surveillance and response project and the Joint Command
Support System showed great promise here. He also referred to other
behind-the-scenes changes, such as the adoption of a standardised ‘J series’
message format (supporting tactical information exchange) as being critical pieces
of the NCW puzzle.
He also foreshadowed that Defence would place key links, such as Airborne
Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, into the network over the next
few years. And the recent move into space, through the Optus satellite, provides
another part of an increasingly pervasive network. These systems, said Cosgrove,
will magnify the pay-off from our network-centric approach.45
A governance system for the Defence Information Environment was
implemented in 2003, led by the newly-created Office of the Chief Information
Officer, to ensure that activity across the Department was aligned and enforced.
This governance framework encapsulated the interrelationships and
interdependencies in the development, management and operation of Defence’s
supporting information environment.46
Network protection was to be designed through the use of an Information
Security Architecture, which is an integral component of a Defence-wide
Information Architecture. The architecture would address the design of
information systems, access control, data management and accountability
frameworks.
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The human dimension
The examination of NCW’s human dimension was to focus on the following
areas:
• the nature of C2;
• transitioning to a new way of operating;
• nurturing innovation; and
• Defence culture.
As General Cosgrove had remarked in May 2003, ‘it is vital that we keep
people in our focus as we implement NCW. Anybody can buy technology.
Anybody can copy concepts. But nobody can duplicate the advantage we get
from our smart, dedicated and adaptable people’.47
The 2005 NCW Roadmap developed this human dimension further, with a
focus on doctrine, education, training and development. It argued the need to
raise NCW awareness, educate the senior leaders, prepare the future leaders,
understand the future workforce, produce the NCW tools and plan for doctrine
development, and develop a mechanism for evaluation and feedback of lessons
learnt.48
Accelerating change and innovation
In terms of accelerating change and innovation, Defence was to establish a RPD
program by July 2004 to fulfill three functions:
• identify and test new technologies, concepts, procedures and organisations
that could be implemented in the near term (6–18 months) to improve the
ADF’s networked warfighting capabilities;
• identify early problems with the implementation of NCW and use RPD as
an intervention activity to redress the problem or mitigate risk; and
• provide for the rapid delivery of capability to warfighters to meet or
anticipate emerging security challenges.
A Rapid Prototyping, Development and Evaluation (RPDE) capability was
set up in 2005, with the mission of enhancing ‘ADF warfighting capacity through
accelerated capability change in the NCW environment’.49  Importantly, RPDE
allows collaboration across a wide range of organisations, more rapid fielding
of capability improvements, and a focus on all fundamental inputs to
capability—personnel, organisation, collective training, major systems, supplies,
facilities, support, and command and management.50
Defence’s Information Superiority and Support Concept
In August 2004 Defence released its IS&S Concept, which articulated the key
components of the concept, described the architectural approach to be taken,
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identified the target states for the future and posed a key set of questions to be
addressed.51
The key components of the concept (focused on connecting, collecting, using
and protecting information) are outlined below:52
• Ubiquitous network or information distribution (Connect) enables effective
sharing of information by people, systems, applications and sensors, whether
it is by voice, data or video. It involves coordinating the infrastructure
including fixed and mobile communications, computers, processes, systems
and tools that enable the sharing of information throughout the force to
achieve information and decision superiority. When the network is
threatened, it must allow for a graceful degradation of service availability
and access to information that ensures continuity of operations. Once the
threat has been resolved, access to information and original service
availability levels must be rapidly reconstituted.
• Persistent awareness (Collect) enhances situational awareness that allows
better perception of battlespace elements in terms of time and space, the
comprehension of their meaning and projected intent. Persistent awareness
tools and systems help collect, collate and fuse disparate data and information,
which requires greater attention to content management. Persistence does
not mean continuous; it means sufficient awareness to enable the ADF to act
in a way that is operationally responsive and appropriate.
• Smart use or decision support (Use) focuses on achievable intent. It involves
planning and the provision of information and common processes and
collaboration tools to facilitate timely and effective decision-making
throughout the various levels of command.
• Pervasive Security (Protect) provides a secure information environment that
offers a trusted and reliable flow of information to continuously support
operations and business activities.53
Networking issues
The IS&S Concept emerged from the observation that networking improves
efficiency and effectiveness of operations. It depends on computers and
communications to link people through information flows, which in turn depends
on interoperability across all systems. Networking involves collaboration and
sharing of information to ensure that all appropriate assets can be quickly brought
to bear by commanders during combat operations.54  In a 2004 report by the US
Congress, a number of key networking issues were identified, the most relevant
of which, for the purposes of this discussion, was network architectures.55
Because NCW is so highly dependent on the interoperability of
communications equipment, data, and software to enable the networking of
people, sensors, and platforms (both manned and unmanned), network
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architectures are very important. Architectures are needed to bring together all
the elements of NCW technology that rely on line-of-sight radio transmission
for microwave or infra-red signals, or laser beams; as well as other technologies
that aggregate information for transmission through larger network trunks for
global distribution via fibre-optic cables, microwave towers, or both low-altitude
and high-altitude satellites.56
The ADF architecture must enable rapid communications between individuals
in all three Services, as well as rapid sharing of data and information between
mobile platforms and sensors used across the ADF. As the ADF comes to depend
on networking, the network itself must be able to re-form when any
communications node is interrupted (the United States refers to this as
dynamically self-healing).
The ADF’s capability planning for NCW
The ADF’s concept is less about warfighting and more about how net-centric
capability will enable future warfighting.57  Defence has been moving steadily
along the net-centric path for several years now in terms of developing the
capability to provide the ability for data to be exchanged across linked networks.
Some ships and aircraft as well as fixed and deployable communications systems
have already achieved a degree of data connectivity.58
The ADF can deliver secure C2 to small-scale deployments around the world.
It can use its ‘Secret’ and ‘Restricted’ fixed networks, as well as data-links (Link
11) and radios (Parakeet) to provide certain levels of connectivity.
It can draw information from multiple sources such as the over-the-horizon
Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) and radars on Royal Australian
Navy (RAN) ships to generate a basic level of situational awareness. Major combat
units are linked by voice communications, with some aircraft and ships
data-linked. Secure SATCOM are available to select elements of the ADF, such
as Special Forces, and secure satellite data-link provides connectivity between
ground-based air defence systems and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF)’s
Regional Operations Centre.59  Defence has argued that it is developing its
networked force by:60
• creating new doctrine, better training and a more agile organisation, all of
which leads to people operating more effectively as a network;
• guiding force development through the release of the 2005 NCW Roadmap
and Integration Plan (the latter is not available publicly);
• connecting broad areas of Defence so that information can be shared and
used more cooperatively; and
• fast-tracking the introduction of new technology through its RPDE program.
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The Chief of Capability Development Group is responsible for implementing
NCW across Defence, which reinforces the earlier point that the ADF’s
network-centric focus is on developing capability to enhance future warfighting
effectiveness.
The major network projects that have been identified for implementation
thus far include:61
• A joint command support environment, which will link the air, maritime,
land and special operations elements into the one single ADF command
system.
• A similar project, which will integrate intelligence systems.
• Military SATCOM that will provide the ADF with coverage throughout the
region.
• Tactical information exchange that will facilitate movement of information
from sensors to weapon systems, starting with ANZAC frigates and Hornet
fighters.
• Battlespace communications for air, land and maritime forces, which will
provide the information backbone and tactical data distribution for deployed
forces.
• A Defence wide-area communications network, which will provide the
next-generation fixed infrastructure for secure computers and telephones.
Linkages will be established between the fixed and deployable
communications networks.
• A Defence network operations centre, which will enhance current computer
network defence capabilities.
• Combined information exchanges with the United States, United Kingdom,
Canada and New Zealand, which will provide a permanent system for
exchanging information and enabling collaboration.
• A number of major systems that will connect to the ‘network’, such as the
New Air Combat Capability, high-altitude long-endurance UAVs, the Air
Warfare Destroyer (AWD), and a suite of other projects that will ‘harden’
and ‘network’ the Australian Army.
By 2020, a networked ADF should be able to generate a range of lethal and
non-lethal effects that are timely, appropriate and synchronised. It will have
continuous information connectivity to link fighting units, sensors and
decision-makers that sees an ADF with increased situational awareness and the
capacity to act decisively. The Defence C2 system will promote collaboration.
Defence will be capable of rapidly deploying and protecting an optimised force.
A pervasive network of active and passive sensors will improve awareness for
force protection purposes. Key logistics networks will be linked and offer
connectivity and collaboration.62
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Defence has adopted a systems approach to improve the integration of many
complex projects. Capability Development Group is focusing on three key areas
of development in its Capability Plan. These are:
• the enabling infrastructure to deliver the robust communications network;
• the enabling information systems to support mission command, ISR, imagery
and military geospatial information sharing; and
• the combat platforms and hardware to deliver combat effects enabled by the
information systems and infrastructure.63
There has been some significant slippage in the milestones needed to evolve
NCW capability that were articulated in the 2005 NCW Roadmap. The key
milestones in that Roadmap were as follows:64
• 2008: Broadband Networked Maritime Task Group—initial capability.
• 2008: Networked Aerospace Surveillance and Battlespace Management
(ASBM) capability.
• 2009: Interim Networked Land Combat Force.
• 2010: Networked Fleet—mature capability.
• 2010: Integrated Coalition Network capability.
• 2012: First Networked Brigade.
• 2013: Networked Air Warfare Force.
• 2014: Second networked Brigade.
• 2015: Robust Battlespace Network.
• 2015: Networked Joint Task Force.
The milestones in the 2007 NCW Roadmap are as follows:65
• 2008: Networked Special Operations Unit.
• 2008: Networked Air Combat Force.
• 2009: Networked Battle Group.
• 2009: Networked Rapid Mobility Force.
• 2011: Networked Maritime Task Group.
• 2011: Networked Combat Support Force.
• 2011: Networked Tactical ISR.
• 2012: First Networked Brigade.
• 2012: Networked Special Operations Task Group.
• 2012: Networked Deployable Joint Task Force Headquarters.
• 2014: Networked Fleet.
• 2014: Second Networked Brigade.
• 2014: Networked Aerospace Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare (C4ISREW)
Force.
• 2014: Networked Operational ISR.
• 2014: Networked Deployable Joint Task Force.
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• 2014: Networked Coalition Combat Force.
• 2016: Networked Joint Force.
Notwithstanding the slippages, there has been some acceleration, and the
2007 NCW Roadmap certainly provides both a clearer and a more comprehensive
view. For a start, the new Roadmap breaks these milestones into six domains as
depicted in the following table:66



































































(Source: Director General Capability and Plans, NCW Roadmap 2007, Defence Publishing Service, Canberra,
March 2007, p. 22.)
A second improvement in the 2007 NCW Roadmap is that it breaks down
each of the six domains into the grids—C2 capability, network capability, sensor
capability, and engagement capability. Furthermore, in the two years between
the roadmaps, Defence had come to understand the need for greater cooperation
and coordination across projects to deliver a new networked ADF for 2016. These
milestones are discussed in more detail below under each domain.
Maritime
• Networked Maritime Task Group—2011: This capability will be principally
delivered through three projects: JP 2008 Phase 3F (Military SATCOM
Capability); SEA 1442 (Maritime Tactical Wide Area Network); and AIR 5276
(the AP-3C Orion upgrade). The outcomes of these projects—Maritime
Advanced SATCOM Terrestrial Infrastructure System (MASTIS) terminals,
wide area Local Area Networks (LANs), and new high-speed data-links for
the AP-3C Orion—will provide broadband connectivity for major fleet
units.67
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• Networked Fleet—2014: SEA 1442 (Maritime Communications and Information
Management Architecture Modernisation) equipment acquisition will enable
Internet Protocol (IP) networking at sea between major fleet units via the
expansion of the Maritime Tactical Wide Area Network (MTWAN). Phase
4 of SEA 1442 will deliver upgraded communications capabilities through
replacement radios, antennas and other systems and will form the basis of
the networked fleet. SEA 4000 (AWD) and JP 2048 (Helicopter Landing Dock)
will significantly improve the warfighting capability of this force.68
Land
• Networked Special Operations Unit—2008: JP 2097 Phase 1A (Project Redfin)
will deliver a Special Operations Vehicle and Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
(C4ISR) package to provide a network-enabled capability for Special Air
Services Regiment (SASR) land operations.69
• Networked Battle Group—2009: This force will consist of a number of all
arms sub-units based on a mechanised infantry battle group headquarters
or a cavalry battle group headquarters. The force will be equipped with
digital communications and battle management systems.70
• First Networked Brigade—2012: The Networked Battle Group 2009 capabilities
will be extended to complete the rollout to other Brigade elements. This
milestone will see the evolution of the 1st Brigade into a fully networked
capability. The major activities during this period will include the
introduction of a Battle Management System–Dismounted (BMS–D) (Land
125), introduction of the M1A1 (Land 907), new communications bearers (JP
2072 Phase 2 and 3), Battle Management System–Mounted (BMS–M) (Land
75 Phase 4) and improved logistics support (JP 2077).71
• Networked Special Operations Task Group—2012: Project Redfin (JP 2097
Phase 1B) and the delivery of JP 2030 (Special Forces Command Support
Capability) will provide communications, sensors, C2 and engagement systems
for a complete Special Operations Task Group. This will consist of Special
Operations Command (SOCOMD) units and external units in direct support.
Gateway interfaces will enable the exchange of information with other ADF
and coalition networks.72
• Second Networked Brigade—2014: The Networked Brigade 2012 capabilities
will be extended to a second Brigade (3rd Brigade). This milestone will result
from the capability delivery of two major projects, LAND 75 (Battlefield
Command Support System) and LAND 125 (Solider Combat System).73
Aerospace
• Networked Air Combat Force—2008: The provision of Tactical Data Links to
the ANZAC frigate and F/A-18 Hornet (through JP 2089 Phase 2) combined
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with the force multiplier capabilities of the AIR 5077 (AEW&C aircraft) are
key enablers in networking the Aerospace Domain.74
• Networked Rapid Mobility Force—2009: The delivery AIR 8000 Phase 3 (four
Boeing C-17 Globemaster III) combined with AIR 5402 (Multi-Role Tanker
Transporters—Airbus A330-200) will provide significantly increased capacity
and range for operations. The new Mobile Regional Operations Centre (AIR
5405) will provide an enhanced deployable C2 capability that can be
combined with the transportable Tactical Air Defence Radar System (AIR
5375) to improve the networking and protection of the rapid mobility assets.75
• Networked Combat Support Force—2011: The delivery of further applications
for the JP 2030 Phase 8 (Joint Command Support System) coupled with
advances to the Standard Defence Supply System (SDSS) provided by JP
2077 (Improved Logistics Information Systems) will enhance the ability to
provide timely levels of resources to deployed forces.76
• Networked Aerospace C4ISREW Force—2014: Projects JP 5077 (AEW&C),
AIR 7000 Phase 1B (Multi-mission Unmanned Aerial System), and the
upgraded AP-3C Orion (AIR 5276) will provide highly capable long-range
ISR sensors. The delivery of the JP 2065 Phase 2 (Integrated Broadcast System)
will disseminate ADF and allied ISR and Blue Force Tracking information to
deployed forces via Tactical Data Links (JP 2089) and SATCOM (JP 2008).
The delivery of SEA 4000 (AWD) will bring with it for the first time Theatre
Ballistic Defence capabilities as well as an improved ability to control airspace
well beyond Australian landmass where required.77
ISR
• Networked Tactical ISR—2011: Project DEF 7013 Phase 4 (Joint Intelligence
Support System) provides intelligence to commanders from networked
databases and applications. The Battlespace Communications System (Land)
(JP 2072) and Maritime Communications and Information Management
Architecture Modernisation (SEA 1442 Phase 4) projects provide the means
for tactical information dissemination. Project AIR 7000 Phase 1B (Multi-role
UAV) and JP 129 (Tactical UAV) will provide new tactical and strategic
sensors.78
• Networked Operational ISR—2014: By 2014, common geospatial information
data and products will be accessible to users across the network (JP 2064
Phase 3). Advanced operational ISR capabilities will provide enhanced views
of the battlespace through the space-based surveillance capability delivered
by JP 2044 Phase 3 and the JORN upgrade (JP 2025 Phase 5). The ability to
conduct tactical electronic warfare (EW) will be improved through Force
Level Electronic Warfare DEF 224 (Bunyip). The networking of the ISR
capabilities, together with the means to fuse the information, will be delivered
by JP 2096. The Multi-mission Maritime Patrol Aircraft and the Multi-mission
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Unmanned Aerial System (AIR 7000 Phase 1B and Phase 2B) will complete
the acquisition of advanced networked collection systems from the tactical
to the strategic levels. The networking of Defence into national and coalition
intelligence and ISR networks will be accomplished by the remaining
deliverables of JP 2096.79
Joint force
• Networked Deployable Joint Task Force Headquarters—2012: For Joint
Operations Command, Projects JP 8001, JP 2008 and JP 2030 Phase 8 will
enhance situational awareness and connectivity. Other enhancements include
JP 2089 (Tactical Data Links) and JP 2065 (Integrated Broadcast System).
The delivery of the Mobile Regional Operations Centre (JP 5405) will enhance
the C2 capability of deployable headquarters.80
• Networked Deployable Joint Task Force—2014: Improved spaced-based
surveillance (JP 2044 Phases 3A and 3B), various communications bearers
(JP 2008, SEA 1442, JP 2072), and surveillance projects (JP 2025, AIR 5432,
AIR 7000 Phase 1B) will contribute to enhanced joint task force operations.
The delivery of the Amphibious Ships (JP 2048 Phase 4A/4B) will further
enhance the C2 capability of deployable headquarters.81
• Networked Joint Force—2016: By 2016 the ADF will have achieved the
infrastructure, tools and C2 systems (JP 2030, AIR 5333, and JP 2072) capable
of providing a robust battlespace network across the whole ADF.
Communications beyond line-of-sight will be improved through JP 2008
Phase 4. The achievement of this milestone will allow the ADF to conduct
NCW operations, thereby greatly improving warfighting flexibility and
combat effectiveness.82
Coalition
• Networked Coalition Combat Force—2014: This milestone coincides with the
achievement of one key milestone from each of the other five Domains:83
• Networked Fleet 2014;
• Second Networked Brigade 2014;
• Networked Aerospace C4ISREW Force 2014;
• Networked Operational Intelligence 2014, and
• Networked Joint Task Force 2014.
The Networked Coalition Domain focuses on how Defence integrates with
Australia’s allies and other government agencies. The integrated Coalition
Network Capability will allow for the seamless integration of ADF C2, ASBM
and communications into established coalition network architectures. A mature
Networked Coalition Domain will also provide significant whole-of-government
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benefits through integrating Defence with a range of other government
agencies.84
Conclusion
Defence is responding to the challenges of networking the future force in several
ways, one of which is through an integrated Defence Information Environment.
This is an environment where the Defence Information Infrastructure (DII) will
need to be increasingly developed and managed as an integrated entity. Data,
user applications, common information services, user devices, systems hardware,
networks and data-links, and communications bearers will be integrated to form
a foundation or backbone information capability.
A second and equally important way is through Capability Development
Group’s integrated capability development approach, which includes an NCW
Program Office. Here, all capability projects are looked at through the lens of
the particular domain (maritime, land, aerospace, ISR, joint force, and coalition);
and then through the lens of the type of capability (C2, network, sensor, or
engagement).
The degree of integration will be based on developing a robust
communications network, supported by consistent joint doctrine and
comprehensive training that should address and remove operational, intelligence
and single Service stove-pipes. The approach is, of necessity, an incremental
one that needs to be synchronised over time and defined through comprehensive
architectures and technical standards, all underpinned by a focus on high levels
of interoperability—particularly with Australia’s close partners (especially the
United States).
To achieve this, Defence will need to renew its efforts to better coordinate
all aspects of NCW—the capability projects, the DII, the human element, the
organisational element, the role of industry through RPDE, and research and
development (R&D)—as well as further develop its NCW compliance process.
Delivery of the following would mean that a networked deployable joint task
force should be possible by 2014, provided there is no substantial program
slippage:
• key capability projects for maritime communications;
• military SATCOM;
• satellite surveillance;
• Mobile Regional Operations Centres;
• the ADF Air Defence System (known as Vigilare);
• the Joint Battlespace Communications System;
• the Battlefield Command Support System;
• Maritime Communications;
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• the Tactical Information Exchange Domain (data-links);
• the Joint Command Support System;
• Integrated Broadcast System;
• Joint Intelligence Support System; and
• Project Redfin;
as well as the major capability projects such as:
• the Navantia-designed F100 AWD;
• the UAVs;
• the F/A-18 Hornet upgrade, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet;
• the Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) Project;
• the A330 multi-role tanker transport (MRTT) aerial refueling tankers;
• the Wedgetail AEW&C aircraft;
• the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF);
• the M1A1 Abrams tank;
• the soldier combat system program;
• the large Canberra class amphibious ships; and
• a network maintenance and upgrade program.
The ADF has learned a lot from recent operational experiences and
experimentation, and is applying that to good effect.
In the networked ADF of the future, based on the capabilities outlined above,
transparency of information and self-synchronisation must become key
characteristics. This means that the various cultures and sub-cultures in Defence
will have to converge, language will have to standardise, and collaboration will
have to be the norm.85
NCW is as much an organisational and workforce phenomenon as it is a
technological one. The ADF needs to prepare both its people and its organisation
for the transition to this new technological base.
The omens are strong for achievement of a networked ADF in 2016, and
realisation of the NCW vision. However much remains to be done, and serious
intellectual effort needs to be devoted to realise an effectively networked ADF
of the future. The capability milestones must be adhered to, the Network and
its underlying infrastructure must be established, the human dimension must
be developed (together with new doctrine, training and education programs),
new organisational structures and processes must evolve, and the process of
change and innovation must be accelerated through increased use of industry,
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Information is used to create value and achieve a desired end-state or effect.
Preventing this value from being realised, on the one hand, and protecting those
systems that allow that value to be realised, on the other, are caught up in the
notion of Information Warfare (IW). This chapter addresses these two
aspects—the value of information and IW. It discusses the methods an adversary
might use to attack Australia’s networks and other capabilities and what we
should do to prevent that. Cyber-crime is the other side of the same coin—posing
a threat to our networks. We need to determine just what constitutes our Critical
Information Infrastructure (CII) in Australia and ensure we have adequate
protection measures in place. These aspects are also canvassed.
The value of information
The objective for using information in business is to create capital value; across
government, it is to deliver value to the public; and the objective in the military
is to achieve a desired end-state or effect. Thus, information is used to create
value and achieve a desired end-state or effect.
In a business sense, the value of Information Technology (IT) can be exploited
by gaining leverage through process innovation, by applying data and
information in one process to other processes, and by sharing networks or selling
excess capacity.1 This also applies to the fixed information infrastructure that
supports the Australian Defence Organisation (ADO). Ed Waltz extends this
thinking to the military operations dimension by arguing that leverage can be
gained through the use of data-links to deliver real-time targeting information
to weapons; intelligence could be applied to support the competitiveness of the
economy; and coalition networks with appropriate security mechanisms can
burden share.2
The real utility of information can be seen as a function of its accessibility
and flexibility, as well as its reliability, together with the way in which it
contributes to achieving a desired end-state or effect.
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In traditional military thinking, information has tended to be viewed as
battlefield intelligence and tactical attacks on enemy radar and telephone
networks. That thinking should now be broadened to view information as a
powerful lever that can alter an adversary’s high-level decisions. Indeed, it
becomes a strategic asset, in which opposing sides will try to shape the other’s
actions by manipulating the flow of intelligence and information.3
It was out of this thinking that Command and Control Warfare emerged in
the early 1990s. David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla of RAND Corporation in Santa
Monica took this further into the realms of cyber-war—turning the balance of
information and knowledge in one’s favour.4
In a strategic sense, the value of information boils down to the ability to
‘acquire, process, distribute and protect information, while selectively denying
or distributing it to adversaries and/or allies’.5  In other words, the real value
comes from providing the right information to the right people at the right time
in the right place and in the right form.
While information or knowledge superiority might win wars, it is also highly
fragile—as Alvin and Heidi Toffler say, ‘a small bit of the right information can
provide an immense strategic or tactical advantage. The denial of a small bit of
information can have catastrophic effects’.6 This leads to the notion of
information superiority, which is the capability to collect, process, and disseminate
an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s
ability to do the same.7
Should an information attack be launched against the Australian Defence
Force (ADF), it should be able to take defensive or offensive measures. A
defensive response would generate alerts, increase the level of access restrictions,
terminate vulnerable processes, or initiate other activities to mitigate potential
damage on the ADF. An offensive response would support targeting and specific
attack options that the ADF might wish to carry out.8
With many weapons increasingly coming to rely on information—such as
smart munitions that use Global Positioning System (GPS) guidance—the ADF
can expect information to become more directly relevant in warfare of the future.
Similarly, a digitised force should be able to operate at a higher tempo than a
non-digitised one through its improved ability to coordinate actions.9
Open source information
Outside the traditional military realm, the explosive growth of personal computers
(PCs) and their linking via the Internet offers vast quantities of public information
that is freely available. While the intelligence community is probably the most
affected, all branches of government are impacted. Indeed, the ongoing extremist
threat, other non-State threats, and the increasing need for whole-of-government
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consideration of security issues should be sharpening the government’s focus
on the potential and indeed the strategic and tactical importance of open source
information on the Internet.
Joseph Nye, a former head of the US National Intelligence Council in the
1990s stated:
Open source intelligence is the outer pieces of the jigsaw puzzle, without
which one can neither begin nor complete the puzzle … open source
intelligence is the critical foundation for the all-source intelligence
product, but it cannot ever replace the totality of the all-source effort.10
Within this context, the Australian Government needs to consider the value
of open source information; the importance of the ever-increasing amount of
information on the Internet; the utility of new analytic tools that can collect,
sift, analyse, and disseminate this publicly available information; and, training
issues relating to open source technology and techniques.11
Open source information may be defined as that information which is publicly
available and that anyone can lawfully obtain by request, purchase, or
observation. However, the acquisition of such information must conform to any
existing legal copyright requirements. Open source information can include:
• media such as newspapers, magazines, radio, television, and computer-based
information;
• public data such as government reports, and official data such as budgets
and demographics, hearings, legislative debates, press conferences, and
speeches;
• information derived from professional and academic sources such as
conferences, symposia, professional associations, academic papers,
dissertations and theses, and experts;12
• commercial data such as commercial imagery; and
• grey literature such as trip reports, working papers, discussion papers,
unofficial government documents, proceedings, preprints, research reports,
studies, and market surveys.13
It can also include company proprietary, financially sensitive, legally
protected, or personally damaging information that is unclassified.14
Increasingly, it also encompasses information derived from Internet blogs.
In 2004, the US Congress called for an open source centre that could collect,
analyse, produce, and disseminate open-source intelligence. Congress argued
that open source intelligence was a valuable source of information that had to
be integrated into the intelligence cycle to ensure that US policy-makers were
fully informed. Accordingly, the National Open Source Center (NOSC) was
established on 1 November 2005, and placed under the management of the
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Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The NOSC’s functions included ‘collection,
analysis and research, training, and IT management to facilitate government-wide
access and use’. The intent now is to provide a centre of expertise for exploiting
open-source information across whole-of-government. Indeed, the NOSC can be
tasked by other agencies for specific research.15
For Australia, it will be important to ensure that open-source experts are
available across all government agencies so as to also avoid unnecessary
duplicative efforts. Thus, some form of Centre with the requisite expertise and
capability to train open source experts in government agencies is needed now.
Such a Centre could improve information sharing across agencies by using
state-of-the-art IT, seeking to maximise connectivity throughout the Australian
Government and eliminate incompatible formats and any duplicative effort.
Individual agencies should still be able to maintain independent open-source
databases, but they would have to be maintained in formats accessible to other
agencies.
Commercial satellites offer a good supplement to imagery from government
satellites. Indeed, today, anyone with access to the Internet can obtain
high-quality overhead imagery. It would be important for an Australian Centre,
therefore, to have links to the Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation
(DIGO).
In short, there would seem to be real merit in establishing an Australian Open
Source Agency outside the Intelligence Community, with the intent to provide
open-source information to all elements of the Australian Government, including
parliamentary committees. Increasingly, open-source information will become
essential for all functions of government and will demand more concerted efforts
to acquire and analyse the vast quantities of available information. This could
be one of the functions of a Cyber-warfare Centre as described in the final chapter
by Des Ball.
Information Warfare
In the end, information is an important enabler, which may at times be of great
strategic value, but in essence this is usually because of other actions, effects,
and end-states to which it contributes.
Some of the pro-information literature tends to argue that information
dominance avoids the need to use force and that it leads to an ability to disrupt
the adversary rather than destroy his forces. While there may be an element of
truth in that, the use of force is not incompatible with achieving a superior
information position, and disruption and destruction are not mutually
exclusive.16
War will continue to be a dangerous and violent clash, while improved
information will tend to facilitate a more economical use of force.17  Information
36
Australia and Cyber-warfare
is not an end in itself.18  Rather, it is a means to an end, and increasingly nations
will view that end as the achievement of an effect, whether it be diplomatic,
military, economic, informational, societal, technological, or a combination of
these instruments of national power.
Ed Waltz offers a basic model of warfare in terms of options for attack. He
argues that one can launch a physical attack, engage in deception, carry out a
psychological attack, or engage in an information attack.19  In each of these,
information has a key role. The aim of these options is to destroy, to deceive or
surprise, to disorient, and to severely dislocate (by affecting confidence in
information through destruction, deception or disorientation).
The logical extension of all of this for the country that can master the
information domain is to close the loop on Sun Tzu’s observation that the acme
of skill is to ‘subdue the enemy without fighting’.20 The US thought leader Dick
Szafranski updated Sun Tzu’s observation by arguing that the knowledge systems
of an adversary should be the primary strategic target.21 This is not meant to
imply that information is the only option for attack, but rather that its importance
as a partner to the more traditional physical forms of attack has increased.
In a warfighting sense, sensor technologies have extended the engagement
envelope; computers and communications technologies have led to an increase
in the tempo of operations; and the integration of sensors into weapons has made
them more precise and lethal. The real transformation, therefore, has not been
in sensor, weapons or IT per se, but in shifting the focus from the physical
dimension to the information dimension.
Waltz calls this the transition toward the dominant use of information and
the targeting of information itself. He makes a neat distinction between IW,
which emphasises the use of information as a weapon or target, and
Information-based Warfare, which he describes as the use and exploitation of
information for advantage—often in support of physical weapons and targets.22
Martin Libicki contends that there are seven different types of IW that can
be categorised by the nature of the operations they contain. These are:23
• Command and Control Warfare, which is aimed at separating command from
the forces by attacking command and control (C2) systems.
• Intelligence-based Warfare, which aims to support other forms of attack by
collecting, exploiting and protecting information.
• Electronic Warfare, which attacks communications by concentrating on
transfer (radio-electronics) and formats (cryptographic).
• Psychological Warfare, which attacks the human mind.
• Hacker Warfare, which ranges over the Global Information Infrastructure
(GII).
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• Economic Information Warfare, which aims to control an economy by
controlling certain information.
• Cyber Warfare, which brings together abstract forms of terrorism, simulation
and reality control.
Waltz differentiates Command and Control Warfare as attacks against the
Defence Information Infrastructure (DII) and Information Warfare as attacks
against the National Information Infrastructure (NII).24
The key aspects that emerge from Waltz’s analysis of this work are that three
security-related attributes are needed from an information
infrastructure—availability, integrity and confidentiality.25  Availability
encompasses information services (processes) as well as information itself
(context). An adversary’s objective in IW would be to disrupt (availability),
corrupt (integrity) or exploit (confidentiality or privacy).
The ADF is developing new ways of accomplishing its missions by leveraging
the power of information and applying network-centric concepts, made possible
by rapidly advancing IT. Indeed, military leaders have always recognised the
key contribution that information makes to victory in warfare. To that end, they
have always sought to gain a decisive information advantage over their
adversaries.
As David Alberts argues, in the Information Age militaries now need to
understand
the complex relationships among information quality, knowledge,
awareness, the degree to which information is shared, shared awareness,
the nature of collaboration, and its effect on synchronisation, and turning
this understanding into deployed military capability.26
Technological advances in recent years have vastly increased the military’s
capability to collect, record, store, process, disseminate, and utilise information.
However, the advances in the ability to process information simply have not
kept pace with the ability to collect that information.
Technology is also bridging distances and providing the capability for
individuals to be able to interact with each other in increasingly sophisticated
ways, making it easier for individuals and organisations to share information,
to collaborate on tasks, and to synchronise actions.
Thus, our increasing reliance on satellite technology and IT to mount joint
and combined operations presents any adversary with an opportunity for an
asymmetric advantage if our networks can be corrupted, damaged, or destroyed.
Furthermore, our national reliance on IT networks and the increasing
interconnectedness of all forms of national power mean that a strategic campaign
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could be waged against both our military forces deployed in distant theatres
and our domestic IT infrastructure.
How would an adversary attack us?
As a Center for Security Policy paper observed recently: ‘The increasing
digitization of military operations, economic and financial infrastructure, as well
as all modern communication networks carries with it a great risk’.27 The
combination of global connectivity, mobility of employees, and rapid
technological change exposes Australia’s civilian information infrastructure to
certain risks such as fraud, theft, industrial espionage and disruption to business
continuity. Thus, the civilian IT systems of our nation and the ADF’s Command,
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems are at great risk if they are not adequately
defended.
What would a state-based adversary seek to do though? Such an adversary
would seek to disrupt our decision-making process by interfering with our
ability to obtain, process, transmit, and use information.28  Furthermore,
depending on the circumstances, that adversary may wish to impede our
decision-making with the aim of delaying or even deterring conflict so that it is
no longer on our terms. Once the use of military force becomes likely, the
adversary would use IW to shape the battlespace in such a way that their
likelihood of victory would be improved.
The adversary would support the training and operations of their military
with civilian computer expertise and equipment, sourced from training and
education establishments and IT industries in their country. The intention would
be to integrate these civilians into regular military operations. Then these
integrated IW capabilities would be directed primarily at the ADF.
One avenue of attack could be through computer viruses designed to attack
our computer systems and networks. A virus such as Myfip could be used as it
can be disguised and, once activated on poorly protected network systems, can
compromise the entire network information system and steal any of the following
file types:29
• .pdf—Adobe Portable Document Format
• .doc—Microsoft Word Document
• .dwg—AutoCAD drawing
• .sch—CirCAD schematic
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The network could lose its documents, plans, communications and databases,
or it might simply have all of its proprietary information stolen and remain
totally unaware.
The adversary would test our cyber-defences with low-level assaults and
incursions, essentially conducting ‘cyber-reconnaissance’ by probing the
computer networks of Australian Government agencies and private companies,
seeking to identify weak points in the networks, understand how Australian
leaders think, discover the communications patterns of Australian Government
and private companies, and obtain valuable information stored throughout the
networks.30
An attack could be launched against ADF or other Government Department
email systems through a Distributed Denial of Service (DDS), where systems
would be overwhelmed by ‘botnets’ that make a request for service from a single
information resource. These botnets (that could number more than 100 000)31
would be extensive networks of computers used by the adversary to overload
the response capability of our information systems.
The adversary will have been planning for several years to conduct a limited
war by attacking our C4ISR systems, as well as our national economic system,
possibly using a terrorist organisation to detonate an electro-magnetic pulse
weapon above Australia, at the appropriate time. The adversary would also have
developed its IW doctrine along the following lines:
Information Warfare involves combat operations in a high-tech battlefield
environment in which both sides use information-technology means,
equipment, or systems in a rivalry over the power to obtain, control and
use information. Information Warfare is combat aimed at seizing the
battlefield initiative; with digitized units as its essential combat force;
the seizure, control, and use of information as its main substance; and
all sorts of information weaponry [smart weapons] and systems as its
major means.32
The adversary would carry out its attacks with non-attributable asymmetric
techniques that focus upon information suppression, destruction and alteration,
which would be consistent with its doctrine of exploiting the inherent
vulnerabilities of information systems. Furthermore, its doctrine would anticipate
using highly-trained civilian computer experts as its ‘soldiers’ in an information
war rather than committing large numbers of troops to overrun the ADF. In this,
it would seek to deter and even blackmail Australia through the dominance it
achieves in possessing information.
As part of the adversary’s attempt to corrupt our networks, they would also
employ special equipment (both airborne and covertly-emplaced local systems)
to intercept the pro forma data codes used in our computer-to-computer data
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exchanges. The pro forma include the dial tones of protocols and link-ups that
determine the signaling method (such as data transfer multiplexers and private
branch exchanges) and the paths and speeds of data transmission.
Buoyed with success against our IT networks, the adversary would also attack
our air defences by jamming our radar stations, deceiving the processing, and
reconfiguring the displays so that certain azimuths and aircraft types cannot be
‘seen’. Adversary aircraft, both manned and unmanned, effectively would have
unrestricted access over Australian airspace.
To prevent our air response capability being mobilised, the adversary would
inject wireless application protocols (WAPs) and firewall-penetrating software
into the avionics of our aircraft as they become airborne, allowing them to be
effectively ‘hijacked’ by that adversary’s cyber-specialists with foreknowledge
of the details of the hardware and software used in our avionics systems.
High-power lasers and radio frequency (RF) weapons would be used to burn
out the avionics in any of our aircraft that were not susceptible to ‘hijacking’.33
Similarly, our maritime response capability would be immobilised by
electronic warfare (EW) attacks against the radar systems on our ships and the
confounding of ships’ communications systems. The radars and other electronic
systems aboard every vessel in the fleet would have been carefully studied
beforehand—the antenna designs and the signal frequencies, strengths and pulse
characteristics—and electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment and application
tactics calibrated to effectively jam or deceive each system. Satellite
communications (SATCOM) links with the Australian fleet would be in the
adversary’s hands, following the ‘hijacking’ of all of the transponders on our
communications satellites.34
Critical elements of our command, control and communications system would
be destroyed or incapacitated by RF weapons, carried by Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs) and cruise missiles on one-shot, one-way missions. Ultra-wide
band (UWB) weapons, which generate RF radiation over a wide frequency
spectrum (nominally from about 100 MHz to more than 1 GHz), but with little
directivity, would be used to incapacitate electronic components across broad
categories of telecommunications and computerised infrastructure. High-power
microwave (HPM) weapons, which generate an RF beam at a very narrow
frequency band (in the 100 MHz to 100 GHz range) would be used against our
hardened C2 centres, using both ‘front door’ and ‘back door’ entry points. In
the former case, the RF weapons designers would have used foreknowledge of
the antenna systems at the command centres to produce an in-band waveform,
with the right frequency and the right modulation to couple with the antennas,
allowing the intense energy to burn out components connected to the antennas.35
Residual command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) systems,
such as delegated command authorities, fibre-optic cables, rejuvenated sensor
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systems and makeshift broadcast stations would be dealt with by Special
Forces—landed by submarines, and guided by UAVs.36
China’s cyber-attack capability
As one example of the cyber-attack capability of nation-states, a brief discussion
on China is offered here. On 9 December 2007, the New York Times reported
that in a series of sophisticated attempts against the US nuclear weapons
laboratory at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, Chinese hackers had removed data.37  In
March 2007, US Strategic Command Chief General James E. Cartwright told
Congress that the United States was under widespread attack in cyber-space.38
During 2007 and 2008, 12 986 direct assaults on federal agencies and more than
80 000 attempted attacks on Department of Defense computer network systems
were reported. Some of these attacks reduced the US military’s operational
capabilities.39
An American cyber-security company that focuses on centralised activity
emanating from China reported that attacks from China had almost tripled in
the three months before December 2007.40  In December 2007, Jonathan Evans,
the chief of the United Kingdom’s domestic counter-intelligence agency MI5,
warned a number of accountants, legal firms, and chief executives and security
chiefs at banks that they were being spied on electronically by Chinese state
organisations. Evans noted that a number of British companies, with Rolls Royce
being one example, had discovered that viruses of Chinese Government origin
were uploading vast quantities of industrial secrets to Internet servers in China.41
Earlier, in October, one of Germany’s top internal security officers, Hans
Elmar Remberg, told a Berlin conference on industrial espionage that his country
was involved in a cyber-war with the Chinese, arguing that he believed Chinese
interests were behind the recent digital attacks. One month earlier, in September,
the French Secretary General for National Defence, François Delon, argued that
he had proof that there was involvement from China in cyber-attacks on France,
but could not conclusively say it was the Chinese Government.42
The German Government too has been subjected to cyber-attacks, with
German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, being informed in August 2007 that three
computer networks in her own office had been penetrated by Chinese intelligence
services. A few days later, she confronted the visiting Chinese premier directly
about the attacks. Premier Wen Jiabao was shocked and promised that his
government would get to the bottom of the matter. Interestingly, he then asked
for detailed information from Germany’s counter-intelligence agencies to help
China’s security police find the culprit.43
Notwithstanding the wide-ranging nature of such attacks, by far the target
attacked most intensely by the Chinese is the US military, closely followed by
the State Department, the Commerce Department, and the US Department of
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Homeland Security. Computer networks in sensitive US sectors relating to
commerce, academia, industry, finance, and energy are also being targeted.
Indeed, one US cyber-security expert told a group of federal managers that ‘the
Chinese are in half of your agencies’ systems’.44
While the United States and other governments appear reticent to reveal the
extent of the vulnerabilities of their databases to Chinese penetration, the
information available does tend to indicate how widespread Chinese cyber-attacks
have become. Cyber-warfare units in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) have already penetrated the Pentagon’s Non-classified Internet Protocol
Router Network (NIPRNet) and have designed software to disable it in time of
conflict or confrontation. Major General William Lord, Director of Information,
Services, and Integration in the US Air Force’s Office of Warfighting Integration,
admits that China has downloaded data from the NIPRNet already, and that
China now poses a nation-state threat.45
Richard Lawless, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Asia-Pacific Affairs,
told a Congressional panel on 13 June 2007 that the Chinese are ‘leveraging
information technology expertise available in China’s booming economy to make
significant strides in cyber-warfare’. He noted the Chinese military’s
determination to dominate, to a certain degree, the capabilities of the Internet,
and that this capacity provides them with a growing and very impressive ability
to wage cyber-warfare.46
Lawless argued that the Chinese have developed a very sophisticated,
broadly-based capability to attack and degrade US computer and Internet
systems. He noted that the Chinese well-appreciated how to access computers
and disrupt networks, particularly by penetrating the networks to glean
protected information and by carrying out computer network attacks, which
would allow them to shut down critical systems in times of emergency. Lawless
argues that the capability is already there; it is being broadened; and it represents
a major component of Chinese asymmetric warfare capability.47  It is also believed
that PLA cyber-warfare units have access to source codes for America’s
ubiquitous office software, giving them a skeleton key to every networked
government, military, business, and private computer in the United States.
As China’s cyber-attack capability becomes clearer, the US Government will
need to acknowledge the vulnerability of America’s national security information
infrastructure as well as its commercial, financial and energy information
networks and make the requisite changes. And, via their computer network
operations, China’s clandestine intelligence collection would seem to be the
foremost intelligence threat to America’s science and technology secrets.48
Clearly, this applies equally to Australia.
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What should we do?
As our computer networks proliferate and dependencies on them increase, their
protection against cyber-attacks needs far more attention than previously. The
knowledge and abilities of hackers have become much more sophisticated and
are outstripping methods that detect, identify and alert users to network attacks.
These current cyber-defence methods tend to rely on data mining approaches
that are useful for simple attacks but not for the more complex or coordinated
attacks of recent times. Cyber-space security urgently requires next-generation
network management and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS).
One method of dealing with the emergent challenges is to address network
security from a system control and decision perspective that would combine
short-term sensor information and long-term knowledge databases to provide
improved decision-support systems as part of improved C2. In this respect,
information fusion is needed to provide the foundation for a decision and control
framework that can detect and predict multi-stage stealthy cyber-attacks.49
The problem with our networks
Large networks today contain a multitude of hardware and software packages
and are connected in multiple ways. Inevitably, the complexity of these networks
introduces security problems that evade detection by network administrators,
who tend to focus on isolated and discrete vulnerabilities.
Cyber-attacks traditionally have been one-dimensional—Denial of Service
(DS) attacks, insertion of computer viruses or worms, and unauthorised intrusions
(referred to as ‘hacking’). These attacks were mainly launched against websites,
mail servers or client machines. For the future, cyber-threats will be more
diversified and take the form of multi-stage and multi-dimensional attacks that
utilise and target a variety of attack tools and technologies. For example, the
latest generation of worms uses a variety of different exploits, propagation
methods, and payloads to inflict damage. Networks and computers that become
infected are used to launch attacks against other networks and computers and
may access or delete data held within them.
Framework for network defence
In improving cyber-defence, the awareness of potential attacks and an
assessment of the impacts of those attacks must be made. This is typical risk
assessment/risk management. Recent advances in applying data fusion techniques
offer part of the solution.
The fusion of data allows basic awareness and assessments to be refined in
order to identify new cyber-attacks. Recognition of the features of such attacks
must be both dynamic and adaptive in order to generate initial estimates of the
situation and to respond as new or unknown forms of attack emerge.
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The following types of network-based attacks, focused on web, email or
network attack, were identified as the most likely by Shen et al:50
• Buffer overflow (web attack)—This occurs when a program does not check
to ensure the data it is putting into a buffer area will actually fit into that
area. A vulnerability currently exists in Microsoft IIS 5.0 running on
Windows 2000 that allows a remote intruder to run arbitrary codes on the
targeted machine, whereby the intruder is able to gain complete
administrative control of the machine. A remote attacker could send a request
that might cause the web server to crash with unexpected results.
• Semantic URL attack (web attack)—In a semantic Uniform Resource Locator
(URL)51  attack, a client manually adjusts the parameters of its request by
maintaining the URL’s syntax but altering its semantic meaning. This attack
is primarily used against Common Gateway Interface (CGI)52  driven websites.
A similar attack involving web browser cookies53  is commonly referred to
as cookie poisoning.
• Email bombing (email attack)—An email bomb involves sending large volumes
of email across the Internet to an address, seeking to overflow the mailbox
or overwhelm the server. One possible response to this form of attack is to
identify the source of the email bomb or spam and configure the router (either
internally or through the network service provider) to prevent incoming
packets from that address.
• Email spam (email attack)—Spam involves the use of electronic messaging
systems to send unsolicited, undesired bulk messages, without the permission
of the recipients. The addresses of recipients are obtained from network
postings, web pages, databases, or through guesswork, using common names
and domains.
• Malware attachment (email attack)—Malicious software (or malware) is
software designed to infiltrate or damage a computer system without the
owner’s informed consent. Common Malware attacks include worms, viruses,
and ‘Trojan horses’.
• Denial of service (network attack)—A DS attack is an attempt to make a
computer resource unavailable to its intended users. Typically, the targets
are high-profile web servers, with the aim of the attack being to make the
hosted web pages unavailable on the Internet. A DDS attack occurs when
multiple compromised systems flood the bandwidth or resources of a targeted
system, usually a web server. Systems can be compromised through a variety
of methods and attacks may be multi-stage. For example, email spam and
Malware may be used first to gain control of several temporal network nodes,
which might be poorly-protected servers, followed by a DS attack that is
triggered to a specific target.
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From a network defence perspective, the following defensive actions were
considered by Shen et al:54
• Deployment of Intrusion Detection Systems—An optimal deployment strategy
of IDS should be used to maximise the chance of detecting all possible
cyber-network attacks and intrusions.
• Firewall configuration—A firewall is an IT security device which is configured
to permit or deny data connections that may be set and configured by the
organisation’s security policy. Firewalls can be either hardware or software
based or both.
• Email-filter configuration—Email filtering involves organising email according
to specified criteria. While this usually refers to the automatic processing of
incoming messages, it also applies to outgoing emails and can involve human
intervention as well as automatic processing. Email filtering will usually do
one of three things—pass the message through unchanged for delivery to
the specified user’s mailbox, redirect the message for delivery elsewhere, or
discard the message. Some email filters are also able to edit messages during
processing.
• Shut down or reset servers—This should eliminate the threat; however, it also
denies access to authorised users for the period of the shut-down.
Policy-makers, government administrators, infrastructure owners and
operators need to work together to protect Australia against IW, implementing
eight key initiatives.55  First, all external entities who interface with the
Australian Government’s information infrastructure should be required to be
ISO 17799 certified56  or a new standard yet to be developed.
The ISO standards cover the following 12 domains: risk assessment and
treatment, security policy, organisation of information security, asset
management, human resources security, physical and environmental security,
communications and operations management, access control, information systems
acquisition, development and maintenance, information security incident
management, and business continuity management and compliance. Security
analysts responsible for protecting sensitive information can be relatively
confident if an organisation is ISO 17799 compliant. A high degree of information
assurance (security) is likely to be a characteristic of the data set being used.
The reverse may be true if the organisation is not compliant with ISO 17799.57
Second, the Australian Government needs to oversee an information security
awareness training program across all sectors, highlighting the threats and
vulnerabilities associated with the use of the information infrastructure (especially
computer networks and the Internet).
Third, all sensitive national research and development programs should
implement an information security plan that includes personnel screening
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practices, security training, and monitoring practices. The methods and means
used by unfriendly competitors or hostile nation-states and the nature of
modern-day information processing technology dictate that we must be vigilant
in protecting critical information assets and our national research infrastructure.
Fourth, access to the Internet by Australian Government employees should
be restricted and isolated. Only a limited number of employees need to have
direct access to the Internet. In such cases, the workstations should be completely
isolated from the internal network.
Fifth, communications on all Australian Government information systems
should be encrypted.
Sixth, any products, materials, integrated circuits, components, programs,
processes or other goods that are deemed to be crucial to national security of
Australia should be manufactured exclusively in this country or from highly
trusted allies.
Seventh, private owners of information networks that interface with any of
the nation’s critical infrastructure (e.g. defence, law enforcement, finance, and
energy) should be required to become ISO 17799 certified. Critical infrastructure
is defined by Perry as ‘services that are so vital that their incapacity or
destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defence or economic security
of Australia’.58
Eighth, Australia should do all it can to produce more domestic engineers
and scientists. We are not growing the intellectual resources that are needed.
Cyber-crime59
As just mentioned, the accelerated use of the Internet has led to a dramatic
rise in criminal activity that exploits this interconnectivity for illicit financial
gain and other malicious purposes, such as Internet fraud, child exploitation,
and identity theft. Efforts to address cyber-crime60  include activities associated
with protecting networks and information, detecting criminal activity,
investigating crime, and prosecuting criminals.
The annual loss due to computer crime was estimated to be US$67.2 billion
for US organisations, according to a 2005 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
survey. The estimated losses associated with particular crimes include $49.3
billion in 2006 for identity theft61  and US$1 billion annually62  due to
phishing.63 These projected losses are based on direct and indirect costs that
may include actual money stolen, estimated cost of intellectual property stolen,
and recovery cost of repairing or replacing damaged networks and equipment.
Cyber-forensic tools and techniques64  are a key component of cyber-crime
investigations as they allow the gathering and examination of electronic evidence
that can be useful for prosecution.
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Table 2—Techniques used to commit cyber-crimes65
DescriptionType
Sending unsolicited commercial email advertising for products, services, and
websites. Spam can also be used as a delivery mechanism for malware and other
cyber-threats.
Spamming
A high-tech scam that frequently uses spam or pop-up messages to deceive people
into disclosing their credit card numbers, bank account information, Social Security
numbers, passwords, or other sensitive information. Internet scammers use email
bait to ‘phish’ for passwords and financial data from the sea of Internet users.
Phishing
Creating a fraudulent website to mimic an actual, well-known website run by another
party. Email spoofing occurs when the sender address and other parts of an email
header are altered to appear as though the email originated from a different source.
Spoofing hides the origin of an email message.
Spoofing
A method used by phishers to deceive users into believing that they are
communicating with a legitimate website. Pharming uses a variety of technical
methods to redirect a user to a fraudulent or spoofed website when the user types
in a legitimate web address. For example, one pharming technique is to redirect
users—without their knowledge—to a different website from the one they intended
to access. Also, software vulnerabilities may be exploited or malware employed to
redirect the user to a fraudulent website when the user types in a legitimate address.
Pharming
An attack in which one user takes up so much of a shared resource that none of
the resource is left for other users. DS attacks compromise the availability of the
resource.
Denial of Service attack
A variant of the DS attack that uses a coordinated attack from a distributed system
of computers rather than from a single source. It often makes use of worms to
spread to multiple computers that can then attack the target.
Distributed Denial of
Service attack
A program that ‘infects’ computer files, usually executable programs, by inserting
a copy of itself into the file. These copies are usually executed when the infected
file is loaded into memory, allowing the virus to infect other files. A virus requires
human involvement (usually unwitting) to propagate.
Viruses
A computer program that conceals harmful code. It usually masquerades as a useful
program that a user would wish to execute.
Trojan horse
An independent computer program that reproduces by copying itself from one system
to another across a network. Unlike computer viruses, worms do not require human
involvement to propagate.
Worm
Malicious software designed to carry out annoying or harmful actions. Malware
often masquerades as useful programs or is embedded into useful programs so that
users are induced into activating them. Malware can include viruses, worms, and
spyware.
Malware
Malware installed without the user’s knowledge to surreptitiously track and/or
transmit data to an unauthorised third party.
Spyware
A network of remotely controlled systems used to coordinate attacks and distribute
malware, spam, and phishing scams. Bots (short for ‘robots’) are programs that are
covertly installed on a targeted system allowing an unauthorised user to remotely
control the compromised computer for a variety of malicious purposes.
Botnet
(Source: GAO, CYBERCRIME: Public and Private Entities Face Challenges in Addressing Cyber Threats, pp.
7–8)
Cyber-crime laws vary across the international community. Australia enacted
its Cybercrime Act of 200166  to address this type of crime in a manner similar
to the U.S. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986,67  which specifies as a crime
the knowing unauthorised access to the computers used by a financial institution,
by a federal government entity, or for interstate commerce. Such crimes include
knowingly accessing a computer without authorisation; damaging a computer
by introducing a worm, virus or other attack device; or using unauthorised
access to a government, banking, or commerce computer to commit fraud.
Violations also include trafficking in passwords for a government computer, a
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bank computer, or a computer used in interstate or foreign commerce, as well
as accessing a computer to commit espionage.
In addition, international agreements are also emerging, such as the Council
of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime signed by the United States and 29 other
countries on 23 November 2001, as a multilateral instrument to address the
problems posed by criminal activity on computer networks.
In one example of cyber-crime, a person in the United States was convicted
of aggravated identity theft, access device fraud, and conspiracy to commit bank
fraud in February 2007. He held over 4300 compromised account numbers and
full identity information (i.e. name, address, date of birth, Social Security number,
and mother’s maiden name) for over 1600 individual victims.68
US Department of Defense officials stated that its information network,
representing approximately 20 per cent of the entire Internet, receives
approximately six million probes/scans a day. Further, representatives from
DOD stated that between January 2005 and July 2006, the agency initiated 92
cyber-crime cases, the majority of which involved intrusions or malicious
activities directed against its information network.69
Indonesian police officials believe the 2002 terrorist bombings in Bali were
partially financed through online credit card fraud, according to press reports.70
As the GAO Report argues:
As larger amounts of money are transferred through computer systems,
as more sensitive economic and commercial information is exchanged
electronically, and as the nation’s defence and intelligence communities
increasingly rely on commercially available IT, the likelihood increases
that information attacks will threaten vital national interests.71
The effectiveness of the systems put in place to audit and monitor systems,
including intrusion detection systems, intrusion protection systems, security
event correlation tools, and computer forensics tools,72  have limitations that
impact their ability to detect a crime occurring.73
Addressing our critical information infrastructure
When the Estonian authorities began removing a statue of a Soviet soldier (a
Second World War memorial) from a park at the end of April 2007, a number
of DDS attacks disabled various websites such as the Estonian parliament, banks,
ministries, newspapers and broadcasters. The attacks overloaded the bandwidths
for the servers running the websites.74
These attacks were not initiated by the Russian Government or its security
service as was initially suggested. Fake Internet Protocol (IP) addresses were
used, which pointed to a Russian Government computer. The attacks were
low-tech and probably carried out by large numbers of ‘script
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kiddies’—teenagers with relatively little real computer expertise, who use readily
available techniques and programs to search for and exploit weaknesses in
computers via the Internet.
This reinforced the concern of many that Critical Infrastructure Protection
(CIP) needs greater attention. There are two interlinked and at times reinforcing
factors that concern nations: the expansion of the threat spectrum in recent
years, especially in terms of malicious actors and their capabilities; and a new
kind of vulnerability due to modern society’s dependence on inherently insecure
information systems.75
Both of these factors combine to pose challenges that involve uncertainty
over who, how, where, what, why, and when.76 The notion of an imminent,
direct and certain threat, which is how we treat most military threats, does not
describe these challenges adequately. They are actually indirect, uncertain and
future risks rather than threats.77  For this reason, the focus needs to be as much
on general vulnerabilities of society as it is on actors, capabilities and motivations.
Critical infrastructure is deemed critical because its incapacitation or
destruction would have a debilitating impact on the national security and the
economic and social welfare of a nation. Examples are telecommunications, power
grids, transport and storage of gas and oil, banking and finance, traffic, water
supply systems, emergency rescue services, and public administration. Fear of
asymmetric measures being perpetrated against such targets has been aggravated
by the information revolution.
Today, almost all critical infrastructure relies on various forms of
software-based control systems for effective, reliable and continuous operation.
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) connect infrastructure
systems in such a way as to make them interrelated and interdependent. Thus,
CII has joined the lexicon, and includes computers, software, the Internet,
satellites and fibre-optics.
CIIs are generally regarded as inherently insecure. Most of the components
are developed in the private sector, where the pressure of competition means
security does not drive system design. Computer and network vulnerabilities
are therefore to be expected, and these lead to information infrastructures with
in-built instabilities and critical points of failure.78
A relatively small attack on infrastructure can achieve a great impact, thus
offering a ‘force-multiplier’ effect to those carrying out infrastructure attacks.79
The spread of ICT has facilitated access to the tools for attack, and made the
success of an attack more likely. In other words, asymmetric attacks against




These risks (or asymmetric threats) are of two types—unstructured and
structured. The former is random and relatively limited. It consists of adversaries
with restricted funds and organisation and short-term goals, such as individual
hackers and crackers as well as small groups of organised criminals. The
resources, tools, skills and funding available to the actors are too limited to
accomplish a sophisticated attack against critical infrastructure and, more
important, the actors lack the motivation to do so. They do it for thrill, prestige
or monetary gain.
In contrast, structured threats or risks are considerably more methodical and
better supported. Adversaries from this group have extensive funding, organised
professional support and access to intelligence products, and long-term strategic
goals. Foreign intelligence services, well-organised terrorists, professional hackers
involved in IW, larger criminal groups and industrial spies fall into this category.
Unfortunately, there are no clear boundaries between the two categories.
Even though an unstructured threat is not usually considered of direct concern
to national security, there is a possibility that a structured threat actor could
masquerade as an unstructured threat actor, or that structured actors could seek
the help of technologically skilled individuals from the other group.
Because of the uncertainty of threat, we need to focus on the risk of an event
occurring. In this respect, the important question is not what caused the loss of
information integrity, but rather what the possible result and complications may
be. A power grid might fail because of a simple operating error without any
kind of external influence or sophisticated hacker attack.80  In all cases, the
result is the same: a possible power outage that may set off a cascading effect of
successive failures in interlinked systems. Analysing whether a failure was
caused by a terrorist, a criminal, simple human error or spontaneous collapse
will not help to stop or reduce the effect.
Thus, it would seem to be more appropriate to adopt an ‘all hazards’ approach,
designed for protection efforts irrespective of the nature of the threat, with a
focus on the capability to respond to a range of unanticipated events. The key
is to create greater resilience, commonly defined as the ability of a system to
recover from adversity and either revert to its original state or assume an adjusted
state based on new requirements.81
Structural approaches, and attempts to prohibit the means of IW altogether
or to restrict their availability, are largely not feasible because of the ubiquity
and dual-use nature of IT.82 There are also concerns over military reliance on
advanced ICT and the extensive IT infrastructure used to conduct operations,
as discussed earlier.
Cyber-crime is considered a menace to the economic prosperity and social
stability of all nations that are linked into the GII. All nations therefore have an
51
Information Warfare—Attack and Defence
interest in working together to devise an international regime83  that will ensure
the reliability and survivability of information networks. Again, this is more of
a resilience strategy than a threat-focused approach. Multilateral conventions
on computer crime, such as the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime of
2001,84  could be expanded and built on. International organisations could help
develop and promulgate information security standards and disseminate
recommendations and guidelines on best practices. International law enforcement
institutions and mechanisms, like Interpol, could be used for information
exchange—in order to provide early warning of any attack—and cyber-crime
investigations. Enhanced cooperative policing mechanisms could also be created.
Comprehensive protection against the entire range of threats and risks at all
times is virtually impossible, not only for technical and practical reasons, but
also because of the associated costs. What is possible is to focus protective
measures on preventive strategies and on trying to minimise the impact of an
attack when it occurs.
A key problem currently is that standard procedures do not exist for assessing
the risks to critical infrastructure or for recommending security improvements.
Furthermore, a framework for agreeing priorities for security remediation of
those critical infrastructures deemed the most vulnerable does not exist.
As Stephen Gale (co-chair of the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Center
on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, and Homeland Security) argued recently,85
a key initiative for addressing these shortfalls would be the development and
deployment of a Security Impact Statement (SIS), analogous to the Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) that exists to protect the environment. Like the EIS, the
SIS would be designed as a means for both identifying vulnerabilities and
determining the standards and methods to be used in protection and remediation.
The system would need to be able to estimate both the likelihood of specific
events occurring and the impacts of alternative security measures to deal with
those events. It would need to drive the prioritisation process of investing in
security improvements. Experts would be used in determining the likelihood
of specific threat scenarios and the likely outcomes of such threats. The optimal
system would be one that could provide quantitative estimates of risks and
vulnerabilities; clear indicators of priorities for investments in security; and
standards for making specific, effective, and efficient improvements in security.
Under such a system, organisations would be required to undertake due
diligence reviews for protecting infrastructure and be offered, say, tax credits





The entire computing industry needs to work together to improve security,
as businesses continue facing cyber-attacks. Experts believe that hardware,
software, and networks can be made much safer by creating a multi-layered
solution. Bill Gates has suggested replacing password protections, often too
easily defeated by phishing and other forms of low-tech hacking, with an
InfoCard—a digital identity that can be stored in the microchip of a smart card
and used to access password-protected websites.86
Of course Microsoft has a keen interest in promoting more secure computing
environments, since its operating systems are routinely the target of virus attacks.
Gates noted, however, that the shift away from passwords would likely take as
long as four years because it requires the collaboration of numerous vendors.
While the InfoCard technology should be useful for personal data security,
large institutions, such as banks, are looking at large-scale defences to tackle
Internet scams. By using the very networks that hackers exploit, companies can
fight fraud and cyber-crime at different nodes, instead of in isolation. For
instance, if a cyber-criminal in a third-world country exploits a stolen credit
card number and then tries to hide behind a proxy server in New York, that
New York IP address could be quickly blacklisted and banks and other
organisations immediately notified.
While creating more secure technology requires the coordination of software,
networks, and hardware, cryptography is at the heart of it. And while no
encryption scheme will be completely foolproof, there is a strong effort underway
to address security issues before they become major problems.
Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted the value of information to Australia and the ADF
today, and discussed the potential forms of IW that could be used against us.
There are certain actions an adversary might take against us and certain things
we can do to protect ourselves. And there are cyber-crime activities that need
to be addressed, as well as CII aspects. This discussion on cyber-attacks and
broad network defence flows neatly into the next two chapters, which examine
information infrastructure attack in more detail and how we might best secure
the Defence and national information infrastructures in Australia.
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The national, defence and global information infrastructures underpin and enable
today’s information society. They play a critical role in how we and others live,
and they shape and influence our decision cycle, i.e. what we see, think, decide
and how we act. In defence terms, these infrastructures largely determine the
functional efficiency of a country’s Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare
(C4ISREW) and net-warfare capability. And in both defence and broader national
security terms, they provide a pathway to psychological operations. Foreign
information infrastructures can be targeted to weaken the military capability
and national morale of an adversary, and strengthen those of allies and friends.
In certain non-war circumstances, foreign infrastructures may also be targeted
to project national power, and shape events to national advantage. The ability
to target foreign infrastructures for military advantage in combat operations,
and to influence the morale and decision-making of friends and foes alike, is
recognised as an essential inclusion in the twenty-first century inventory of
national capabilities. Australia must develop this capability to protect and project
its national interests.
The information society
The advent of the Information Age, now into its second decade, has brought
about very fundamental changes in the way that all societies now function.
The information society, including the various information-based
environments within, is now a reality. The exponential growth in Information
Technology (IT), the accompanying seamless and virtually instant access to
vastly disparate information resources, and the flexibility to positively exploit
that technology and information across government, business and society
generally, is unprecedented.
In all modern functioning nations, which include Australia and all developed
and most developing countries, access to and the benefits derived from the
information society are taken for granted.
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At the personal or micro level, the expectation and ability to instantly
communicate and access comprehensive information resources, including
domestic and international media broadcasts, iPod downloads, chat rooms or
the like, on a 24/7 basis, by such now-basic means as mobile phones,1  the
Internet, and Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), is the norm.
At the macro level, the provision of reliable information and information
technology-dependent services across government and the private sector, is also
assumed. Examples include key industries and groupings which are essential to
the efficient functionality of the state, such as communications; banking and
finance; transportation and distribution services; energy including electricity,
oil and gas; water supply; education; the media and other information services;
and other essential government services including defence, and emergency
services. It is these industries and groupings that enable such activities as share
market trading; domestic and international banking; salary and social security
payments; electricity distribution; robotics in manufacturing; integrated logistic
systems; suburban and interstate train services; air traffic control; all telephone
and Internet services; supermarket checkout transactions; and functional
C4ISREW in support of the Defence forces.
In less-developed countries, including, for example, some nations in the
Asia-Pacific region, the availability of many of the above services across society
generally may be limited, because of less infrastructure-related investment or
the skills to maintain a reliable service. However, they do exist and generally
work well where the local government and key private sector organisations
want them to; for instance, for political, defence and other security reasons, and
for commercial profitability.
The benefits enjoyed by the information society identifiably include access
to better services, enhanced government and private sector capabilities generally
and other lifestyle improvements. But the information now available, and the
sophistication of supporting technology, impacts across society both
quantitatively and qualitatively, and with an intensity, never before experienced.
This impact affects not only how we live, but also shapes and influences our
decision cycle (what we see, hear, think, decide, and how we act).2
For this combination of reasons, information and its supporting technology
would—indeed must—routinely be included on the targeting list of any nation
at war, especially any nation that includes Information Operations (IO)3  as a
core capability of its warfighting inventory. Furthermore, they would also be
included on the list of potential targets of a nation, non-state organisation or
individual who seeks to shape or influence specific physical events, or
decision-making, across any part of the public, private or general sectors of the
information society, in non-war circumstances.
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Information Infrastructures: the NII, GII and DII
What is being targeted, by us or by others? The answer is three mostly
interconnected and interdependent information infrastructures. The first is the
National Information Infrastructure (NII), this being the key network element
within a country that enables its information society to function, and determines
the efficiency of its functionality. The second is the Global Information
Infrastructure (GII), which provides the international connectivity to the NII.
The third is the Defence Information Infrastructure (DII), which, as the name
implies, serves a country’s Defence organisation, both military and civilian.
Definitions of the above vary between authorities, authors and so on within
and between countries, but all boil down to the same essential characteristics.
ADF definitions have been used below as the primary definitions for the NII
and DII because of the ADF’s lead role in Australia for targeting any foreign
infrastructures. Another definition of the NII, drawn from Defence sources, has
also been cited because of its simplicity. Interestingly, the ADF has no definition
of the GII.
The National Information Infrastructure
The NII is defined in Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP)
3-13—Information Operations (2006), as
compris[ing] the nation wide telecommunications networks, computers,
databases and electronic systems; it includes the Internet, the public
switched networks, public and private networks, cable and wireless,
and satellite telecommunications. The NII includes the information
resident in networks and systems, the applications and software that
allows users to manipulate, organise and digest the information; the value
added services; network standards and protocols; encryption processes;
and importantly the people who create information, develop applications
and services, conduct facilities, and train others to utilise its potential.4
The above is more a statement of the composition of the NII than a typical
definition, but is very useful in that regard. A shorter definition initially used
by Australia’s Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) in 1997, in Australia’s first
national study of the threats to and vulnerabilities of the NII, reads:
[The NII] comprises those components that make up the network within
and over which information is stored, processed and transported. It
includes those people who manage and serve the infrastructure, and the




The Global Information Infrastructure
Although there is presently no ADF definition of the GII, the current US
Department of Defense definition is
the worldwide interconnection of communications networks, computers,
databases, and consumer electronics that make vast amounts of
information available to users. The global information infrastructure
encompasses a wide range of equipment, including cameras, scanners,
keyboards, facsimile machines, computers, switches, compact discs,
video and audio tape, cable, wire, satellites, fibre optic-optic transmission
lines, networks of all types, televisions, monitors, printers, and much
more. The friendly and adversary personnel who make decisions and
handle the transmitted information constitute a critical component of
the global information infrastructure. Also known as the GII.6
This definition is essentially the same as the US definition for the NII, the
only difference being the substitution of the words ‘the worldwide
interconnection’ with ‘the nationwide interconnection’ as the lead.7  As for the
ADF definition of the NII, the US NII and GII definitions contain a useful
description of the composition of components within these infrastructures.
Alternatively, the GII may be defined simplistically as comprising a global
network of NIIs as well as other dedicated international information networks.
However, the GII, as defined, is not identical with the Internet. The Internet
is the global network of networks; other dedicated networks that are stand-alone
and not networked, are not part of the Internet.
The Defence Information Infrastructure
The DII is defined in ADDP 3-13 as
the shared or interconnected system of telecommunications networks,
computers, data bases and electronic systems serving the Defence
Department’s national and global information needs. It is a subset of and
comprises the NII, and includes the people who manage and serve the
infrastructure, and the information itself. It includes information
infrastructure which is not owned, controlled, managed or administered
by Defence.8
The issue of ownership, control and management applies to the NII and GII as
well as the DII, and is discussed further below.
Information Infrastructures: Some key characteristics
A number of key characteristics of information infrastructures flow from the
above definitions that are important to targeting considerations. These include
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components, connectivity, bandwidth, functional interdependence, and ownership
and control.
Components
The NII, DII and GII comprise five distinct interdependent components. The
first four are explicit in the definitions above; the fifth is more implicit:
• the hardware, e.g. the computers; sensors; physical transmission components
such as cable; radio/wireless; satellites, and transmission towers;
• the software applications, e.g. processes; protocols; encryption; and firewalls;
• the information itself, e.g. the databases; and information in transmission
including voice, facsimile, text messages, imagery, or information in other
forms;
• the people who operate and maintain the infrastructure; and
• power supply, without which hardware and software cannot function and
information cannot be transmitted or accessed. While integrated backup
power supply (e.g. uninterrupted power systems (UPS)) could be considered
a part of the hardware component, mains supply is not. Most UPS have only
a limited capability in terms of both duration and capacity, and mains supply
remains critical for full and enduring functionality.
Connectivity
The very broad, virtually instantaneous and seamless connectivity and reach
across the various domestic and international information domains of the
NII/GII/DII networks is a characteristic that also contributes significantly to
infrastructure functional efficiency. Users of these infrastructures have adjusted
business or other practices accordingly. Real-time communications are now
critical in many areas of business and government. The domestic and global
marketplace, which includes stock exchange and credit card transactions, are
such examples.9 This real-time dependence also applies to many emergency
services and especially to Defence functions across the whole C4ISREW spectrum,
including sensor to weapon configurations, during combat operations. Disruption
to connectivity, even for relatively brief periods of time, could have a major
impact on outcomes.
Bandwidth
Bandwidth across all three infrastructures is constantly increasing, particularly
over data networks, in parallel with technology improvements. Client demand
has not only kept pace with bandwidth availability, but has outstripped it. Broad
bandwidth allows access to vast quantities of information in a very short space
of time. In a Defence context in particular, it is an important feature of real-time
delivery of surveillance and reconnaissance imagery, and the immediate
‘pull-down’ accessibility of deployed combat forces to their headquarters’
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intelligence databases. It is also important in emergency services scenarios, for
example in real-time or near real-time monitoring of bushfires or other natural
disasters where lives are at risk and the timely delivery of humanitarian aid is
critical.
Functional interdependence
Functional interdependence between information and its supporting systems,
and between the supporting systems themselves, is a major factor related to the
functional efficiency and security of any information infrastructure. And the
more complex the system or network, the greater that interdependence. Failure,
in whole or by a part of any component of an interdependent system, can impact
on the functionality of another part or, potentially, on the whole system.
Depending on the type of system affected (for example, its size or complexity)
and the scale of the failure, the cascade effect can have significant implications
for specific or general services and capabilities, and ultimately affect how people
live and behave. In military terms especially, this cascade of ‘knock-on’ effects
fits the classic mould of targeting outcomes in ‘effects-based’ operations.10
The principle of related ‘effects-based’ considerations also applies to any
compromise of the five key criteria of Information Assurance (IA), which is
discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
Ownership and control
Ownership of the networks that make up the NII, DII (and thus GII) varies
between the government and private sector, depending on the country, and
what part of the network within that country, is involved. In most countries
today, the major telecommunications service providers are privately owned.
And in the world of globalisation, those services may be owned, or part owned
by foreign private corporations, the exceptions being where the major
telecommunications service providers are state-owned enterprises, like, for
example, in North Korea.
In addition, the majority of software systems, especially commercial
off-the-shelf (COTS) operating systems, are sourced from foreign corporations,
as are many specialist hardware components used within those systems.11
Furthermore, the people who develop and maintain and administer particular
systems within networks, or the networks themselves, will usually be from the
private sector, and indeed may be foreigners.
The up-side of the above is that globalisation or selective global marketing
enables access, potentially, to the best hardware, software and people services
that are available to deliver and maintain key parts of a country’s NII and DII.
The down-side is that a country (i.e. its people and government as both
shareholders and stakeholders) may not own or, in reality, fully control or
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manage these vital national services. Potentially at least, systems and networks
could be vulnerable (in the production, operating and administrative phases) to
a hostile person (local or foreign), acting on behalf of others or alone, who
accesses, manipulates (or establishes the means to access and manipulate) the
functionality of the systems and networks at a future date. There are many ways
how this might be done, within and without the target country, but could include
covertly inserting trap-doors and ‘Trojan horses’ in its operating software,
causing the malfunction of key hardware and software components at a critical
time, or enabling other hostiles to access exploitable parts of the system. In
normal circumstances this situation might not pose a significant risk, but it could
become a national security issue in a time of crisis or war.
The percentage of the DII that is made up of and dependent on the NII, and
GII, varies from country to country, but it is generally assessed in most
technically advanced countries as about 90 per cent or more. Thus, only 10 per
cent or less of the DII in these countries falls into the category of being owned,
controlled, managed or administered by their Defence organisation. And,
generally, the infrastructure that they do own, control and manage exists
primarily at the tactical level only. Few countries can afford to have their own
fully independent strategic and/or operational broadband communications
systems. The United States is one such country, but that resource is nevertheless
limited relative to the total size and operational commitments of the US armed
forces. This limitation necessitates the majority of communications being
transmitted over leased or other non-Defence owned networks.
One important conclusion is, therefore, that a significant proportion of any
Defence organisation’s C4ISREW capability, its Network Centric Warfare (NCW)
‘information superiority’ capability, and any potential information-based
Asymmetric Warfare capability, is outside its total control, and may well be
foreign owned and under actual or de facto foreign control.
It also means that maintaining and protecting a functional and efficient NII
(inclusive of DII components) and its GII connectivity is a critical Defence-specific
security requirement, as much as a broader national security requirement.
The Importance of Information Assurance
IA is another key consideration of NII/DII and GII targeting. Effective IA is a
critical element in the information society, and underpins both the functionality
and efficiency of all information infrastructures.
IA comprises five essential criteria for the protection of information and




• availability applies to the information itself, its supporting technology and
the people who operate and serve the infrastructure;
• integrity refers to the trustworthiness of information and system/process
reliability;
• confidentiality is about denying access to the information and sensitive aspects
of supporting technology, to those persons without authorisation;
• authentication refers to assuring that those who do access the information or
supporting systems have the requisite authorisation; and
• non-repudiation is linked to authentication and, effectively, is the digital
signature.
The principle that applies to functionally-interdependent systems, whereby
the failure of one component can impact on the functionality of one or more
other components, also applies to IA. Thus, if any of the above IA criteria are
compromised for any reason, at least some element of information and/or
functionality and efficiency of related information infrastructures is also likely
to be compromised. The more significant the compromise, particularly in key
areas or system choke-points or nodes, the more significant the impact will be
on functionally and efficiency. Identifying existing vulnerabilities, or creating
vulnerabilities that will enable IA to be compromised, is an important part of
the targeting process.
The effective implementation of IA involves a wide range of security processes
and procedures, as well as physical measures. One important measure is
redundancy and diversity, which is intended to counteract the effects of any
failure within, or compromise of, a system, or at least to minimise those effects.
However, the high-end functionality and efficiency of many of the processes,
systems, services and capabilities we rely on and take for granted is dependent,
or largely dependent, on current-generation hardware and software. For high-tech
systems in particular, the rapid changes in technology resulting in increasingly
more powerful hardware and software, means that planned redundancy and
diversity to provide effective backup and continuity, must also largely keep
pace technologically with primary-use hardware and software.
In Australia and other developed and many developing countries, redundancy
and diversity across critical infrastructure has been significantly hardened since
the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, but at a cost.
However, even high-quality redundancy and diversity might struggle to provide
a full service if challenged to do so. But where that quality of investment is not
made, or made in depth, technologically-dated backup systems may simply be
incapable of maintaining even a basic level of services over a short period to
meet national or sector needs, if put to the test.
Redundancy and diversity, however robust, must be recognised as part of
the IA equation. They must therefore be factored into targeting considerations.
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Targeting Information Infrastructures: who and why?
As indicated earlier above, there are three broad groups of people who,
potentially, might target information infrastructures: a nation-state or country
for national security reasons; a non-state organisation such as a terrorist, criminal,
or political or other Issue Motivated Group (IMG) in pursuit of group objectives;
or an individual in pursuit of personal objectives.
Motivation, be it for the short, medium or long term and whether for tactical,
operational, strategic or other reasons, is important as it will indicate potential
targets, irrespective of whether that targeting process and plan is highly
sophisticated and focused or, apparently, more simple, random and
opportunistic.12
Nation-state targeting
Nation-state targeting may occur during war or non-war situations.
War: targeting the adversary
At the national level, the most obvious scenario for one or more countries to
target the NII, DII and GII connectivity of another country or countries is when
those countries are at war. The overriding political objective in this scenario
would be to win the war by destroying the military warfighting capability and
the military and civilian logistic and other support capacity of the adversary or
adversaries to wage war; and by changing the will of their military, politicians
and civilian population from pursuing the war to seeking peace.
Post-war objectives, ideally shaped during the conflict itself, concerning the
future profile of the enemy nation or nations, would include the restoration of
a politically viable and economically functional state, sympathetic (in the case
of Australia) to Australia’s national interests.
Operations and activities undertaken during war against an adversary to
achieve the above objectives would, of necessity, be directed at both military
and civilian targets, and be both overt and covert.13  In addition, activities across
the adversary’s NII, DII and relevant GII linkages, that are undertaken to shape
and influence outcomes, would employ destruction and degradation of those
infrastructures. Deception and psychological measures would also exploit the
adversary’s information infrastructures, and those in other countries where
these also could contribute to denigrating the adversary’s capability and will.
In sum, the measures undertaken would encompass the full spectrum of IO
including computer network attack, deception and psychological operations.
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War: targeting allies, friends and neutrals
Other activities undertaken during war would target allies and friendly
countries to boost their morale and commitment to the war effort and post-war
objectives. Such activities would be primarily psychological in nature.
Neutrals would also be targeted, in an effort to persuade them to commit to
the allied cause, or at least counter any enemy propaganda aimed at persuading
them to commit to the axis cause. Such activities would focus primarily on
psychological measures. In certain circumstances, however, where a neutral
country or business enterprise within is supplying important military or
military-support materiél to the adversary, the information infrastructure within
the neutral country that is linked to the production or delivery of that materiél,
could be targeted to cease or disrupt supply.
Non-war situations or circumstances short of war
In these situations and circumstances a range of scenarios exist that may
politically justify targeting another country’s information infrastructures.
Scenarios include, but are not limited to:
• Intelligence gathering directed at obtaining information from the NII, DII
or GII linkages of the targeted country or countries, through activities as
communications intercept, computer network exploitation (CNE)14  and/or
human intelligence (HUMINT) operations. Depending on the country, these
operations could be enduring and undertaken to meet specific national
intelligence requirements, whether political, strategic, military, economic,
societal or any combination of these. The intelligence product would feed
the national assessment and policy process of the collector, enabling that
collector to plan and undertake action to maximise that country’s advantage,
or minimise any disadvantage, relevant to the target.
• Assisting friendly opposition elements in a target country that is hostile or
opposed to our key national security interests, but does not pose the threat
of war, to assist the opposition to bring about a change to that government’s
policy, or indeed change the government itself. Assistance in this scenario
would be mostly covert and generally limited to psychological measures and
possibly deception, but would not include destruction or degradation of the
NII/DII.
• Pre-emptive action against a country with which we are not at war, but
where that country poses an imminent threat to us of war or aggression. As
in the previous scenario, activities could be directed at assisting opposition
elements in the target country to bring about change to that government’s
policy or of the government itself. Opposition elements in this scenario could
include any armed resistance groups, and assistance could incorporate
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psychological measures and covert attacks directed at destroying or degrading
the NII/DII and GII linkages, and deception.
• Pre-emptive action as above, but where the threat of war or aggression is to
allies or friendly governments.
• Activities against hostile occupation forces in an allied or friendly country,
where those invasion and occupation forces involved a country with whom
we are not at war. Activities would be directed at undermining the capability
and morale of occupation forces, while boosting the capability and morale
of resistance forces, in order to force the ultimate withdrawal or capitulation
of the aggressor. Activities would include psychological measures, deception
and the destruction and degradation of the aggressor’s DII and relevant parts
of the occupied country’s NII and GII linkages. Activities generally would
be covert, but the veneer of deniability may be thin. In these circumstances,
psychological and other appropriate activities would also be undertaken
against the targeted aggressor within their country and appropriate third
countries in support of these objectives.
• Disruption activities against an aggressor or hostile non-government
organisation or individual in a third country or countries (e.g. targeting a
terrorist organisation, IMG, criminal group or particular individual who
might pose a specific but serious security risk), in order to destroy, disrupt
or neutralise that group or individual’s actions. Depending on the
circumstances, activities could include the destruction or degradation of NII
and GII linkages, deception, and psychological measures. Activities could
be overt and covert, or a combination of both.
In the case of a terrorist organisation, the breadth and intensity of activities
could match aspects of those undertaken in wartime.
In all circumstances in an Australian context, the above activities would have
the endorsement of government at the highest level, and be coordinated with
other activities that would or may be undertaken by government via other
agencies of government, including its Defence forces, on a unilateral, bilateral
or multilateral basis. Where appropriate, they would also be coordinated with
similar concurrent activities undertaken by allies or friends.
Targeting by non-state organisations
Some targeting considerations applicable to three non-state organisations are
reviewed briefly below. They are terrorist organisations, criminals, and IMGs.
Terrorist organisations
The targeting of information infrastructures by terrorists is normally aimed
at the dissemination of propaganda that promotes the terrorist’s political
objectives. Objectives include justifying and proselytising their own cause and
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actions, disseminating propaganda that emphasises the evils, corruption,
injustices or misguided thinking of their opponents or enemies (usually, but not
exclusively, ideologies, governments, and individuals within government),
winning over converts to their cause, and recruiting new activists. Most terrorist
organisations are very adept in the use of psychological measures across media
outlets or the Internet, and know how to focus their messages to play on the
emotions of their target group. And unlike the Western media or Internet sources
which will often censor graphic descriptions or images of tragic scenes, including
atrocities committed by terrorists, the terrorists themselves will play up
graphically any tragic situation caused by, or which they attribute to, the ‘enemy’
in order to instil high levels of fear and/or hatred of that ‘enemy’. Typical
examples are images of ‘collateral damage’ by their ‘enemy’, involving graphic
pictures of bodies of innocent women and children. Other examples of graphic
releases have been ‘justifiable acts of revenge’ or ‘justice’ in the form of a video
of the execution of an ‘enemy’ agent.15
Other forms of the use of information infrastructures by terrorists are illegal
activities to finance their operations, counterfeiting, and money laundering.
Examples of the former include drug trafficking and credit card fraud. Tamara
Makarenko, an international specialist on criminal affairs, claims that these
activities are widespread amongst some terrorist groups.16  Interestingly, an
autobiography published in 2004 and written by Imam Samudra, one of the
Indonesians involved in the Bali bombings in 2002, includes a chapter entitled
‘Hacking. Why Not?’ In this chapter Samudra urges fellow Muslim radicals to
take the holy war into cyber-space by attacking US computers specifically for
the purpose of credit card fraud. Samudra apparently tried, unsuccessfully, to
finance the Bali bombings by attempting such fraud himself.17  Counterfeiting
has been used for the production of false identity documents for the use of
terrorist members, while money laundering has been used to hide the sources
and quantities of any funds.
Most terrorist organisations are well aware of the vulnerability of their
members’ communications being intercepted when using telephones (mobile or
land line) or the Internet, and have adopted procedures to minimise the risk.
These include maximising the use of ‘clean’ phones by the frequent replacement
of the phone and Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card. One technique for
clandestine communication over the Internet is the use of ‘steganography’,
whereby secret messages are concealed beneath overt messages—a sort of
electronic microdot. Encryption is also used.
The modus operandi of terrorist organisations can vary significantly
depending on their objectives and the sophistication of their training. For
example, in the Philippines many terrorist activities have involved the
destruction of physical infrastructure by explosives or arson, particularly that
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owned by companies who refuse to bow to extortion and meet terrorist demands
for payment of ‘revolutionary taxes’. Targets have included information
infrastructure hardware, and/or supporting infrastructure, such as
communications towers, electricity transmission towers, and electricity
sub-stations. They have been selected not because of any focus on information
infrastructure as such, but simply because such targets are accessible and incur
less risk to the attackers than optional targets. In this sense, they can be described
as opportunistic. But information infrastructure can also be deliberately targeted
where this fits with terrorist objectives.
Publicly available information indicates that while there is evidence that a
number of terrorists use sophisticated computer skills to conduct activities such
as identity theft and credit card fraud, there is no evidence of them having, or
at least using, hacking or other skills to conduct large-scale theft or extortion.
There is, however, no reason to assume terrorists will not learn these skills and
target information infrastructures accordingly, when or if it serves their purpose
to do so.
Criminals
Criminals target information and supporting infrastructure mostly for reasons
of extortion, theft and fraud. Targeting takes two general forms: targeting the
computers themselves to illegally obtain the information within; and using
computers as the implement of, or to facilitate, the crime.18
Targeting in order to access the computers themselves includes such
techniques as hacking, the use of malware to obtain passwords by reading
keystrokes, or insider help to obtain passwords. It also includes theft of the
information within the computer system itself, such as identity information (e.g.
credit card or bank account details of individuals, corporations and government).
The use of computers for criminal purposes has grown in parallel with the
growth of computer availability and the information society generally. Related
criminal activity includes the theft of intellectual property or other forms of
commercial or industrial espionage, the misappropriation of money, money
laundering, scams to solicit money using fraudulent investment schemes, and
embezzlement. Activity also includes the distribution of illegal material such as
child pornography, forgery including breaches of copyright (e.g. production of
pirated compact discs and software), and extortion in its many forms. Types of
extortion include the threat of destroying a corporation’s key databases or
disclosing confidential information within those databases. Implicit in the
blackmail is the willingness to carry out the threat if the corporation fails to
meets the extortionist’s monetary demands.
Part of the criminal modus operandi has been the use of various skills or
methodologies to obtain the necessary personal or other data to access targeted
71
Targeting Information Infrastructures
sites. For example they might use hacking, spyware or phishing to obtain
passwords or personal information, including bank account or credit card details,
for later exploitation. Or they might use a combination of cyber and non-cyber
methods to attack a target, for instance using an ‘insider’ to provide passwords
or other operational data necessary to then plan and mount a cyber-attack. The
skills and methodologies used, at least by some criminals, are very sophisticated.
The use of state-of-the-art software, in operations involving theft and fraud,
may take some time to detect and counter. While the above comprises a diverse
range of criminal activities using cyber-crime, the general categories of crime
are not new: it is, instead, the technology and circumstances involved that are
new.
Like terrorists, criminals also communicate across information infrastructures
using techniques to avoid detection and interception. Such methods also include
steganography, encryption and cut-outs. Indeed, because of the overlap of
systems, it is probable that many of the techniques used by terrorists were
initially sourced from criminals.
Who the criminals are, and the level of their sophistication, will determine
their target selection. International computer crime statistics have shown a steady
annual increase in the frequency of cyber-crime, and reports have surfaced
occasionally about some allegedly highly sophisticated acts of extortion, theft
and fraud involving very significant sums of money.19 The incidence of
computer crime (or cyber-crime) can be expected to increase in proportion to
the growing awareness of and exposure to potential opportunities, assisted by
increasingly higher levels of computer literacy generally, and accessibility to
sophisticated hacking techniques.20
The simple conclusion that can be drawn from this situation is that where
money (or other gain) is involved, the threat of criminal targeting is inevitable.
And the larger the amount of money involved, the more probable the threat.
Issue Motivated Groups
IMGs, including politically motivated groups, most often target information
infrastructures to exploit their reach so as to promote issues to their advantage.
Such promotion may be information that explains or supports their position, or
denigrates that of their opponents. The Internet is frequently used for this
purpose and includes the hosting of websites, and the use of other means such
as YouTube and chat rooms. Issues can be enduring, such as those supporting
a Palestinian homeland or opposing the war in Iraq; more recent issues include
promoting protection of the global environment (which is expected to become
an enduring issue), and current issues include opposition to Japanese whaling.
However, some IMGs actively seek to hack into websites and access
information which they are not authorised to receive, and particularly
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information which, if leaked, would damage their opponent’s position and thus
support their cause. Forged documents or other fabricated information that
advantages an IMG’s position is not that uncommon, and is indeed often used
to keep alive or inflame an issue.
Other forms of action by IMGs can include ‘electronic vandalism’ as a protest
against a specific organisation, by defacing a web page or closing down a website
by the use of Denial of Service (DS) attacks. However, while some IMGs are a
threat to the confidentiality of information that can be exploited to advance
their cause, and do target the functionality of specific infrastructure targets by
electronic vandalism, in general they are not a threat to the broader functionality
of the infrastructure itself.
Individuals
Individuals are a ‘wild card’. They vary from the benign to the highly
dangerous. The former include gifted hackers, some of whom break into restricted
computer systems simply to prove to themselves or their colleagues that they
can do it, but take no further action. They are sometimes referred to as ‘joyriders’.
However, as indicated above, other hackers are highly destructive. They include
writers of malicious software programs, or malware, such as viruses and worms
that can rapidly replicate themselves across computers and networks and cause
significant damage through the destruction or corruption of operating systems
and databases. This group of hackers also includes individuals who deliberately
destroy or degrade hardware and software, or steal, disclose or enable the
disclosure of confidential information from within. They include revenge seekers
such as disgruntled employees, clients or customers.
Threats from individuals are a reality, but the specifics of who, what and
when remain largely unpredictable.21
Targeting: objectives
Having painted the broader background canvas of targeting information
infrastructures, this chapter now reviews the issues of objectives, targets,
capabilities required, vulnerability, accessibility and intelligence. The context is
Defence related, specifically a country at war, but considerations may be scaled
down for application to limited war, crisis or other non-war situations.
The starting point for any plan of action is the end-state or objectives to be
achieved. As earlier stated, the overriding objective of a country at war would
be victory by destroying the military capability and military and civilian support
capacity of the adversary to wage war, and to change the will of their military,
politicians and civilian population from pursuing the war to seeking peace.
Post-war objectives concerning the future profile of the enemy, shaped during
the conflict itself, would include a politically and economically viable and
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functional society sympathetic (in the case of Australia) to Australia’s interests.
Other objectives included boosting the morale and commitment of allies and
friends, and countering efforts by the enemy to win over the sympathy or
support of neutrals.
Targets were seen as psychological or cognitive, and ‘physical’ in terms of
destroying, degrading or manipulating hardware, software, information, and
power supply. People who operated or maintained the infrastructure could be
targeted both psychologically and physically. Activities undertaken also could
be overt and covert.
Both psychological and physical targets impact on the decision cycle. While
perhaps self evident in the case of psychological operations, anything that can
impact on an enemy’s collection or ‘observe’ capability22  (e.g. reconnaissance
and surveillance) or their analysis or ‘orient’ capability (e.g. access to intelligence
databases) will affect decisions and actions. And, often, incorrect or impaired
decisions and actions can generate their own psychological effects which may
adversely impact on morale and commitment, and on subsequent
decision-making.
The above overarching objectives are strategic; objectives would also be set
at the operational and tactical level, in all cases in support of and coordinated
with achieving the higher aim.
Some examples follow. A basic military capability objective at the
strategic/operational/tactical level would be to hide or disguise friendly-force
manoeuvre from enemy observation, to achieve surprise. Targeting in this
scenario would include the destruction or disruption of critical enemy satellite
ground stations in order to neutralise headquarters-controlled imagery,
reconnaissance and surveillance resources at that time. This action would also
be supported by electronic deception activities.
Another basic objective would be the disruption to an enemy’s logistic supply
capability that provided critical support to the enemy’s combat capability needs.
Information systems on which such logistic supply depends could be targeted
at the strategic, operational and tactical level. Besides the direct impact of logistic
disruption to the enemy’s warfighting capability, this impact would also affect
enemy morale. Negative morale could be further exploited by appropriately
tailored psychological operations (psyops).
A further objective using psyops to reach a broad multinational audience
would be targeting the morale of the enemy, the morale and commitment of their
supporters, the commitment of our allies and friends, and attitudes of neutrals,
by the dissemination of adverse publicity, or propaganda, about any enemy
illegal, unethical, immoral, or otherwise culturally insensitive activities. Issues
exploited could include those affecting the treatment or welfare of
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non-combatants in occupied areas, particular religious or ethnic groups, or
political or military prisoners.23
Methods of delivering intended messages or publicity across information
infrastructures could include all forms of domestic and international media (radio,
television and newspapers), the Internet, and the use of phones, especially mobile
phones (via oral or Short Message Service (SMS)), in enemy country or countries,
and appropriate third countries. Methods chosen may need to circumvent severe
censorship in enemy and enemy-occupied countries. Scope also exists for the
focused use of disinformation. However, while disinformation can be an effective
tool, especially for short-term gain, it is a double-edged sword. User credibility
can be compromised if it is blatantly exposed or excessively used by the same
source.
A final example relates to coordinated cyber-attack and psychological
operations at the tactical level against enemy occupation forces in a third country.
This scenario assumes our forces are deployed against the enemy in the combat
zone, the existence of an armed and capable resistance behind enemy lines with
whom we are in contact and can coordinate operations, and whose post-war
political ambitions, together with those of the local population generally in
enemy-occupied areas, are compatible with ours. The enemy’s C4ISREW
capability would be fully targeted, using all resources available to us, including
the local resistance against related targets as directed by us. The result, especially
at a time of proposed major combat operations aimed at inflicting serious losses
on and, potentially, the withdrawal or capitulation of the local enemy forces,
would be to severely disrupt the enemy’s surveillance capability and thus
knowledge of the battlefield, his decision-making and C2 capability generally,
thereby giving us the significant combat advantage we need to win.
Concurrent psyops, and those mounted after the battle, would be directed
at boosting the morale of the resistance and local population generally, and
demoralising further the enemy. Psyops would not only target friend and foe
in the immediate area of combat operations, but those in adjacent areas that will
be the scene of future combat operations.
The above are indicative examples only, and specific objectives may involve
highly complex plans necessitating the coordination of highly varied resources
across many different countries. But the starting point is clearly identifying the
objectives (primary and other), both physical and psychological, and then
applying the requirements, assessment and planning methodology.
Targeting: capabilities required
Australia requires a comprehensive physical and psychological operations
capability to effectively target, attack or exploit information infrastructures in
support of its national and Defence interests. That capability is essential, not
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just as a part of a twenty-first century warfighting capability, but also as an
option for power projection across the whole spectrum of national interests in
both war and non-war situations. Developing and maintaining such a capability
would not be without challenge.
All significant national security and Defence capabilities cost money and
resources, and this chapter does not attempt to cost all resource requirements.
Four considerations do, however, apply:
• First, Australia has long recognised the need to develop and maintain a
technological edge in its regional warfighting capability. That edge has been
progressively eroded as neighbours develop and acquire new technology
weapons and thus capabilities. IO is not only a new technology capability,
but offers to many countries a significant asymmetrical warfare capability
if properly used. All regional countries in East Asia are aware of this. In the
case of technologically advanced countries such as China, Japan, South Korea,
Taiwan and Singapore, the concept of IO has been accepted, and the
capability is reportedly well developed. If Australia is to remain in the
advanced-technology sphere, IO is a capability that must be acquired.
• Second, used in the right circumstances and the right way, the application
of this holistic capability in some circumstances may well avoid the need to
engage in combat operations. Or it might otherwise significantly reduce the
scope of combat operations. Not only might this save a significant number
of lives of Australian Service personnel, but it would be a significantly
cheaper option than engaging in major combat operations. The cost of a
comprehensive capability needs to be assessed against the totality of the
national security budget, the cost of other warfighting capabilities, their
effectiveness at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and particularly
the cost of major combat inventory items such as aircraft and ships that could
be lost in combat operations.
• Third, acquiring the capability would not be a substitute for other existing
or planned capabilities, but would supplement those capabilities. This new
capability offers not only support to existing capabilities, but a greater reach
of military and general national security options, and a greater flexibility of
options.
• Fourth, the blocks on which to build a comprehensive capability are already
in place. What is required is the identification and acquisition of the necessary
additional equipment and skill sets, in a similar vein to any other priority
national security requirement.
A comprehensive capability to target information infrastructures includes,




A basic psyops capability exists within Defence. The Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade (DFAT) does not have this specific capability; it has expertise
in advocacy. Understanding and developing a capability that properly meets
national IO requirements needs to be developed. Part of such a development
will necessitate comprehensive databases within the Defence Intelligence
Organisation (DIO) on the region’s inhabitants (demographics, characteristics of
race, culture, religion, relationships within and between ethnic and religious
groups, national aspirations, and attitudes to Australia). Databases must also
include comprehensive details on how these individuals communicate
domestically and internationally (e.g. Internet, media, landline and mobile
telephone, personal meetings) and the relative influence of the different methods
of communications.
Much of this knowledge already exists within Australia, within various
universities, Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), and our immigrant
population. But accurately interpreting this information, and knowing how to
properly and effectively use it to meet specific objectives, requires a great deal
of skill. It is essential that the people be profiled to accurately reflect who they
really are and what attitudes and thinking they hold, rather than who we would
like them to be and what we would like them to think.
‘Wargaming’ in psyops involving, as a minimum, Defence, DFAT, the
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPM&C) and relevant Ministers is
also essential. Key decision-makers and those responsible for policy
implementation and practice must develop an informed understanding of the
most appropriate use of psyops in different circumstances, including nation
building and national cohesion.
Database management
A detailed knowledge and maintenance of current databases is required of the
NII, DII and GII linkages in all relevant countries within our regional area of
interest. Databases should include specific knowledge about operational aspects,
vulnerabilities and accessibility relevant to the systems and networks that make
up these structures. The DSD will have a lead role in assembling this knowledge.
Computer Network Operations (CNO)
Knowledge and experience is required in the full range of CNO skill sets,
including destruction, degradation, manipulation, and intelligence extraction.24
This must include the practical know-how of hacking into all relevant
commercially available and other IT operating systems, and the development
and placement of trap-doors, ‘Trojan horses’, viruses, worms and the like.
Knowledge and expertise must also include cascade effects, and how to monitor
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the effects of CNO. DSD and DIO will have the lead roles in developing this
capability.
The potential application of CNO skill sets raises a number legally (and
politically) sensitive issues such as hacking through the information
infrastructures of neutral countries, and the ability to destroy or disrupt major
commercial IT systems or equipment, including satellites, by different forms of
electronic attack. These legal issues need to be addressed, and also considered
in the Rules of Engagement (ROE) in any operational application.
Other weapons and methodologies
Other weapons and methodologies for attacking and destroying or degrading
information systems must be developed. Weapons will include those that employ
high-powered microwave, and directed energy, including laser beams. The
Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) will have a lead role in
the development of this capability.
Media
It will be necessary to acquire a radio and television capability that can beam
broadcasts into target countries. In the event that these broadcasts are jammed
by the target country, a capability to break into and override existing radio and
television broadcasts within the target country is also required. Psyops specialists,
in cooperation with other key contributors, will have a lead role in selecting
which individuals should do the broadcasting, and the appropriate content of
broadcasts.
HUMINT assets
HUMINT assets must be acquired and other specialist HUMINT assistance
provided, in target and third countries, in support of all aspects of physical,
psychological and deception operations. The Australian Secret Intelligence
Service (ASIS) would have the lead role in providing these assets and assistance.
Additional capabilities
Any other capabilities which are required would build on those already in
existence. These include conventional and other specialist intercept techniques,
decryption and EW.
Targeting: vulnerability and accessibility
Vulnerability and accessibility are also critical elements to the targeting process.
There is an interdependence between both these elements and capability. Any
potential vulnerability that is also accessible cannot be exploited unless the
attacker has the requisite capability.
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There is also an interdependence between vulnerability and accessibility. As
for capability, any known or potential vulnerability cannot be exploited unless
some relevant component is accessible.
Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities include:
• Identified weaknesses in a system due to inadequate security procedures or
processes designed to prevent unauthorised access (e.g. passwords, level of
encryption).
• Weaknesses due to the failure of a person or persons to follow proper security
procedures to prevent unauthorised access (e.g. improper disclosure of
passwords or security procedures, disclosure of classified information over
open line telephones or the Internet, failure to secure buildings or security
containers housing critical hardware or software).
• Physical access to parts of the infrastructure that are not protected by
physical or electronic barriers of some kind (e.g. fibre-optic cable runs or
radio/microwave transmission towers outside protected establishments).
• Nodes or physical choke points where different parts of an infrastructure
are concentrated and which, therefore, offer a rich assembly of targets. Nodes
can offer the benefits of economy and concentration of force, and the
outcome, if attacked, of more significant damage and delays in restoring
functionality than if an individual component only was attacked.
• Vulnerability may be a product of interdependence and complexity, i.e. the
more interdependent and complex the infrastructure, the more vulnerable
the information or systems if almost any part of the infrastructure is
destroyed, disrupted or manipulated.
• Vulnerability may also be a product of the time required to repair the
infrastructure or reinstate business continuity, e.g. the longer the time it
takes to repair or replace hardware, software or human components to restore
functionality, the more vulnerable the target. Critical components that
significantly affect functionality and require extended time to repair or
replace are the preferred targets.
Accessibility
Accessibility is multifaceted. It may seek to target one or more of the key criteria
of IA, e.g. availability, integrity or authentication. It could also target any one
component of hardware, software, information, the people who operate and
maintain, or power supply, or it may be a combination of these. Targeting might




Examples of direct access in order to destroy or disrupt key hardware could
range from a missile strike, to sabotage by resistance forces or Special Forces.
Direct access in order to intercept the enemy’s communications may require
‘tapping’ into accessible fibre-optic cables. It might also include destroying an
enemy’s primary communications route that is inaccessible to tapping or other
forms of intercept, in order to force the target to use an alternative
communications route that is accessible. HUMINT assets, potentially, could assist
directly in all the above situations.
Indirect access to degrade, corrupt or manipulate data within a critical enemy
intelligence or logistic database could be achieved by hacking into that database
through third countries. Important information about an enemy’s intentions
might also reside in, for example, their embassy or an axis partner’s embassy in
a third country. That information might be accessible in that country, but not
elsewhere, through HUMINT, signals intelligence (SIGINT) or CNO operations
mounted there.
A final example could be ‘disruption’ at a critical time to enemy
communications across a foreign-owned satellite, through cooperation by the
foreign owners/operators of the satellite service, or a HUMINT asset among those
who operate or maintain that facility.
All information infrastructures are potentially vulnerable in some way. The
issue is where and how. While an initial assessment might suggest a particular
objective is impossible, it might actually prove to be possible with the application
of lateral thinking. The issue then is whether the risk and resources are worth
it.
Intelligence
The quality of intelligence input into the targeting of information infrastructures
will largely determine the effectiveness of the targeting outcomes.
As previously mentioned, the intelligence applies to psychological
requirements as much as to requirements related to all components of the
infrastructures themselves. These requirements are comprehensive and need to
be identified and fulfilled in advance of any crisis or conflict, not once they
occur.
Many of the requirements may be met from open-source material or overt
means. Examples are sociological and related information about the people, and
details about the information infrastructures themselves, especially the NII and
GII. Covert collection requirements will also apply, covering aspects of all
components (hardware, software, and details about the information, people and
power supply) across both the NII and particularly the DII.
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High-quality analysis of the intelligence is also critical. This necessity applies
across the board, but particularly in psyops related areas where judgements
about the people in our region and their responses in various wartime situations
and post-war aspirations may be a difficult and, at times, controversial call.
‘Wargaming’ that identifies intelligence gaps and challenges assessments (as
well as developing skills and experience) will form an important part of the
intelligence process.
Conclusion
The information society has seen the introduction of rapid technological change
that has conditioned how we now live, think, decide and act. From a national
perspective, harnessing this change to our national advantage is important, as
is protecting our interests from its exploitation by others.
Defence, as for other key national security and wellbeing issues, is particularly
important. Defence has acknowledged and embraced the offerings of the new
technologies, and is now moving down the path of a networked force that will
deliver efficiencies across the whole C4ISREW spectrum. This is also the case in
countries within our region, and in other areas where the ADF could be
operationally deployed.
In war, our objective would be to win by destroying an enemy’s capability
to fight as well as their will to fight. This objective entails political, strategic,
military, economic, and societal elements and targets. The objectives are both
psychological and physical.
A country’s NII, DII and GII linkages enable the information society, including
its Defence capability. The ability to target and attack the information
infrastructures of an enemy in war, or to exploit those of allies, friends or
neutrals, must be part of a Defence capability and a national capability. The
requirement may also exist to target these infrastructures in non-war
circumstances. Developing the capability to target foreign information
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As discussed in chapter 2, the concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW)
anticipates ready access to information. This demands an ability to protect
information such that its security can be as assured as its ready access. From a
military perspective, therefore, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) must balance
the quest for information superiority against the potential for creating an
operational vulnerability. And it must do this within the broader context of
balancing security and privacy as it increasingly shares information. From a
national perspective, the Australian Government will wish to balance these same
issues as it shares information across national security agencies and possibly
with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).
Reliance on information and information systems and addressing the
consequent vulnerabilities raises the question of protecting along a
spectrum—from simple failure to attacks from terrorists or state-based
adversaries. Cyber-security demands far more attention, and while protecting
critical information infrastructure addresses much of the problem, more needs
to be done. Government and Defence need to develop a trusted information
infrastructure and put in place the mechanism for Australia to protect its critical
information infrastructure.
In addressing these issues, this chapter provides frameworks for dealing with
operational vulnerabilities, cyber-terrorism, privacy, and security risk, which
can be managed at the Defence enterprise level for the ADF and at the
whole-of-government level for national issues.
Balancing information superiority and operational
vulnerability
The pressure to ensure both a superior information position as well as security
of that information within an environment of increased sharing of information
has been building with the rise of NCW, increases in coalitions to deal with
security threats and challenges, and the focus on domestic security since the 11
September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. Information superiority
for the ADF will come from:1
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• seamless machine-to-machine integration of all manned and unmanned
systems, including those in space, across the joint force;
• real-time pictures of the battlefield;
• predictive battlespace awareness—driven by commanders who will be
required to predict and pre-empt adversary actions when and where they
choose;
• assured use of information through effective Information Assurance (IA) and
defensive Information Operations (IOs); and
• denial of effective use of information to adversaries through offensive IOs.
Achieving a balance between access to information and protection of that
information is something of a contradiction in this age of information and
globalisation. Ensuring access to information involves a number of key concepts
and assumptions as follows:
• The concepts of ‘Information Superiority’ and NCW imply that all ADF
commanders will have full access to relevant information.
• Commanders at all levels will continue to deal with uncertainty or the ‘fog
of war’ due to a lack of complete and accurate information.
• ‘Reach back’ will allow support functions to be provided from outside the
area of operations, thereby reducing the ‘footprint’ of the deployed force in
the area of operations.
• There will be increasing use of civilian communications for strategic systems
into the area of operations and for tactical systems within that area, through
out-sourcing and commercialisation. These systems will have to be integrated
with any Defence-owned and operated systems and with the systems of other
Government agencies.
• The concept of ‘national information economy and infrastructure’ promotes
the efficiencies of computer-based business automation and Internet-based
services, which will apply equally to the national security arena.
Improved information accuracy and responsiveness are seen as key attributes
that help reduce the probability of failure in modern military operations. The
side which is not confounded by the ‘fog of war’ and which can get inside the
decision cycle of the adversary can expect to have a higher probability of success.
Information superiority requires connectivity and interoperability across all
relevant force elements so that synchronised operations can be carried out at an
appropriate operational tempo. The political sensitivities of operations also
demand that adequate information and reporting is available at higher levels
outside the area of operations.
Vulnerabilities
In terms of vulnerabilities that the ADF could introduce through increased
information sharing and access, the following points are relevant:2
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• Dependence on real-time information and intelligence introduces one form
of vulnerability, while the sharing of that information and intelligence
introduces another.
• Similarly, dependence on the security and information management policies
of coalition partners and other agencies introduces one form of vulnerability,
while the new interfaces with those policies of external partners introduces
another.
• Key information relating to operations is distributed widely at the strategic,
operational and tactical levels and is shared with coalition partners and other
agencies.
• Commanders at all levels are exposed to information overload, which can
saturate their ability to cope.
• Time-sensitive decisions can be slowed while commanders seek greater
clarification of the situation, in the belief that the last piece of information
can be found.
• Australian Government networks are dependent on commercial or allied
communication systems.
• The adversary, whether State-based or simply an individual, has equal access
to modern global communications and the Internet.
• Perceptions generated in political and public minds become reality and,
therefore, have to be factored into any strategic and operational planning.
• More information is available at lower levels of command where there is a
higher probability of capture by an adversary.
The advantages of access to information through Defence’s restricted and
secret systems in the normal execution of duties are expected by all personnel.
Access to external email and the Internet for daily business is also expected.
This dependency introduces potential vulnerabilities associated with the
management of a large organisation such as Defence as follows:
• The dependence on email and Intranet for the conduct of business, both
inside and outside the Department, means that any disruption of the networks
and applications would have an immediate effect on the functioning of
Defence.
• External connectivity provides an easy avenue for the manipulation of, and
attack on, Defence’s information.
• Deliberate or inadvertent misuse of the restricted system for the transmission
of classified information outside Defence provides an easy avenue for the
media (through whistle blowers, leakers, or paid informants) or adversaries
(through sympathisers, agents or supporters).
• Disruption of personnel and pay processes would have an immediate impact
on the morale and well-being of military and civilian personnel, more so
when they are deployed on operations.
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• Some Defence functions are contracted out and depend on e-business
arrangements.
Balancing security and privacy in information sharing
Evolving national security policy in both Australia and the United States is
seeking higher levels of cooperation, information sharing and system-to-system
interaction across Government agencies and between the public and private
sectors. Any implementation of trusted information sharing systems will demand
that a number of components be addressed:3
• collaboratively developed public and private sector policies;
• the use of available frameworks, architectures, standards and technologies;
and
• the deployment of systems that integrate effective risk management controls.
All three components are needed in developing trusted systems, which meet
three key requirements for privacy and security—government and business
requirements as well as citizen expectations.
Where possible, existing bodies of knowledge, current technologies and
standards-based products should be used to build and manage the infrastructure
for information sharing. In terms of information security, threat management,
identity management, access management, and security command and control,
capabilities exist today and can be applied effectively once appropriate policies
and business processes have been established.4
As business privacy and personal privacy continue to become major issues
for critical infrastructure protection across both the public and private sectors,
an architecture will be needed to address privacy protection and to develop
requirements for appropriate information privacy controls. Technologies, such
as business intelligence, data management, enterprise management, and storage
management systems are currently available to meet requirements.5  However,
more needs to be done to build on the work in the private sector to foster business
and personal privacy system architectures and to establish standards-based
interoperability.
In the United States, the National Strategy for Homeland Security (July 2002)
and the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (February 2003) demanded
unprecedented levels of cooperation and system-to-system interaction among
private sector companies and all levels of government to ensure protection of
national critical infrastructure.6 This applies equally to Australia and the way
in which the National Counter-Terrorism Committee addresses national critical
infrastructure issues that reach across the Commonwealth, States and Territories.
As John Sabo argues, for the United States:
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This will involve new and trusted working relationships among
organisations which have had little formal interaction on infrastructure
protection issues, as well as on issues such as new systems, expanded
network interfaces and significant increases in data collections, data
flows, and data integration, analysis and dissemination.7
This applies equally in Australia, where common information security and
infrastructure protection aspects across Government agencies need to be seen
more as a national capability issue rather than simply as an operational support
issue.
Managing security risk
There are four key areas in managing security risk—threat management, identity
management, access management, and security command and control. These are
discussed below.8
Threat Management controls are needed to protect networks and systems
against external and internal threats. They must also be able to assess
vulnerabilities, and identify and mitigate physical and systems-based risks and
attacks. Essentially, it is these controls that protect the critical infrastructure.
Identity Management controls are needed to provide a foundation for
‘registering’ users and for establishing role-based access, as well as enabling
role-based and portal views of information and applications. However, uniform
policy development will be necessary to address the diverse perspectives of the
different organisations involved.
Access Management controls are needed to protect classified, regulated and
business-sensitive resources; control how resources are accessed and used; and
ensure authorised availability across networks, systems and platforms.
Tiered controls for access management will probably be needed to reflect
roles, information classification requirements, and particular organisational rules
for information and for participants across the breadth of participating
organisations and users. This will become increasingly important if new
classification categories for sensitive critical infrastructure information are
instigated that fall outside the scope of current security classification levels (such
as Secret and Top Secret for Defence and Protected and Highly Protected for
non-Defence agencies).
Security Command and Control capability is needed to effectively manage
the security of the networked infrastructures. This includes such things as
resource management, impact correlation, secure collaboration, intelligent




Privacy is defined as ‘the proper handling of personally identifiable or business
confidential information in accordance with policies having the consent of the
data subject or as required by law or regulation’.9
Open standards-based architectures, protocols, languages or schemas do not
yet exist for ensuring that privacy rules and policies can be embodied in
Information Technology (IT) systems or for allowing them to be interoperable
across networks that manage the collection and processing of information. Both
personal privacy and business privacy requirements must be engineered into
the new cyber-security architecture if Australia and the ADF are to develop and
field trusted systems.
The vast quantities of data and information that may ultimately flow across
network and jurisdictional boundaries will eventually demand automated
management of relevant policy rules. These standardised policies and protocols
will be needed for scalability, efficiency and trust reasons. Any rules will have
to be enforced within an overall governance framework, the start point for which
will be a privacy architecture.
There are several already defined services and capabilities that will assist in
addressing privacy controls for information sharing. These include:10
• control and data usage functionality, to ensure that policies drive business
rules processing;
• certification of system credentials;
• validation of data;
• interaction of data subjects, systems and processes;
• individual and business access to data as well as audit capability;
• use of agents, both technology-based and/or human;
• negotiation where appropriate; and
• enforcement of policy violations.
Many of these framework services can be supported by currently available
technologies in business intelligence, data management, enterprise management
and storage management, particularly when applied to enterprise implementations
of data-sharing systems.11
Dangers in getting privacy wrong
In March 2004, the Australian Federal Privacy Commissioner, Malcolm Crompton,
argued that the case for stronger identity management was being made as a key
element for preventing terrorism, preventing identity fraud, and even eliminating
spam. Indeed, the case was strengthened as proponents argued how important
identity management was for e-business and e-health.12
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Malcolm Crompton highlighted some of the dangers for the community,
business and government of getting privacy wrong when developing identity
management solutions:13
• Subversion—the natural response of unwilling or suspicious participants,
from reduced participation and deliberately misleading information all the
way through to more active resistance.
• Pent up reaction that can produce very strong public policy responses, such
as the legislative responses in the United States creating the ‘Do Not Call’
list to keep out direct marketers or the worldwide movement against spam.
• Financial loss when developed projects must be shelved.
• Self-defeating solutions that create new threats to privacy, security and
identity integrity.
• Creating the foundation for a total surveillance society, the full implications
of which may only be recognised after it is too late.
Technological solutions can be a key part of getting privacy right in this area.
Some technologies, such as biometrics, have the potential to enhance privacy
depending on how carefully they are designed and implemented. But some of
our thinking needs to change, such as the assumption that full identification is
needed in all circumstances. Solutions to the issues that Crompton highlights
include finding the right answers through technology, law and accountability
processes. A critical issue will be the need to fully engage all stakeholders in
vigorous public debate along the way.14
Search engines, such as Google, have become increasingly more powerful,
just as the World Wide Web has become a richer source of information as more
individuals, businesses and government agencies rely on it more and more to
transmit and share information. The information is stored on servers that are
linked to the Internet.
Any errors can lead to this information, which is not meant for public
viewing, being made available to the public. Errors can come through
improperly-configured servers, inadequacies in computer security systems, or
simply human error. It is virtually impossible to pull back the information once
a search engine has found it.
An article in the Sydney Morning Herald on 18 February 200415  highlighted
that Google’s search engine ‘crawled’ over every web page on the Internet on
a bi-weekly basis. It ‘grabbed’ not only every page on every public server, but
also every link attached to every page, and then catalogued the information.
The article16  also highlights vulnerabilities which can bring up spreadsheets,
credit card numbers and social security numbers linked to a list of customers,
as well as total dollar figures in financial spreadsheets. It would be virtually
impossible to monitor the tens of millions of searches that occur every day,
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according to a search engine expert, Tom Wilde.17 The concern goes even
further in terms of the potential for identity theft and identity fraud, as well as
other cyber-crime aspects discussed in chapter 3.
Research by AusCERT18 found that 42 per cent of 200 organisations surveyed
had information compromised through attacks on their IT networks. That same
research highlighted that in 2001 Optus was breached and 425 000 user names
and passwords were compromised.19
Cyber-security
Thomas Homer-Dixon postulates a future scenario:20  In different parts of a US
state, half a dozen small groups of men and women gather. Each travels in a
rented mini-van to its prearranged destination—for some, a location outside one
of the hundreds of electrical substations throughout the state: for others, a point
upwind from key, high-voltage transmission lines. The groups unload their
equipment from the vans. Those outside the substations put together simple
mortars made from materials bought at local hardware stores, while those near
the transmission lines use helium to inflate weather balloons with long silvery
tails. At a precisely coordinated moment, the homemade mortars are fired,
sending showers of aluminium chaff over the substations. The balloons are
released and drift into the transmission lines.
Simultaneously, other groups are doing the same thing along the eastern
seaboard and in the south and southwest of the United States. A national electrical
system already under heavy strain is short-circuited, causing a cascade of power
failures across the country. Traffic lights shut off. Water and sewerage systems
are disabled. Communications systems break down. The financial system and
national economy come to a halt. And if that is not of sufficient concern, Brad
Ashley21  of the US Air Force notes that:
Today’s battlefields transcend national borders. Cyberspace adds an
entirely new dimension to military operations, and the ubiquitous
dependence on information technology in both the government and
commercial sectors increases exponentially the opportunities for
adversaries as well as the potential ramification of attacks.22
Indeed, Ashley goes well beyond Homer-Dixon’s scenario and depicts a
number of scenarios all rolled into one devastating attack.23  Ashley postulates
that military systems are under relentless electronic attack and the global media
is reporting these attacks with great zeal, thereby adding to the problem. An
unknown adversary has seized control of military logistics, transportation and
administration systems associated with deployment of forces.
Commercial websites are inundated with requests for connection, which
paralyses parts of the Internet. Worldwide computer virus attacks occur, affecting
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over 60 million computers, including military systems. An orchestrated campaign
of individuals flooding Defence and security websites is carried out, a cyber
Jihad is started, and national infrastructure computers are infiltrated, leading
to raw sewage being released into rivers and coastal waters.
Worse still, Defence networks are penetrated, power grids are infiltrated and
shut down, computer problems close the stock market in several capitals. The
competitive media helps spread the ensuing panic throughout the world.
If these incidents sound plausible, it is because they have occurred, in varying
forms and to varying levels of success over a lengthy period of time. However,
were they to be orchestrated over a very short time span as Ashley postulates,
their results could be devastating.
To some, the scenarios postulated of Homer-Dixon and Ashley may have
sounded far-fetched in 2000; however, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks
on the United States changed all that. Many nations have since realised that their
societies are susceptible to terrorist attacks. There are two trends that explain
this: the growing technological capacity of small groups or even individuals to
wreak havoc; and the increasing vulnerability of economic and technological
systems to quite deliberate and specific attacks.
Adding to the vulnerabilities are the changing communications technologies
that now encompass satellite phones and the Internet which permit the
coordination of resources and activities across the world. Criminal and terrorist
organisations can use the Internet to share information on weapons and tactics,
transfer funds, and plan criminal activities or attacks. The links between crime
and terrorist organisations mean that any criminal cyber-attack could be financing
a terrorist organisation. Identity theft is also cause for concern for banks and
financial institutions, as once again a criminal cyber-attack could be linked to
a terrorist organisation.
There are several reasons why hackers will seek to gain illegal access to IT
systems. These include: to gain financially, to commit sabotage, to steal identities,
to commit fraud, to carry out espionage, or to cover up other physical theft. The
level of sophistication needed to hack into sites has decreased while the
availability of hacking tools has increased substantially. As Ashley notes,
adversaries in cyber-space require minimal technology, little training or funding,
no infrastructure support, and can launch attacks from anywhere at anytime.24
A report in 2004 by Trend Micro indicated that viruses affecting personal
computers (PCs) cost businesses worldwide some US$13 billion in damages in
2001, US$20 billion in 2002, and US$55 billion in 2003.25  Add to this, the




Information-processing technologies have also boosted the power of terrorists
by allowing them to hide or encrypt their messages, with the power of a modern
lap-top computer today exceeding anything that could have been imagined three
to four decades ago. Not only can terrorists and criminals run readily available
sophisticated encryption software, they can also use less advanced computer
technologies to achieve similar effect. Steganography (hidden writing) that allows
people to embed messages into digital photographs or music clips which can
then be posted on the World Wide Web for subsequent downloading was
reportedly used by terrorists who planned an attack on the US embassy in Paris
in 2004.27
The World Wide Web also provides ample access to information about critical
infrastructure. For example, the floor plans and design of the World Trade Center
in New York were readily available, as was information on how to collapse large
buildings. Instructions for making bombs and other destructive materials are
also readily available. Indeed, practically anything needed on kidnapping,
bomb-making, and assassination is now available on-line.28
Australia’s economic and technological systems make the nation, the
Government and the ADF all the more vulnerable because of the
interconnectedness across modern society and the increasing geographic
concentration of wealth, people, knowledge, and communication links such as
highways, rail lines, electrical grids, and fibre-optic cables. As societies
modernise, their networks become more interconnected, which means that the
number of nodes increases, the links among the nodes increases, and the speed
at which things move across these links increases. All of this adds to the rich
array of potential targets.
Not only does vulnerability increase through greater numbers, but also the
features of interconnected networks can make their behaviour unstable and
unpredictable. One obvious example is that of a stock market crash, in which
selling drives down prices, which, in turn, leads to more selling. The tight
coupling of networks also makes it more likely that problems with one node can
spread to others. The United States has experienced a number of cascading effects
when electrical, telephone, and air traffic systems have suffered partial failure,
which has spread across the country. In addition, the nature of these networks
also sees a small shock producing a disproportionately large disruption.29
A special commission set up by President Bill Clinton in 1997 reported that
‘growing complexity and interdependence, especially in the energy and
communications infrastructures, create an increased possibility that a rather
minor and routine disturbance can cascade into a regional outage’. The
commission continued: ‘We are convinced that our vulnerabilities are increasing
steadily, that the means to exploit those weaknesses are readily available and
that the costs [of launching an attack] continue to drop’.30
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So much for physical networks: what about psychological networks?
Australian citizens are nodes in this network, linked through the Internet,
satellites, fibre-optic cables, radio, and television news. Immediately after a
crisis, the media and others report the story across this network. Televisions
stay on, telephone lines and e-mail messages are used constantly, to the extent
that services, especially the Internet, become noticeably slower immediately
after the event.
The Australian Government should expect terrorists of the future to target
the critical networks that underpin society. This would include networks for
producing and distributing energy, information, water, and food; the highways,
railways, and airports that make up the nation’s transportation grid; and the
health care system.31 While an attack on the food system would be of greatest
concern to people, vulnerability of the energy and information networks attract
a lot of attention because they so clearly underpin the vitality of modern
economies.32
The use of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems that
monitor and direct equipment at unmanned facilities from a central point pose
a worrying potential vulnerability. In 1998, a 12-year old hacker gained control
of the SCADA systems that run the Roosevelt Dam in Arizona and, in 2001, a
disgruntled worker, Vitek Boden,33  released waste water in Maroochy Shire,
Queensland. More than three million SCADA devices exist throughout the
world.34
The real concern is that these SCADA networks sit ‘squarely at the intersection
of the digital and physical worlds. They’re vulnerable, they’re unpatchable, and
they’re connected to the Internet’.35
SCADA systems are used to digitise and automate tasks such as opening and
closing valves in pipes and circuit breakers, monitoring temperatures and
pressures, and managing machinery on the assembly line. As these systems
connect to corporate networks and as those corporate networks connect to the
Internet or adopt wireless technology, the vulnerabilities become more
pronounced. The power grid could be taken down, emergency telephone systems
could be rendered useless, floodgates to a dam could be disabled, and so on.
These control systems have been designed and developed with efficiency
and reliability in mind, not security. Many of the legacy control systems cannot
accommodate the newer security technologies such as encryption. Compounding
these technical difficulties is a range of cultural and management issues, firmly
rooted in the physical world, that pays scant attention to cyber-security concerns.
Initially, SCADA systems were developed with proprietary technology, with
no connectivity to corporate networks. However, the impact of globalisation
and the Information Age demanded greater efficiency, greater transparency and
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greater connectivity, which resulted in linking the control networks to corporate
networks. This means that hackers who seek to insert worms and viruses in
corporate networks can get an additional dividend in that any connectivity to
control systems that are not turned off can be affected by the worm or virus.
It was in this way that the Sasser virus disabled several oil platforms in the
Gulf of Mexico for two days in 2004, while the SoBig virus affected the rail
signalling and dispatching systems of CSX Transportation in August 2003,
stopping train services for up to six hours.36
While Distributed Control Systems were the predominant form of control
systems decades ago, whereby they existed within a small geographic area (say
a single manufacturing plant), had all components (hardware, software, master
controllers, workstations, etc) provided by the same vendor, and operated over
a dedicated Local Area Network, that is no longer the case. The proliferation of
SCADA systems across a wide geographic area to distribute oil and electricity
in the main sees a lot of master systems communicating with remote devices over
the Internet, wireless radio, the public telephone system, or private microwave
and fibre-optic networks. The remote units are not only controlled by their
master, they also send real-time data back.
The SCADA networks themselves are also vulnerable because of their
dependency on the telecommunications that support them. Transmissions could
be intercepted and altered, redirected or even destroyed, so the transport medium
introduces another area of vulnerability. The use of dial-up modems, where little
or no authentication is required, introduces yet another form of vulnerability.
Not many companies would operate today without firewalls and Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) on their IT networks, yet very few have such security
mechanisms on their control networks. Even if firewall filters were fitted to the
control networks, most firewalls have been designed to filter Internet Protocols
(IPs) but not control system protocols.
It is not just about improving SCADA systems, however. More can be done
to improve the information security on the corporate networks. Improved router
configuration, antivirus software, IDS, and more diligent software patching
would all help reduce the vulnerability. There are also non-technology actions
that can be taken, such as improved configuration management, better
documentation of network architectures, and better contingency planning.37
Returning to the broader issue of cyber-terrorism, it is worth noting the US
House Armed Services Committee’s Sub-committee on Terrorism, Unconventional
Threats and Capabilities consideration of ‘Cyber Terrorism: The New Asymmetric
Threat’38 on 24 July 2003. The Committee chairman, Jim Saxton, argued that
the rapid flow of information was becoming increasingly important on the
battlefield. He said that in the nineteenth century three words per minute could
be transferred whilst 38 830 soldiers were needed to provide information over
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10 square kilometres. In the 1990–91 Gulf War, the transmission rate was
increased to 192 000 words per minute whilst only 24 soldiers were needed to
cover 10 square kilometres. It is expected that by 2010 the data transfer rate
will be further increased to one trillion words per minute whilst only three
soldiers will be needed to cover 10 square kilometres.39
At the same hearing, Dr Eugene Spafford40  said that threats from malicious
software (malware) had grown steadily for 15 years and threatened military,
government, industry, academic and general public information systems. The
interconnections across these segments of the community meant that a threat to
one could readily spread to the others. His concern is exacerbated by the
malware’s use of victim computers to carry out the attack, which presents an
asymmetric threat to computer systems.
Spafford went on to say that the malware threat to US systems, and the
military in particular, is significant because software is at the heart of most
advanced systems, spanning weapons, command and control, communications,
mission planning, and platform guidance. Furthermore, intelligence, surveillance,
and logistics all depend on massive computational resources.41
There is also the threat from simple failure that must be factored in. Systems
are becoming more complex and much of the software is commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) and not developed to contend with active attacks and degraded
environments. Moreover, software vendors have tended to concentrate more on
time-to-market as the most important criterion for success, rather than
well-designed and well-tested code.42  Increased connectivity, whereby systems
are configured so that every machine has network access, which is needed to
provide for remote backups, access to patches, and user access to World Wide
Web browsing and e-mail, adds to the threat.43  Spafford went on to offer a
number of recommendations:44
• Explicitly seek to create heterogeneous environments so that common avenues
of attack are not present.
• Develop different architectures.
• Rethink the use of COTS software in mission-critical circumstances.
• Rethink the need to have all systems connected to the network.
• Require greater efforts to educate personnel on the dangers of using
unauthorised code, or of changing the settings on the computers they use.
• Revisit laws that criminalise technology instead of behaviour.
• Provide increased support to law enforcement for tools to track malware,
and to support the investigation and prosecution of those who write malware
and attack systems.
• Do not be fooled by the ‘open source is more secure’ advocates. The reliability
of software does not depend on whether the source is open or proprietary.
• Initiate research into the development of metrics for security and risk.
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• Establish research into methods of better, more affordable software
engineering, and how to build reliable systems from components that are
not trusted.
• Emphasise the need for a systems-level view of information security. Assuring
individual components does little to assure overall implementation and use.
• Establish better incentives for security.
• Increase the priority and funding for basic scientific research into issues of
security and protection of software. Too much money is being spent on
upgrading patches and not enough is being spent on fundamental research
by qualified personnel.
• Most importantly, re-examine the issue of the insider threat to mission critical
systems.
There are clearly deficiencies in US and Australian cyber-defences. Malicious
and incorrect software pose particular threats because of their asymmetric
potential—small operators can initiate large and devastating attacks. The situation
cannot be remedied simply by continuing to spend more on newer models of
the same systems that are currently deficient. It will require vision and
willingness to make hard choices to equip the military and other national security
agencies with the defensible IT systems they deserve.45
Mr Robert Lentz, Director, Information Assurance, Department of Defense
also gave testimony at the hearing,46  where he argued that a new era of warfare
had emerged, through the greater power, agility, and speed afforded by
connectivity. Thus, a smaller force can mass combat effects virtually anywhere,
anytime through these multiple connections. However, this increasing
dependence on information networks creates new vulnerabilities, as adversaries
develop new ways of attacking and disrupting friendly forces.
Lentz also described the goals that then Defense Secretary Rumsfeld
established for networks, namely to47
• develop a ubiquitous network environment;
• richly populate the network environment with information of value, as
determined by the consumer; and
• ensure the network is highly available, secure and reliable.
Through these goals, Secretary Rumsfeld was seeking to establish the
Department’s IA Program—the strategy, policy and resources required to create
a trusted, reliable network. While the challenges for IA are substantial because
of the size and diversity of the Defence and national security IA community and
because IA is both pervasive and interdependent upon many other policies and
processes, there are clear opportunities. In the first instance, the policy
formulation process could be more open, more visible, more collaborative, and,
as a consequence, faster.48
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Lentz also made the telling comment that the US Administration did not
expect to achieve guaranteed protection of its information, systems and networks.
However, it had put in place ‘a robust Computer Network Defence capability
within the Department, a capability that continues to evolve and transform itself
in pace with the evolving and transforming threat’.49
Finally, Lentz offered a telling reason for factoring legacy systems into
strategic planning, by saying that all systems are legacy systems as soon as they
go on-line. The demand for greater bandwidth, functionality, connectivity and
other features is constantly expanding. Lentz argued that the demand would be
met, but that the greater task was to ensure it was met securely. To that end,
development of protective technologies for space-based laser, advanced
fibre-optic, and wireless transport networks were being pursued, as was the
development of end-to-end IA architectures and technologies.50
The rate of adoption of Internet-based technology, including dependence on
the Internet for voice communications and data distribution, means that nations
today have the ability to conduct cyber-warfare.51 Thus, organisations need to
have a strategy for keeping their businesses running, if information systems and
facilities that depend on those information systems are unable to operate.
The increasing use of IP networking technology to connect critical
infrastructure and the movement to packet-switched voice communications
(away from a circuit-based architecture) has increased the vulnerability.
Additionally, Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) equipment is susceptible to
traditional Internet threats like worms, viruses and break-ins from hackers.
Denial of Service (DS) attacks, which have been experienced in recent times and
taken down websites, could be used to disrupt the flow of voice-carrying packets
on an IP network, thereby causing a major breakdown in communications. At
the infrastructure level, interfaces that allow maintenance and control of
equipment have traditionally been accessed through dial-up modems, and are
increasingly being converted to IP network connections.
The Gartner Report52  identified potential targets as the network interfaces
found in equipment used by dams, railroads, electrical grids and power
generation facilities, and the interface points between the public switched
telephone network and IP networks. Connecting computer systems in banking
and finance, law enforcement, rail transportation, and in industries such as
chemical, oil and gas, and electrical to IP networking adds to the increasing
vulnerability of critical infrastructure.
Most security technology, when used in conjunction with ‘best practices’,
is appropriate to the proportional risk presented by the threat of
cyberwarfare. … The proportional-risk assumption does not mean that
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a cyberwarfare attack would be unsuccessful if undertaken by a
determined foe, but that risk is low.53
The phrase ‘digital Pearl Harbor’ has been around since 1995, according to
Jim Lewis in 2003, then with the Center for Strategic and International Studies
and a former Clinton Administration technology policy official.54  Lewis
considered the threat from cyber-terrorists to have been over-stated. Indeed,
work carried out by Gartner in 2003 highlighted that disgruntled insiders, not
foreign terrorists, posed the greatest cyber-security threat to companies.55
Even the most comprehensive IT security technology cannot stop the careless,
uninformed, or disgruntled person with access to the network from wreaking
havoc. ‘The fact is that some of the most devastating threats to computer security
have come from individuals who were deemed trusted insiders’.56
Costs associated with security policies and software are significant enough,
without having their effect decreased by insiders who may not fully appreciate
their role in maintaining a secure enterprise. The main reasons behind internal
security breaches are noted as ignorance, carelessness, disregard for security
policies, and maliciousness.57  Hence, the best way to address the potential for
such breaches is through an awareness and education program, aimed at reducing
the effect of ‘social engineering’.
Social engineering plays upon the inherent trust that people have in one
another and their basic desire to help others. Social engineering tactics will not
work if people are informed and aware. Thus, employees should not open
unsolicited email attachments and they should scan attached documents for a
virus before opening them. They should be aware that attackers will seek to
take advantage of a natural trust in sharing files. Employees who use Internet
Relay Chat and Instant Messaging services should know about ploys that might
be used to lure them into downloading and executing malware that would allow
an intruder to use the systems as attack platforms for launching distributed DS
attacks. Employees should treat with extreme caution any requests for passwords
or any other sensitive information.58
Richard Hunter of Gartner has cautioned companies to alert their employees
against social engineering. Hunter’s view is that the most successful ways for
foreigners to steal US secrets is to use such practices or to buy US companies in
possession of secrets. After all, computer hacking constitutes only 6 per cent of
theft attempts.59
At a conference in 2004, concern was expressed over US federal agencies not
securing their computer networks and failing to factor technology security into
long-term planning. House Government Reform Committee Chairman, Tom
Davis, called for increased investment in IT security infrastructure, but
acknowledged that the appropriations process ‘is always about the here and
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now’.60 The problem is, of course, that information network defence requires
long-term investment and top-level attention, which is not a natural by-product
of the annual budgetary cycle.
The Internet continues to hold so much promise, but, according to the
Economist, it has to become more trustworthy if it is to realise its full potential.61
Detracting from trust in the Internet is the continuing worm and virus attacks
such as the Blaster worm and SoBig virus that attacked in 2003, causing estimated
losses of US$35 billion.62  As the uptake of broadband increases and as more
PCs and other devices are connected, the potential fall-out from further virus,
or the more insidious worm, attacks can only increase.
The speed with which these attacks can be launched is also increasing (i.e.
attacks are happening faster). The time from initial disclosure of a flaw to the
attack by the Slammer worm in January 2003 was six months, which halved the
time taken in the previous year. For the Blaster worm in August 2003, the time
had fallen drastically to three weeks.63 Over 500 000 computers were infected
and CSX Corporation had to stop its train services as its rail signalling system
was brought down, and check-in services of a number of major airlines were
disrupted.64
Worse still, the intensity of attacks has increased, with the Slammer worm
infecting 90 per cent of vulnerable computers within 10 minutes.65 The
network-security monitoring firm, Qualys, has argued that most organisations
take on average one month to patch their known vulnerabilities, whereas future
attacks could inflict their intended damage within a couple of minutes.66
On 27 January 2004, the world experienced the MyDoom virus (also known
as Norvarg or Shimgapi). It was immediately rated as a high-level security threat,
geared as it was around mounting DS attacks on SCO’s website (a US software
company). Attacks, such as this, which aim to bring down a company’s systems
by flooding them with traffic, could very well be precursors to cyber-attacks
by nations or terrorist organisations.
Indeed, John Donovan’s (Managing Director of Symantec—an Internet
security company) research indicated that politically motivated attacks were
likely to increase.67 The attack on SCO was even more insidious as MyDoom
left a communications port open on the infected computer, which could have
been remotely accessed by a hacker.
Furthermore, as Robert Lemos (a staff writer for CNET News.com) argued,
such a virus allowed hackers to hide their real locations, thus making it very
difficult to trace any on-line attack. The Code Red virus infected many computers
in July 2001, with tens of thousands still infected in 2004 (according to Lemos).68
The Sobig.F virus of August 2003 accounted for one out of every 17 email
messages and infected over 570 000 computers, while MyDoom accounted for
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one in 12. Message Labs (a company that filters email for corporate customers)
had detected and quarantined more than 1.5 million infected emails within 27
hours.69 The Sobig virus could have launched an Internet-wide attack had its
programming been so designed.70
The dramatic increase in cyber-incidents can be seen from the following
statistics—between 1995 and 2005, the reports to Carnegie Mellon’s Computer
Emergency Response Team increased from 171 incidents to 5990.71
Trust in the Internet is also undermined through fraud and spam. Indeed,
the statistics quoted by the Economist are alarming—citing that some 10 per
cent of all emails were scams of one sort or another.72 The degree of cunning
in much of this fraud is worrying; for example, brand spoofs that claim to come
from trusted companies, fake web pages, fake press releases, and
‘phishing’—tricking recipients into giving out sensitive information, such as
credit-card numbers, pin numbers and passwords.
Most companies, government agencies and indeed a number of private
individuals are now using firewalls to keep malicious code out of their internal
networks, and IDS that analyse what gets past the firewalls. Anti-virus software
has become commonplace, although there remains a concern over how up-to-date
that software is.73
While many argue that greater government intervention is needed, that is
likely to simply drive up the cost of being connected. Others argue that software
vendors should be liable for its security—in other words, vendors should be
writing simpler, safer software. So, perhaps, the solution is a combination of
both, whereby government legislates that vendors are liable. This would then
compel software companies to carry product-liability insurance. Insurance
companies would respond by pricing the risk, whereby software companies that
write safer code would have an economic advantage.74
Another option might be to eliminate Internet anonymity, such that every
user could be traced.75  One way of doing this might be to authenticate each
email before it can be sent, by referring to a driving licence, passport, tax file
number, social-security number, or some other trusted form of identification.76
As Ed Waltz observes, by using a basic risk management approach we can
aim to prevent access to 80 per cent of possible attacks.77 We can detect the
presence of the remaining 20 per cent, noting that we would seek to contain 19
per cent of those attacks, and aim to have in place the recovery mechanisms for
the 1 per cent that are not prevented, detected or contained.78  Even with this
methodology in place, we must acknowledge that there may be attacks from
which we cannot recover and, therefore, we also need to cater for that residual
of less than 1 per cent.79
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Functions that are needed to support protection include monitoring the
information infrastructure; generating alerts if an attack is detected or anticipated;
controlling the response to modify protection levels or restore service if an attack
has been carried out; conducting forensic analysis (including attack patterns,
attacker behaviour, damage, and so forth); and reporting to higher authority.80
The potential for individuals, organisations or nation-states to mount an
information attack with the intent of exploiting, disrupting, or manipulating
Australian Government or ADF operations is increasing, to the extent that some
analysts have coined the term ‘weapons of mass effect’, because they can threaten
national interests.81  Hence, it would be prudent for the Australian Government
and the ADF to develop the capabilities for discerning, deterring and defending
against such threats.
The Australian Government recognises the country’s increased vulnerability
to acts of cyber-terrorism and other e-security threats because of the nation’s
growing dependence on the information economy. Accordingly, the Government
has designed an e-security policy framework to82
• enhance e-security awareness and practices amongst home users and the
business community;
• promote the security of Australia’s national information infrastructure
through information sharing and collaboration with the private sector;
• ensure the government’s electronic systems are appropriately secure; and
• promote the security of the global information economy through international
engagement.
The Australian Government has also enacted the Cybercrime Act 2001 to
‘prosecute groups who use the Internet to plan and launch cyber-attacks that
could seriously interfere with the functioning of the government, financial sector
and industry’.83 The Government’s definition of cyber-attacks includes activities
such as hacking, computer virus propagation and DS attacks.
Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) have been set up
internationally to improve computer systems’ security. Australia has set up a
team, AusCERT. This is a not-for-profit body operated by the University of
Queensland. The Attorney-General’s Department also has the Australian
Government Computer Emergency Readiness Team (GovCERT.au) that
develops and coordinates government policy for computer emergency
preparation, preparedness, response, readiness and recovery for major
national information infrastructure incidents. It also acts as a point of
contact within the Australian Government for foreign governments on
CERT issues, and coordinates any foreign government requests.84
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Australia is also leading an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
initiative to build CERT capacities in developing economies.
The Australian Federal Police (AFP) hosts the Australian High Tech Crime
Centre, which investigates e-security incidents in public and private sector
organisations. The Centre ‘performs a national coordination role for the law
enforcement effort in combating serious, multi-jurisdictional crime involving
complex technology’.85
While the Australian Government and the Australian business sector have
established solid risk management guidelines and adhere to sound international
risk management standards, Heinrich de Nysschen argues that:
in future a concerted effort will have to be maintained, building on
current efforts, involving all stakeholders, to develop proactive and
reactive IT risk management strategies. Only then could we ensure that
Australian IT systems, infrastructure and assets are secure, and able to
effectively mitigate the impact of potential future security incidents.86
Heinrich de Nysschen’s view tends to be echoed by comments in 2006 from
the US Cyber Security Industry Alliance, which argued for a short list of high
priorities on communications and cyber-security to be addressed very quickly.87
First, a more aggressive research and development program to build secure
information systems is needed to mitigate the risk. Of the US$1 billion science
and technology budget for the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in
2007, only US$20 million is earmarked for cyber-security.88 The second priority
is an early-warning system, while the third is the ability to assure
communications bandwidth in an emergency. The fourth priority is a plan to
recover the Internet after a disaster and to cope with the interim.
Critical Infrastructure Protection in Australia
Critical infrastructure covers
those systems we all rely on in our day-to-day lives—communications
networks, banking, energy, water and food supplies, health services,
social security and community services, emergency services and
transport. These are the physical facilities, supply chains, information
technologies and communication networks, which, if destroyed or
degraded, would adversely impact on Australia’s social or economic
wellbeing, or affect our ability to ensure national security.89
It also includes key government services and national icons.90
The continuity of supply of all critical infrastructure is dependent, to some
extent, on availability of other infrastructure. Indeed, some sectors are mutually
dependent on one another. The degree and complexity of interdependencies is
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increasing as Australia becomes more dependent on shared information systems
and convergent communication technologies, such as the Internet.
The Australian Government is seeking ‘to ensure that there are adequate
levels of protective security for national critical infrastructure, minimal single
points of failure and rapid, tested recovery arrangements’.91  Furthermore, the
government sees its role as providing strategic leadership on national critical
infrastructure protection through the Attorney-General’s Department. This
department is responsible for
providing national coordination in areas of joint Commonwealth, state
and territory responsibility, producing and communicating relevant
information to key government and non-government stakeholders,
promoting critical infrastructure protection as a national research priority
and leading Australia’s international engagement on critical infrastructure
protection issues.92
Compounding the challenge for government is that in some instances, around
90 per cent of critical infrastructure is privately owned. Individual companies
are unlikely to have the information or resources to address the risks from a
whole-of-sector perspective. Clearly, critical infrastructure protection can only
be carried out by a mix of government at all levels and private companies and
their industry affiliations. This is as much an awareness activity as it is a risk
assessment and mitigation activity. Indeed, this statistic has led the Government
to argue:
The primary responsibility for the protection of Australia’s critical
infrastructure rests with infrastructure owners and operators. …
Protecting Australia’s critical infrastructure therefore requires high levels
of cooperation between business and government at all levels.93
The former Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, told a business forum
on 23 June 2004 that ‘we now live in a world where taking measures to improve
security and fight terrorism is a cost of doing business’.94 The Australian
Financial Review noted ‘concerns in the government’ that both the Critical
Infrastructure Advisory Council and the Trusted Information Sharing Network
(TISN) would be more effective through greater engagement of Chief Executive
Officers in counter-terrorism consultations.95
The TISN strategy provides an overarching statement of principles for critical
infrastructure protection in Australia, outlines the major tasks and assigns the
necessary responsibilities across government, the owners and operators of
infrastructure, their representative bodies, professional associations, regulators
and standards setting institutions.96 The TISN allows owners and operators of
critical infrastructure to share information on issues related to the protection of
critical infrastructure within and between their respective industry sectors.
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These issues include business continuity, consequence management, information
system vulnerabilities and attacks, e-crime and the protection of key sites.
The Australian Government has established the Computer Network
Vulnerability Assessment Program, which
provides co-funding on a dollar-for-dollar basis to help owners and
operators of critical infrastructure identify major vulnerabilities within
computer systems and dependencies between computer networks, and
to test the ability of systems to resist exploitation.97
To counter this increase in vulnerability, both the public and private sectors
are putting in place stronger authentication and identity management for IT
systems. Two-factor authentication is coming into vogue, whereby a password
or Personal Identification Number (PIN) is used together with an authenticator
such as a secure ID token, smart card, or digital certificate.
The government has also created the Business Government Advisory Group
on National Security, which ‘provides senior business leaders with an
opportunity to discuss the strategic direction of our national security policy and
provide advice and feedback on national security issues relating to critical
infrastructure protection’.98 This group is chaired by the Attorney-General.
The 2004–2005 Australian Federal Budget allocated further funding to support
the Government’s Critical Infrastructure Protection strategy, including the TISN.
The 2004 budget funding was designed to assist the telecommunications
(including Internet Service Providers (ISPs), broadcasting and postal industries
in improving the protection of Australia’s communications infrastructure through
improved information sharing and cooperation.
Funding in this budget also supported a number of groups99  such as the
Communications Sector Infrastructure Assurance Advisory Group (CSIAAG),100
the Critical Infrastructure Advisory Council (CIAC) and the National
Counter-Terrorism Committee and related groups such as the Information
Technology Security Experts Advisory Group.101 The Australian Broadcasting
Authority also received funding to assist in developing and maintaining effective
communications mechanisms with broadcast operators for critical infrastructure
protection coordination.
There were a number of significant new security-related initiatives in the
Australian Government’s Budget speech of 9 May 2006. The AFP received
ongoing research and development capacity to counter the use of new and
emerging technologies by terrorists and it established a single facility to manage
the collection, monitoring, recording and evidence preparation of
terrorism-related electronic surveillance material. Part of the significant allocation
to the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) was designed to
improve its IT networks to cope with the new demands and expanded operations.
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Preventing identity theft also received attention in the 2006 budget. Both a
national Document Verification Service and Identity Security Strike Teams were
set up. The new service allows government agencies to check Australian
passports, the Health Services access cards, Australian citizenship certificates,
birth certificates and drivers’ licences issued in Australia.
Funding was also provided for key law enforcement and security agencies
to ensure a continued capability to intercept telecommunications; further funding
was allocated to improve communications within government and with the
public during a national crisis; and funding was provided to establish a National
Emergency Call Centre capability that can be operational with one hour’s notice
of an emergency of national significance being declared by the government.
In 2007, the Australian Government revised its E-Security National Agenda,102
releasing the new version in July that year, and allocating a budget of A$73.6
million over four years. IT security in critical infrastructure, individuals at home
and companies are now considered to be highly interrelated. The government
has recognised that poor PC security can lead to home computers being used in
Distributed Denial of Service (DDS) attacks on critical infrastructure and
government agencies. The increase in the sophistication of e-security attacks
has made it more difficult for anti-malware software companies to identify attacks
and protect clients.
The Agenda created a single whole-of-government committee—the E-Security
Policy and Coordination (ESPaC) Committee—to replace two former committees
run by the Department of Communications, Information Technology and the
Arts (DCITA) and the Attorney-General’s Department. The Agenda has three
priorities:
• reducing the e-security risk to Australia’s national critical infrastructure;
• reducing the e-security risk to Australian Government information and
communication systems; and
• enhancing the protection of home users and Small-to-Medium Enterprises
(SMEs) from electronic attacks and fraud.
In respect of the first priority, the operations of GovCERT.au will be expanded
significantly through the addition of 10 more staff members. It will also have
responsibility for the Computer Network Vulnerability Assessment Program,
which supports critical infrastructure owners and operators in checking network
security.
Government will consider establishing a dedicated Centre to share security
information between government and critical infrastructure organisations so as
to minimise the impact of electronic attacks.
The AFP will expand its activities in combating on-line criminal activity,
including enhancing its ability to detect, deter and investigate criminal threats
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against critical infrastructure and for technology enabled crime such as on-line
fraud.
In respect of the second priority, the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) will
receive increased funding to improve its technical advice on IT security issues
for government agencies, managing e-security breaches for agencies, and analysis
of malware to rapidly develop countermeasures. The Australian Government
Information Management Office (AGIMO) has been commissioned to establish
a single framework for the continued delivery of government services in the
event of a disruption and/or failure of government-operated information,
communication and technology systems.
In respect of the third priority, the Australian Communications and Media
Authority (ACMA) will expand its work with Australian ISPs to help them
identify compromised computers of their clients. The DCITA will continue to
develop and expand its information to home and SME users, delivering
information via www.staysmartonline.gov.au.
Notwithstanding these significant initiatives, more effort needs to be put
into developing a reliable national indicators and warning architecture, and to
improve national planning, programming and operations to build the capabilities
needed to discern, deter and defend against the spectrum of cyber-threats that
loom on the national security horizon. Changes in the nature of computers and
networking could improve processing power, information storage, and bandwidth
to the extent that artificial intelligence could be applied to cyber-warfare.103
The specific requirements for developing a national indicators and warning
architecture for infrastructure protection would be in terms of facilitating the
following:104
• an understanding of baseline infrastructure operations;
• the identification of indicators and precursors to an attack; and
• a surge capacity for detecting and analysing patterns of potential attacks.
Greater analytical expertise is needed within Defence and other government
agencies to address the challenges related to information-based attacks. Rapid
attribution of cyber-events is critical to mitigating attacks and deterring future
ones. This means mature forensic capabilities are needed to support the
attribution and the necessary legal regime to allow for rapid apprehension and
prosecution. International deficiencies such as uniform laws that criminalise
cyber-attacks and protocols for enforcing laws also need to be addressed.105
Furthermore, all federal departments and agencies should be tasked with
developing and submitting plans for protecting the physical and cyber-critical
infrastructure and key resources that they own or operate. The plans should
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address identification, prioritisation, protection, and contingency planning,
including the recovery and reconstitution of essential capabilities.106
Securing the Defence enterprise
From the discussion thus far, it is obvious that as Defence, like other enterprises,
reaches out with its networks and is accessed by ever-growing numbers of
friends, partners and adversaries, the risk of misuse, theft or sabotage increases.
A suitable framework for addressing the vulnerabilities outlined in this chapter,
and for securing the Defence enterprise, might be in terms of four integrated
layers of activity—policy, operations, systems, and technical measures.107
In policy terms, the ADF would need to address such issues as the design,
planning and implementation of communications and information systems, which
is a collaborative activity between users and providers to achieve a negotiated
service. Force protection consequences should be more important than
information access, which means that information might have to be restricted
or even withheld from a user who has a high probability of capture or
compromise. Active information governance measures such as responsibility,
authority, procedures, contingency arrangements, reporting and standards
should apply across the network.
In operations terms, the ADF would need to address connectivity and
interoperability associated with joint force operations as well as combined force
operations. In the former, all force elements would need to be connected at the
lowest practicable organisational levels (e.g. infantry patrol to close air support
aircraft). In the latter, connectivity might be between components and selected
force elements (e.g. ADF land component commander to US amphibious task
group). Finally, connectivity to Defence finance, logistics and personnel systems
and to the systems of other agencies is required by deployed forces.
Systems integration and interoperability will minimise duplication and single
points of failure. Cryptographic security, security against computer network
attack, and personnel and infrastructure security arrangements should all be
provided to the lowest level of connectivity. Robust system redundancy should
be provided with appropriate levels of survivability and recovery, and preventive
security measures should be offered through enhanced deterrence, detection,
containment and response services.
In technical terms, a number of possible initiatives present themselves. First,
IT systems (including communications and cryptographic) standards,
configuration and protocols should be made compatible with national and
combined requirements. Second, dynamic system security can be achieved
through appropriate cryptographic, firewall, and virus protection, while dynamic
system survivability can be achieved through appropriate routing, standby and
duplicate equipment and services. Third, coalition IT and communications
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standards should be compatible with commercial requirements. Fourth,
classification, storage, release and distribution arrangements should be made
that also include training, processes, procedures and responsibilities.
Other technical matters such as security architectures, secure identities and
access, secure workforce, secure content management and secure web services
also need to be addressed. These are covered in more detail below.108
Integrated security architectures need to cover directory services, Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI), and privilege management infrastructure, as well as digital
signatures, authentication, access control, network security, workstation and
Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) security, application security, and monitoring,
IDS and incident response systems.
Identity and access management needs to cover all aspects of authentication,
authorisation and entitlement. Access should be granted only for authorised
users, and those users should access only that information they need to access.
Increasingly, workers will be more mobile and their access will need to be
secured. Similarly, portals and email systems add to overall vulnerability, which
in turn demands greater security vigilance. While web services provide real-time
integration of business services from multiple sources, they also add even further
to network vulnerability.
As part of this framework, Defence also needs a strong risk assessment
methodology (covering attack and penetration testing, and emergency response
measures), solid infrastructure security (by designing secure networks, perimeter
security controls, multi-layered anti-virus architectures, secure wireless networks
and remote access points, and system hardening), business continuity and the
ability to recover from shocks and disruptions. Just as importantly, any enterprise
with which Defence interacts electronically needs to have in place these security
features.
Trusted information infrastructure
One way of addressing trusted information infrastructure is to develop a data
access and management system that incorporates enterprise security, identity
management, IA and information dissemination management. At the technical
level, this would mean data standardisation, encryption and PKI tagging, and a
protected data fusion engine that could manage the secure authentication process.
As Philip Dean and Bruce Talbot109  suggest, such a system would provide
a secure place to post classified information that would be accessible from
networks of various classifications, all within a securely managed workflow that
would ensure that trust could be managed, assured and controlled.
COTS software would be sufficient for providing Multi-Level Identity
Management and Secure Service Provisioning. These two concepts would need
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to be developed in tandem to ensure that security could be delivered through
a layered approach that also manages identification, security clearance and access
rights of both providers and users of the information. Location, information
access and physical protection would be afforded by:
• providing a posting area for information that could be fully managed and
secured and that could only be accessed by authorised users;
• offering compartmented storage within that posting area as necessary; and
• tagging devices such as PCs to ensure that they meet device constraints
related to the specified information.
A data standardisation regime would be needed to ensure data that had been
posted could be received by all authorised devices. Additionally, a management
standardisation regime would be needed so that all interactions could be managed,
such as the posting of documents, the identities of information providers and
users, and the flow of information (based on policies, rules and identity).
Just as intelligence, command and control, and corporate information systems
cry out for multiple layers of security to improve information sharing and
collaboration and to reduce costs, so too do the interoperability requirements
within the battlespace. Specifically, mission control systems such as fire-control
systems on naval surface combatants and the multi-function displays in combat
aircraft will need to be linked to ground forces in future in order to deliver
integrated joint fires.110
While the foregoing is aimed squarely at Defence, the same issues pertain to
a whole-of-nation perspective to securing Government agencies and ensuring a
networked trusted information infrastructure.
Addressing the national requirement
Australia is confronted with a dynamic strategic environment that is continuously
evolving. In meeting the exigencies of that environment, Australia will rely
increasingly on the power it derives from networked government agencies and
the processes for whole-of-government approaches to threats and problems.
These exigencies will arise with little notice, impacting on national interests at
home and overseas, and may originate from home soil as much as from another
country.
As Australia finds itself engaged in persistent operations, where traditional
distinctions blur between peace and war, combatants and non-combatants, and
foreign and domestic activities, it will need to be perpetually reassessing any
strategic gaps both in its preparedness to act and its actual performance on the
day.111  Accordingly, Australia needs the ability to focus, shape, and guide
national effort across its networks. That national effort can no longer be permitted
to be fragmented in its organisation and disjointed in its application.112  Any
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national effort must incorporate an offensive dimension as well as a defensive
one, as well as preventive and responsive policies.113
From a military perspective, we are clearly moving into the fourth generation
of warfare, a generation we might term ‘net-war’. The first generation involved
massed manpower, the second massed firepower, and the third manoeuvre.
Net-war will be characterised by antagonists who will fight in the
political, economic, social and military arenas and communicate their
messages through a combination of networks and mass media. This
generation is likely to be based more on ideas rather than military
technology; this is a crucial point. Warfare will not be the relatively
clear-cut, high technology ‘stately dance’ of conventional war but rather
extremely complex, mainly low-intensity conflicts. In these conflicts it
will be hard to differentiate between war and peace, military operations
and crimes, front and rear areas, combatants and non-combatants.
Fighting will involve an amalgam of military tactics from all four
generations and the concepts of ‘victory’ and ‘defeat’ will probably cease
to exist.114
When these pressures are combined with where the ADF is moving with
respect to NCW, there are compelling reasons to oversee developments from a
single organisational perspective. A Net-war or Cyber-warfare Centre would
provide just this—ensuring a joined-up national effort that incorporated
offensive, defensive, preventive and responsive strategies, policies and actions
while supporting the development and protection of robust networks that
underpin the ADF’s NCW capability. Such a Centre would be responsible for
all aspects of operational planning, support and training, as well as research and
capability development not only for the ADF but across national security agencies
as a whole. Moreover, the Centre would have a key role in supporting Australia
as network complexity and national, allied and coalition Internet-working
increase in the years ahead.
Conclusion
Information is the lifeblood of the ADF’s future networked force and, as such,
it must be protected. The quest for information superiority to underpin
network-centric operations in future will introduce operational vulnerabilities.
The challenge is to identify these vulnerabilities and develop a framework to
address them (in policy, operations, systems, and technical terms). Information
sharing is crucial for networked, dispersed forces, but as these forces reach back
into their enterprise systems and across into others, the issue of privacy looms
large and must be managed through sensible architectures.
The security of information and the underpinning technology is compounded
by the threat of cyber-attack, which demands a sophisticated protection system
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for monitoring the information infrastructure, issuing alerts, and controlling
responses as necessary. It would seem timely for national planning, programming
and operations to build the capabilities needed to discern, deter and defend
against the spectrum of cyber-threats that loom on the national security horizon.
Reliance on information does not just introduce vulnerabilities in the ADF
and in its enterprise systems; it also introduces vulnerabilities in all critical
information infrastructure on which Australia relies. Defence must have in place
robust information security mechanisms across its networks, and it must also
ensure that similar security mechanisms exist in other enterprises with which
it seeks connectivity.
A trusted information infrastructure is key to supporting Information
Superiority and Support (IS&S), which in turn, is key to a networked ADF. That
Trusted Information Infrastructure involves much more than just the ADF’s
networks, and must address enterprise security, identity management, IA, and
the management of dissemination of the information. And it applies as much to
all Australian Government agencies as it does to Defence.
As network complexity and national and coalition Internet-working increase
in the years ahead, there will be pressure on the Australian Government to
ensure a joined-up national effort that incorporates both offensive and defensive
policies and actions through some form of a Cyber-warfare Centre. Defence could
take the initiative now and set up such a Centre to support the development and
protection of its robust networks needed to underpin its NCW capability.
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Desmond Ball
Introduction
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is in the process of being transformed to
enable it to gain information superiority in future contingencies.1  Substantial
elements of its future Information Warfare (IW) architecture are already in place,
such as the Collins-class submarine, some of the satellite communications
(SATCOM) systems, and some of the land-based intelligence facilities, but these
will all have to be extensively modified and technically updated. However, most
of the ADF’s force and support elements remain inadequately networked. Other
advanced capabilities, including the Royal Australian Navy (RAN)’s Air Warfare
Destroyers (AWDs), new Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) fighter aircraft, and
various sorts of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are in the process of
acquisition. Complete functional integration of the ‘system of systems’ remains
embryonic. Some essential elements of the ADF’s future IW architecture are
barely conceived. The most important is a cyber-warfare centre and its
operational capabilities.
There has been considerable development of doctrine by the ADF since the
early 2000s. In June 2002, the ADF released its doctrinal statement on Australia’s
approach to warfare. This occurred at about the same time that the notions of
being able to gain an information advantage, dispersing forces, and networking
them began to appear. The ADF argued that its aim for the future was to obtain
common and enhanced battlespace awareness and, with the application of that
awareness, deliver maximum combat effect. It would seek to achieve this through
networked operations, which would necessitate a comprehensive ‘information
network’ that would link sensors (for detection), command and control (C2) (for
flexible, optimised decision-making), and engagement systems (for precision
application of force).2
In 2002, the ADF also released Force 2020—the ADF’s vision
statement—whereby networked operations were seen as allowing the war-fighter,
through superior command decision-making supported by information
technologies coupled with organisational and doctrinal agility, to utilise relatively
small forces to maximum effect. Force 2020 states that ‘in the force of 2020, we
will have transitioned from platform-centric operations to Network-Enabled
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Operations’. The aim is ‘to obtain common and enhanced battlespace awareness,
and with the application of that awareness, deliver maximum combat effect’.
Shared information ‘allows a greater level of situational awareness, coordination,
and offensive potential than is currently the case’.3  Further doctrinal
development proceeded through 2003, including production of an NCW Concept
Paper and an NCW Roadmap, which were completed by December 2003, and
promulgated in February 2004.4
However, the work in 2002–2003 was fundamentally incomplete. It was
mostly concerned with enhancing and sharing battlefield awareness and with
shortening decision cycles; it essentially ignored the offensive opportunities and
challenges of Network Centric Warfare (NCW), and the offensive role of IW
more generally.
The NCW Roadmap, released in February 2007, reflected enormous recent
progress. It articulated a plan for managing the transition of the ADF ‘from a
network-aware force to a seamless, network-enabled, information-age force’,
and provided a series of ‘milestones’ that ‘the ADF views as critical to the
realisation of its vision for NCW’. It described the mechanisms through which
NCW considerations, such as cost, connectivity and vulnerability issues, are
now addressed in the capability development process. And it stresses that the
purpose of NCW is to enhance the ADF’s ‘warfighting effectiveness’, specifically
mentioning ‘the offensive support system’.5
Since September 2001, a major focus of network-centric activity, across the
whole–of-government, has concerned counter-terrorism. The ‘war on terror’
has stimulated some aspects of Information Operations (IO) while distracting
planners from the longer-term construction of an all-embracing NCW
architecture. The Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) has enhanced its capabilities
for monitoring and tracking mobile phones, and for surveilling websites, Internet
usages and international email traffic. It played a key role in the capture of the
organisers of the Bali bombings in October 2002. Imam Samudra was arrested
in November 2002 after sending an email. Mukhlas was traced by his mobile
phone, even though he changed his Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card every
two days and spoke for only a few seconds at a time. Azahari bin Husin, who
also helped plan the second Bali bombings in October 2005, was killed in a
shoot-out with police in November 2005 after DSD monitored and tracked the
mobile phone of one of his accomplices.6  However, these achievements have
been essentially defensive, involving investigative and forensic activities, rather
than exploiting cyber-space for offensive IO.
Fundamental issues concerning the development of NCW capabilities remain
unresolved, while the role and place of offensive IO and an institutionalised
cyber-warfare centre are yet to even be considered. There is a palpable risk that
Australia will be caught deficient in some critical capability necessary for securing
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our most vital national interests in the security environment of the late 2010s
and the 2020s.
There is a myriad of complex and extremely difficult issues that require
resolution before radically new C2 arrangements can be organised, new technical
capabilities acquired and dramatically different operational concepts tested and
codified. These include the extent to which complete digitisation and networking
of the ADF will permit flatter C2 structures; the availability of different sorts of
UAVs and the timeframes for their potential acquisition; the role of offensive
operations and the development of doctrine and operational concepts for these;
the promulgation of new Rules of Engagement (ROE); and a plethora of human
resource issues, including the scope for the creative design and utilisation of
reserve forces and other elements of the civil community.7 These matters will
take many years to resolve and even longer, in some cases at least a decade, for
the ensuing decisions to be fully implemented.
Numerous organisations currently have important responsibilities concerning
some aspect of network vulnerabilities, security and regulation, in addition to
the Department of Defence, the ADF and the intelligence and security agencies.
Defence has a responsibility to defend vital national infrastructure, and is
critically dependent on parts of that infrastructure for command, operational
and logistical activities, but it is not the lead agency with respect to network
security. Within Defence and the ADF, NCW-related activities remain
compartmented; between Defence and the other national authorities, the
coordination is fitful, sectoral and poorly organised for IO. No agency appears
to be responsible for planning and conducting offensive cyber-warfare.
This chapter proposes the establishment of an Australian Cyber-warfare
Centre. It argues that a Centre of some form is necessary to provide coordination
of all matters concerning cyber-warfare in Australia. It would provide an
institutionalised agency for the development of doctrine, operational concepts
and ROE for the ADF concerning cyber-warfare. It would provide a mechanism
for ensuring not only that all proposed new Defence capabilities are optimised
with respect to comprehensive networking, but also that the requirements for
future cyber-activities are satisfactorily identified and articulated. It would
develop cyber-warfare contingency plans and specify preparatory actions. It
would plan and conduct offensive as well as defensive operations. This chapter
also considers several associated issues, including issues involved in determining
the best location for such a Centre; the implications of cyber-warfare for command
arrangements, intelligence processes and covert activities; and the need to
develop appropriate ROE, doctrine and operational concepts. It also includes a
brief summary of some regional developments with respect to the
institutionalisation of cyber-warfare activities and the practice of cyber-warfare
techniques. Finally, it argues that the establishment of an Australian
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Cyber-warfare Centre has now become a matter of considerable urgency, and
that without it Australia will lack a core system in its ‘system of systems’ required
for warfare in the thoroughly networked Information Age.
The relevant organisations and their coordination
The overall responsibility for e-security in Australia rests with the
Attorney-General’s Department, through its charter to protect the National
Information Infrastructure (NII), which ‘comprises information systems that
support the telecommunications, transport, distribution, energy, utilities, banking
and finance industries as well as critical government services including defence
and emergency services’.8  Its mission is essentially defensive, primarily
identifying and coordinating responses to incidents that seriously affect the NII.
The government’s ‘core policy development and coordination body on
e-security matters’ is the E-Security Coordination Group (ESCG), established in
2001. It is the ‘lead agency addressing e-security matters’.9 The ESCG is
supported by the Critical Infrastructure Protection Group (CIPG), which is
responsible for ‘identifying and providing advice on the protection of Australia’s
information infrastructure where the consequences of a security incident are
defined as critical’. It ‘evaluates the threats and vulnerabilities to the NII’, and
coordinates crisis management arrangements with other Commonwealth agencies,
including with respect to ‘defence, national security and counter-terrorism
programs’. It is chaired by the Attorney-General’s Department, and includes
representatives from the Australian Federal Police (AFP), which provides ‘an
enhanced law enforcement response capability’; the Australian Security
Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), which provides intelligence analysis and threat
assessment advice; the DSD, which provides ‘enhanced incident analysis and
response for Commonwealth agencies’; and the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission, which undertakes ‘detection, investigation and
prosecution of electronic fraud in the financial sector’.10
There are many agencies within the Department of Defence and the ADF
concerned with some aspect of NCW, including monitoring of the
electro-magnetic spectrum and cyber-space; ensuring information security
(Infosec) and e-security with respect to both national and Defence information
and communications systems; conducting research, development and testing of
NCW concepts and equipment; and addressing NCW criteria in the capability
development process.
The Director General Capability Plans (DGCP) ‘provides integration and
coordination of NCW with other capability development matters’. The Director
General Integrated Capability Development (DGICD) ‘provides cross-project
NCW integration’. The Director of NCW Implementation ‘provides research and
policy support’ in NCW matters for the capability planning process. The Network
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Centric Warfare Project Office (NCWPO) is ‘the battlespace architect’; it is
responsible for ‘ensuring cross-project integration … through testing NCW
compliance with battlespace architectures’. The Chief Information Officer Group
(CIOG) ‘manages the Network Dimension of Defence NCW capability’. The
Intelligence and Security Group (I&SG) is responsible for development of the
intelligence component of Defence NCW capability, and for ‘managing the
implementation and ongoing development of the Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance Roadmap’.11
The DSD, Australia’s largest intelligence agency, responsible for both the
collection of foreign signals and the security of the national information and
communications systems, has extensive capabilities relating to cyber-warfare.
It has broadened, with respect to its collection activities, from focusing almost
entirely on the interception of information ‘in motion’, as electro-magnetic waves
travel through the ether, to now also undertaking the collection and manipulation
of information ‘at rest’, stored on computer databases, disks and hard drives.12
DSD has two stations concerned with intercepting SATCOM in the region,
monitoring long-distance telephone calls, emails, facsimiles, and
computer-to-computer data exchanges. DSD’s largest station, at Shoal Bay, near
Darwin, is primarily concerned with intercepting Indonesian communications,
including both radio transmissions and SATCOM. Project Larkswood, which
began in 1979, involves the interception of Indonesian SATCOM, and especially
those involving Indonesia’s Palapa communications satellite system. It also
includes the communications of other Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) countries that use the Palapa system.13  Many more dish antennas
were installed in the late 1990s, making eleven as at September 1999. Most of
the new antennas were designed to intercept various sorts of SATCOM involving
Indonesia, including mobile satellite telephone (Satphone) conversations using
Inmarsat and Global System for Mobile Communications (GSMC) services.14
DSD’s other SATCOM signals intelligence (SIGINT) station is at Kojarena, near
Geraldton, WA; it became operational in the mid-1990s, and currently has five
large radomes. It is able to monitor selectively the communications from more
than a hundred geostationary satellites stationed along the equator from about
40°E to about 170°W longitude.15 The station reportedly functions as part of
the much-publicised ‘Echelon’ system.16
DSD is also Australia’s ‘national authority’ for Infosec. DSD’s Information
Security Group is responsible for ‘the protection of Australian official
communications and information systems’, with respect to ‘information that is
processed, stored or communicated by electronic or similar means’. The Group
also works with private industry in relation to the development of new
cryptographic products, and evaluates Infosec products for industry.17
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The ADF maintains a variety of electronic warfare (EW) capabilities which
are relevant to cyber-warfare. The RAAF’s Electronic Warfare Operational
Support Unit (EWOSU) was established in Salisbury, SA, in 1991. One of its first
responsibilities was to compile ‘the first integrated electronic warfare intelligence
data base in Australia’.18  In 1976, the Australian Army raised 72 Electronic
Warfare Squadron at Cabarlah, Qld, the home base of the Army’s 7 Signal
Regiment, to provide EW support to Army forces. It is equipped with a variety
of communications intelligence (COMINT) and EW systems, employed for
high-frequency (HF) and very high-frequency (VHF) interception, DF, and
jamming operations.19  During the International Force East Timor (INTERFET)
operation in late 1999–2000, a component of the Squadron provided the
headquarters in Dili with ‘timely indicators and warning’, and, ‘as a secondary
task’, provided other reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence collection
services.20
EW and cyber-warfare are becoming conflated as the electro-magnetic
environment merges with cyber-space. Cyber-techniques will be increasingly
used to penetrate the electronic components in weapons systems, collecting
electronic intelligence to inform the development of electronic support measures
(ESM), electronic countermeasures (ECM) and electronic counter-countermeasures
(ECCM). ECM and ECCM operations will involve a conjunction of radio-EW and
cyber-attacks.
The Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) has a major role
in the implementation of NCW in the ADF, providing ‘essential scientific and
technological support’ with respect to intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR), communications, human-computer interfaces, and
decision-support tools. Its work on NCW is coordinated by a NCW Steering
Group that was formed in early 2003, and includes the development of
technologies for battlespace communications and protection of the infrastructure,
as well as integration of future weapons systems into the C2 and engagement
grids.21
The DSTO has recently initiated a series of ‘Net Warrior exercises’ to ‘build,
demonstrate and enhance’ ADF battlespace interoperability. The participants
include the Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft (AEW&C) Testbed,
the Air Defence Ground Environment Simulator (ADGESIM), and a ‘Future Ship’
maritime platform. An important focus has been the tactical data-links for
exchanging ‘battle-space situational awareness information’, including the use
of ‘Internet-based transmission approaches’.22
The ADF Warfare Centre at Williamtown is involved in the development of
doctrine and the delivery of specialist courses on joint EW and joint IW.
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The AFP has considerable expertise in several important aspects of
cyber-warfare. It is capable of processing large quantities of digital imagery,
such as recorded by closed-circuit television systems. Its Telecommunications
Interception Division, which is particularly skilled in monitoring mobile phones,
has expanded substantially since the late 1990s, initially under the National
Illicit Drug Strategy (NIDS),23  and since 2001 in accordance with the Australian
Government’s counter-terrorism agenda. In the case of the so-called ‘Bali nine’,
the Australian heroin smugglers arrested in Bali in April 2005, AFP personnel
reportedly cracked the Personal Identification Number (PIN) codes on some of
the 10 mobile phones seized, enabling them to identify the network providers
and obtain records of ‘every phone call made or received during the life of the
cards in each mobile’.24  It is also able to intercept emails, Short Message Service
(SMS) and voicemail messages ‘that are temporarily delayed and stored during
passage over a telecommunications system’.25 The Australian High Tech Crime
Centre (AHTCC), which is hosted in Canberra by the AFP, provides a ‘national
coordinated approach to combating serious, complex and multi-jurisdictional’
computer-generated crime.26
ASIO has a Technical Operations Branch which supports its
counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism responsibilities. It has expertise not
only in monitoring telephones, but also in covert installation of ‘bugs’ and other
technical devices in embassies, private residences and meeting places, and in
penetrating computer-related systems.
The Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) has a Technical Section
which generally conducts technical operations in foreign capitals, although it
sometimes cooperates with ASIO in operations against foreign missions in
Canberra. For example, it was alleged in May 1995 that ASIS had worked with
ASIO to install fibre-optic devices in the Chinese Embassy in Canberra while it
was being built in the 1980s.27  Since the 1960s, ASIS has assisted DSD by
obtaining foreign code-books; since the late 1990s, it has also provided DSD
with internal telephone and email directories. There has been increasing
cooperation between ASIS and DSD since the 1990s with respect to technical
collection and surveillance operations in foreign capitals. Offensive cyber-warfare
operations, and, indeed IO more generally, will place increasing demands on
ASIS for covert support overseas.
The corporate sector, and especially the telecommunications, IT and aerospace
companies, is an enormous reservoir of cyber-warfare capabilities. Most of the
NII is in private hands. Telecommunications are virtually monopolised by Telstra
and Optus. There is a plethora of Internet Service Providers (ISPs), some of them
committed to the provision of maximum security for their services, regardless
of the implications for access by the authorities. The corporate sector contains
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technical expertise, entrepreneurial ability and research and development (R&D)
capabilities.
Telstra and Optus maintain central parts of Australia’s NII. Optus has a new
headquarters, with 6 500 staff, at Macquarie Park in northwest Sydney. A
Network Operations Centre (NOC) at the headquarters was opened by former
Prime Minister John Howard in October 2007. The Optus C-1 communications
satellite is particularly critical to the ADF’s NCW architecture. Positioned in
geostationary orbit over the equator at 156°E longitude (i.e. just north of
Bougainville), it provides relatively high data rate links between headquarters
and tactical platforms to support current and future C2, surveillance, intelligence,
logistics and administrative networks. It carries four Defence payloads (Global
Broadcast, ultra high-frequency (UHF), X-band and Ka-band), was successfully
launched on 11 June 2003; it allows AEW&C Wedgetail aircraft, Jindalee
Operational Radar Network (JORN) and the ground radar net to share data at
required data rates.28  Optus maintains a Satellite Earth Station at Belrose, which
has four 13-metre antennas, one of which is dedicated to controlling the C-1
satellite.29
Telstra is the largest provider of local and long-distance telephone services,
mobile phone services, and wireless, ADSL and cable Internet access in Australia.
It was able to assist DSD during the hunt for the October 2002 Bali bombers.
Two Telstra technicians visited Jakarta in late October and spent ‘several days
at the main link to Indonesia’s government-owned telecommunications carrier,
Telkomsei’, where they extracted ‘a database of millions of phone numbers’,
which was then handed to DSD for processing.30
Nearly all the servers and routers used in the Australian NII are made by
Cisco Systems, headquartered in California. For example, Cisco provided the
Internet Protocol (IP) phones, the wireless local area network (WLAN) and the
network security at the new Optus head office in Macquarie Park.31  Cisco has
a Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT).32
AusCERT, the Australian Computer Emergency Response Team, based in
Sydney, is a national agency providing expertise on computer network security,
particularly with respect to incident response. It is affiliated with the CERT
Coordination Centre in the United States, which studies Internet security
vulnerabilities, researches long-term changes in networked systems, and provides
information to improve the security of networked systems. AusCERT provides
a central point in Australia for reporting on security incidents and dissemination
of information relating to threats, vulnerabilities and defensive mechanisms.33
The aerospace companies possess a range of R&D, design and manufacturing
capabilities directly relevant to the cyber-warfare exercise. These include tactical
data-links, C2 systems, antenna and radio frequency (RF) propagation systems,
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and UAVs, as well as specialist electronic components and testing equipment.
There is already extensive cooperation between Defence and many companies
with respect to NCW systems. For example, DSTO and ADI Ltd signed an
agreement at DSTO’s Defence Science Communications Laboratory at Edinburgh,
north of Adelaide, in September 2004 to form a ‘Strategic R&D Alliance’ for the
collaborative development of NCW technologies.34  Raytheon Australia has a
test-bed Combat Control System (CCS) at its headquarters in North Ryde in
Sydney which can simulate, and test new concepts and connectivities with, the
Combat Information Systems (CIS) of both the Collins-class submarine and the
prospective AWDs.
Research, planning and preparation
The dimensions of the terms of reference for an Australian Cyber-warfare Centre
require considerable debate and contemplation, and, indeed, they will eventually
only evolve once a Centre has begun operating. However, there are several basic
planning functions that would be central in any construct. Its activities would
be both defensive and offensive. Indeed, the relationship between these is
symbiotic, each nourishing the other. Research into ways of penetrating foreign
cyber-systems inevitably uncovers vulnerabilities in Australian systems, while
research into possible vulnerabilities often suggests ways of exploiting these for
offensive purposes.
A core research function of any Australian Cyber-warfare Centre would be
the study of telecommunications architectures—the terrestrial microwave relay
networks, SATCOM, and fibre-optic cables—both across the region and in
particular countries. SATCOM and microwave relays are reasonably accessible,
allowing IPs and pro formas for computer-to-computer data exchanges to be
identified, and providing opportunities for hacking into command chains, combat
information systems, air defence systems and databases. This research activity
would also involve the identification of the mobile phone numbers and email
addresses of foreign political and military leaders.
Another core research function would be the study of the electronic
sub-systems in major weapons systems, such as the avionics of particular combat
and support aircraft. This would include, for example, finding ways of
penetrating the ‘firewalls’ protecting avionics systems and of using wireless
application protocols (WAPs) to insert ‘Trojan horses’. This would conceivably
allow Australian cyber-specialists to effectively hijack adversary aircraft (and
to choose between hard or soft landings for them). In other cases, it would allow
electronic components to be disabled or deceived—essentially conducting ECM
and ECCM operations through cyber-space.
A Centre would be centrally concerned with studying the vulnerabilities in
both Australian and foreign networks and developments in viruses, worms,
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‘Trojan horses’ and other threats to computer-based systems. Publicly
acknowledged vulnerabilities in servers indicate promising routes for
exploitation. In June 2001, for example, CERT reported a critical flaw in the
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) component of Cisco Internetwork Operating
System (IOS) software using local authentication databases, which ‘allows an
intruder to execute privileged commands on Cisco routers’ and to effectively
take ‘complete control’ of affected systems.35  In June 2006, multiple
vulnerabilities were reported in certain versions of the Cisco Secure Access
Control Server (ACS) for Windows, a key part of Cisco’s ‘trust and identity
management framework’ and a cornerstone of its Network Admission Control
(NAC) system. Some of the vulnerabilities caused the ACS services to crash,
while others allowed ‘arbitrary code execution if successfully exploited’.36
The study of viruses and worms would be not merely for remedial or
longer-term protective purposes, but even more importantly would inform the
R&D of superior viruses and ‘Trojan horses’—making them more malicious, or
more selective, or more difficult to trace and diagnose, or less able to be fixed.
Some recent examples are the VBS/Loveletter worm (appearing in 2000 and
causing between US$5 and US$10 billion dollars in damage), which used a
back-door ‘Trojan horse’; the Code Red and Code Red II worms in 2001, which
attacked the Index Server in Microsoft Internet Information Servers; the SQL
Slammer worm, which attacked vulnerabilities in the Microsoft SQL Server; the
Blaster worm, which exploited a vulnerability in Microsoft Windows systems;
Sobig and MyDoom worms, which spread rapidly via emails; Witty, which
exploited vulnerabilities in several Internet Security Systems (ISS); and Santy,
a ‘Web-worm’ that exploited vulnerabilities in Google.37  Systematic exploration
of all known viruses would suggest the most lucrative avenues to explore.
Destructiveness is not necessarily the objective. Although there is a place in
IO for relatively crude cyber-operations, such as defacement of websites and
Denial of Service (DS) attacks, the most effective and successful cyber-warfare
activities are those in which control of computer-related systems is taken without
detection by the hosts. Covert corruption of databases, deception of sensor
systems, and manipulation of situational awareness is much more likely to
produce favourable strategic and tactical outcomes.
A Cyber-warfare Centre would be responsible for the preparation of
contingency plans. These would include the development of various forms of
‘Trojan horses’ designed to surreptitiously corrupt data and files, and matched
to particular national stock exchanges, power utilities, air traffic control systems
and other information infrastructure; of plans for disabling and deceiving critical
elements of military chains of command; and plans for targeting the computer,
communications and electronic systems used by particular individuals and
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agencies. Scenarios would be continually researched and techniques practised
to ensure the currency of the plans in contingent circumstances.
A Cyber-warfare Centre would be responsible for identifying the preparations
necessary for expeditious implementation of the plans, including the preparations
for offensive operations. Some of this preparatory activity will involve the
placement of taps on communications systems, of intercept equipment in
microwave alleys, and of various electronic devices on antenna systems and
communication junctures in foreign countries—to monitor communications,
identify IPs and pro formas, collect local electronic emanations for the application
of countermeasures, and to manipulate and deceive air defence and logistical
systems. Devices could be implanted in radars and other sensor systems, or at
junctures in their data-links. It is obviously easier to do this before crises or
wars eventuate. A Cyber-warfare Centre would have to work very closely with
designated ASIS or Special Forces elements with respect to these sorts of activities.
The proportion of both international and local telecommunications traffic
being conveyed by fibre-optic cables has increased rapidly since the late 1980s,
notwithstanding the increasing volume of mobile telephony connected by both
satellite and terrestrial transponders. A rising proportion of voice telephony is
being carried by the Internet, via cable, satellite and wireless, as Voice Over
Internet Protocol (VOIP) communications. Current trans-oceanic fibre-optic
cables typically have four or eight pair of fibre strands, each pair providing four
channels, with a capacity of 10 Gigabits per second per channel. Systems have
been demonstrated which can carry 14 Terabits per second (111 Gigabits per
140 channels) over a single optical fibre.38  However, tapping fibre-optic cables
is much more difficult than intercepting satellite or terrestrial microwave
communications. It requires considerable expertise and specialised equipment,
and direct access to the cables.
There are two approaches to tapping fibre-optic cables. One is to access the
amplifier or repeater points which regenerate the signals, and which are typically
every 160 km or so. This is relatively easy in older systems, which use
opto-electronic repeater amplifiers. These convert the optical signals into electrical
signals, clean and amplify them and then convert them back to optical for
re-transmission; the signals can be intercepted by external induction collars
during their electronic stage.39
More modern optical cable systems use Erbium [Er]-Doped Fibre Amplifiers
(EDFA), in which the signal is boosted without having to be converted into
electricity. At each EDFA repeater point there is a small internal tap that takes
signals from the eastwards fibre and sends them back along the westwards fibre
to let the cable operators diagnose cable fault points very accurately. These
signals can be monitored by inserting tap couplers into the EDFAs, although
care must be taken to avoid a voltage drop.
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The second approach involves the ‘scrape and bend method’, in which a
small piece of cladding is removed from one side of the cable, allowing a
detectable amount of light to escape but not enough to alert the cable operators.
The exposed fibre is placed in a special reader unit that slightly bends it so that
some of the light is refracted (due to it hitting the glass close enough to the
perpendicular), and a photon sensor or light detecting device then reads the
escaping light. Dummy light packets may have to be inserted so that photon
loss is not noticed.40
Transmission of the intercepted data is a formidable problem. A cable can be
carrying hundreds of gigabits of data, or the equivalent of a hundred million
telephone calls at a time. It requires prioritising, based on careful consideration
of future intelligence requirements, as well as placement of equipment at the
tap sites. The techniques involved include distinguishing the Synchronous
Optical Network (SONET) frames that carry the multiplexed digital traffic;
concentrating on selected IPs and other easily sorted packages; and using filters
that filter terabits per second down to reasonable data level.
In 2005, the USS Jimmy Carter, one of the new Seawolf class of submarines,
was extensively modified for a range of covert missions, including tapping
undersea optical cables.41  However, these missions are obviously extremely
complex as well as very expensive.
Fortunately, signals are rarely conveyed by optical cable, let alone undersea
cable, for the whole of their journey from sender to recipient. Undersea cables
have landing points where they connect with satellite ground stations, terrestrial
microwave relay stations, or other cable systems, which in turn often connect
with mobile telephony or broad-band wireless transponders. The terminals,
junctions and switching centres, as well as the Network Access Points (NAPs),
now usually called Internet Exchange Points (IXPs), which serve as Internet
exchange facilities, are more accessible and likely to be more lucrative than most
undersea cables.
Offensive activities
Many of the posited functions of a Cyber-warfare Centre are already being
performed, to a greater or less extent and with unsatisfactory coordination, by
one or more of the organisations operating in the Defence intelligence or
cyber-security areas. However, none of them has any mandate for the planning
and preparation of offensive cyber-warfare activities. Offensive capabilities,
represented by the strike capacity of the F-111s and important parts of the Army
and RAN, are an essential feature of Australian strategic policy. They must be




The ADF has moved slowly to acknowledge the offensive dimension of NCW.
Force 2020, the vision statement issued in 2002, stated that ‘in the force of 2020,
we will have transitioned from platform-centric operations to Network-Enabled
Operations’, and that the objective is ‘to obtain common and enhanced battlespace
awareness, and with the application of that awareness, deliver maximum combat
effect’. It said that shared information ‘allows a greater level of situational
awareness, coordination, and offensive potential than is currently the case’.42
This remained the only mention of the word ‘offensive’ in the public guidance
for another five years, although in 2002–2003 the Knowledge Staff under the
Chief Knowledge Officer argued that, among its transformational capabilities,
NCW would provide ‘an offensive information operations capability’.43
The 2007 NCW Roadmap also argued that a networked force would ‘facilitate
enhanced situational awareness, collaboration and offensive potential’. It
described ‘the offensive support system’, which is ‘predominantly based in the
engagement grid [of the NCW architecture]’, but which also ‘combines aspects
of the sensor and command and control (C2) grids while exploiting the
information network to exchange information between all the grids’.44
However, this conception of offensive activities is essentially limited to
Network-enabled operations which exploit networking to provide enhanced
situational awareness, more informed targeting, and greater precision in weapons
delivery. Indeed, the Knowledge Staff classed offensive NCW not only as
‘effectors’, but as ‘weapons systems’.45  It does not extend to the conduct of
offensive cyber-warfare activities—hacking, disabling information
infrastructures, disrupting chains of command and decision-making processes,
corrupting databases and conducting sophisticated IW—which could well have
at least as much impact on some conflict outcomes as more efficient and more
effective application on conventional force.
Information Warfare and the intelligence process
IW, and cyber-warfare in particular, poses several new challenges for the
intelligence community. The centrality of intelligence collection and analysis is
enhanced. Timeliness becomes even more critical; indeed, analysis and assessment
become conflated with operations. New intelligence skills are required.
The intelligence collection and processing stations, the EW centres and the
cyber-warfare facilities will effectively be integrated. The intelligence centres
disseminate the processed intelligence, collated from all sources (especially
SIGINT and imagery intelligence (IMINT)) in real-time to the high command,
subordinate headquarters and staffs, and to field units. The EW centres maintain
catalogues of electronic order of battle (EOB) data about radar systems and other
electronic emitters in prospective areas of operations. This includes data on the
location of the emitters, their signal strengths and frequencies, the pulse width
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and pulse length of the signals, and the physical descriptions of the emitting
antenna system. The cyber-warfare centre is responsible for both offensive and
defensive cyber-activities. It penetrates foreign computer networks, implants
viruses, worms and ‘Trojan horses’, conducts DS attacks, defaces websites, sends
misleading information, and disrupts or manipulates connected sensor and
information systems.
These centres not only provide intelligence and EW and cyber-warfare
capabilities to support the conventional functional and designated commanders;
they are also integrally involved in the planning and conduct of operations. In
future wars (including prospective phases in the ‘war on terror’), the winners
in the long-term will not necessarily be those who enjoy military success on the
battlefields but those who win the information war. In many (but not all)
contingencies, the IO units could well play more determinate roles than the
conventional force elements. They are the essence of ‘effects-based’ operations.
NCW and IO have fundamental implications for the role and place of the
intelligence process, although this was ignored in the Flood inquiry into
Australia’s intelligence agencies in 2004.46  In IO activities, the intelligence
process is categorically conflated with the conduct of operations. The role of
intelligence changes from a staff agency to an instrumental service. The
intelligence cycle becomes the definitive sequence in the operations themselves.
In exemplary cases, remotely-controlled sensor systems serve as both intelligence
sources and shooters.
This conflation is greatly facilitated by UAVs. Its essence was demonstrated
in the use of a Predator, armed with Hellfire missiles, to hit a car in Yemen on 3
November 2002, killing its six occupants, including the al-Qaeda leader
responsible for planning the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000.47 The
Predator was remotely-piloted from Djibouti, with the surveillance imagery
relayed in real-time to a field user equipped with a remote video terminal and
to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)’s headquarters in Virginia.48
The Defence intelligence agencies will have to be drastically reformed, and
in parts substantially augmented, in order to perform their central role in NCW
and IO/IW. They presently lack important technical capacities, and are surely
incapable of providing the timely, accurate and insightful intelligence necessary,
when operationalised through IW and cyber-warfare activities, to manipulate
the policy-making and decisional processes of notional adversaries.
Command issues
Construction of an IW architecture, including a cyber-warfare component, raises
numerous important organisational and command issues for the ADF. Networking
will provide more direct sensor-to-shooter connections and enable a more
flattened C2 structure. IO generally do not require, and indeed are likely to be
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impeded by, the erstwhile hierarchical C2 structures of traditional armed forces.
With all force elements digitised and connected with sufficient bandwidth, the
high command and the ‘front-line’ IO units can work with a shared battlefield
awareness; orders can be issued by the high command to the IO units directly
and in real-time, without passing through intermediate echelons; and the IO
units, with full appreciation of both the tactical and strategic dimensions, can
operate with considerable autonomy from intermediary oversight.
Most IW involve several Services and Defence agencies, with (currently)
complex, complicated and distributed command arrangements—as in the
plausible IO mission scenario in which a Collins-class submarine embarks Special
Forces and ‘special intelligence’ personnel to implant electronic devices in
adversary communications, control, command and intelligence (C3I) systems to
enable cyber-warriors, using UAVs for connectivity, to penetrate and take control
of adversary networks, providing other ADF elements with unrestricted access
to adversary telecommunications systems and airspace. Civilians would be
integrally involved in the conduct of important operations, especially those
involving cyber-warfare. DSTO will accrue new responsibilities, with large
elements also directly involved in operations, as the ‘wizard war’ becomes
real-time. New concepts and mechanisms are required for the utilisation of
reserves and mobilisation of other civil resources (especially IT and
super-computer resources).
Plausible operations could involve a cyber-warfare centre in Canberra working
in direct support of air strikes by corrupting an adversary’s air defence data, or
supporting amphibious lodgements by confusing an adversary’s sensor systems
and response processes, or supporting counter-terrorist operations by temporarily
disrupting electrical power in a particular locality, while depending on UAVs,
submarines and Special Forces to provide access to the adversary’s networks.
Civilians would be involved in the actual conduct of operations, first, where
particular hacking skills are required, and, second, to provide subject expertise.
Experts on a foreign national financial system, or the key personalities and
political processes in a foreign government, would literally sit next to the hackers,
providing direction and advice as penetration is achieved, data surreptitiously
distorted, effects modulated, and decisions effectively manipulated.
The issue of creating a Commander of Information Operations, at the
equivalent level of the present functional or environmental commanders (i.e.
2-star), has been raised elsewhere.49 The case will undoubtedly become
increasingly compelling, as the role of IO not only as an enabler of more effective
air, maritime and land operations but also as a determinant of conflict outcomes
becomes more apparent, and other benefits with respect to IO planning, doctrine
development and capability development become better appreciated. Operational
command and control of a cyber-warfare centre would be simplified, as would
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some of the tasking arrangements involving special operations units and platforms
such as the submarines and UAVs.
A premium on ante-bellum activities
IO place a premium on the conduct of preparatory activities, inherently involving
covert operations in peacetime. It is a process quite different to the planning
and logistics preparations that are involved in conventional operations; it is
more akin to the craft of the cryptanalyst.
Information Supremacy requires intimate familiarity with the intricacies of
an adversary’s C2 structure, public media, defence communications systems,
sensor systems, and cyber-networks. It requires the maintenance of
comprehensive, accurate and completely up-to-date EOB data for the design of
ESM and ECM EW systems and application tactics. It requires detailed knowledge
of the antenna systems and electronic equipment aboard adversary combatants
(such as the avionics in aircraft) and installed in hardened command centres, in
order to design EW, ‘front-door’, ‘in-band’ high-power microwave (HPM), and
cyber-penetration techniques. Cyber-warriors must explore offensive
cyber-warfare, in which software is developed for penetrating the firewalls in
designated sectors (such as air traffic control and air defence networks); worms,
viruses and ‘Trojan horses’ are developed, and plans are prepared and tested,
for the corruption or disablement of websites and databases; and ‘back-door’
programs are installed in designated computer networks enabling data to be
copied from files without detection, or the cyber-warfare centre to take control
of the infected computers.
Much of this would be done in the Australian Cyber-warfare Centre itself,
using airborne connectivity with the adversary’s networks. However, the process
would be greatly advantaged by the prior emplacement of various sorts of devices
on adversary C3I systems—such as telephone exchanges, microwave relay
towers, radar equipment, and even SATCOM ground control stations.
There are questions about Australia’s willingness and capacity for engaging
in ante-bellum activities, especially those involving identifiable penetrations of
cyber-networks or physical implants of technical devices.
Rules of engagement, doctrine and operational concepts
The ROE for IW, including cyber-warfare, will have to be very different from
those of traditional military operations. New doctrine will have to be
promulgated. New ‘laws of war’ will have to be developed and accorded some
international standing.
New ROE are required to accommodate the transient nature of some of the
real-time intelligence available to the shooter and to remove intermediary
command levels. For example, early in Operation Enduring Freedom, a Predator
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UAV armed with Hellfire missiles, on a mission for the CIA, spotted ‘a top Taliban
leader’ entering a building. The aircraft could have taken a shot at the building,
but the CIA officials had to seek permission from US Central Command in Tampa,
Florida, and by the time the military officials ordered a strike the Taliban leader
had fled.50
New ROE are also required for those ADF elements that might be engaged in
pre-emptive operations, covert operations, and offensive cyber-warfare activities.
US military officials have said that clarifying the ROE for initiating computer
network attacks has been ‘a particularly thorny issue’ in the Pentagon, ‘due to
larger political considerations, particularly to ensure that the attacks do not have
any important unintended political ramifications or effects beyond the target’.51
During the planning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, IO officers encountered
opposition from ‘the Pentagon’s legal community’, which was worried about
the unintended effects of IO.52  US officials have said that the activities of the
Compass Call IW aircraft were determined, both preceding and during the war,
partly by legal arguments (which determined that ‘jamming a sovereign country
is an act of war’), and that ‘it was very difficult for us to get our hands around
what we were authorized to do before the start of hostilities’.53
New operational concepts and doctrine will have to be developed for new
areas of activity, especially those involving offensive cyber-warfare. For example,
doctrine is required to define and exploit the ‘intersection of information warfare
and air defence suppression’. Special mission aircraft, such as the RC-135 Rivet
Joint, can tap into enemy radar systems to ‘see’ what they are detecting—and
hence instruct fighters to either press home or abort an attack.54
Some of this doctrine and associated ROE will have to be developed in the
absence of any relevant international law. The killing of the al-Qaeda operatives
by the Predator UAV in Yemen on 3 November 2002 raised troubling ethical
questions. Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh called it ‘a summary execution
that violates human rights’.55
The inherent transnational and non-State attributes of cyber-activities,
confounding distinctions between external and internal security operations,
pose not only new technical challenges but also contain new risks, in terms of
both national vulnerabilities and threats to civil liberties. These have to be
addressed in both national legislation and ROE.
Capability planning
The 2007 NCW Roadmap described the mechanisms through which the NCW
Concept has now thoroughly infused the capability development process. All
major capability proposals are now rigorously vetted from an NCW perspective,
primarily focused on their ‘level of connectivity and integration requirements’,
their IT vulnerabilities, and the potential contribution of their Combat
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Information Systems to provide enhanced ISR capabilities and to enable more
combat effect.56
A Cyber-warfare Centre would add a new and critically important dimension
to this process. Major capability proposals have to have initiators and mentors.
There has to be some place concerned with identification of long-term
cyber-warfare requirements apart from critiquing the NCW aspects of other
proposals. A Cyber-warfare Centre would provide an institutionalised advocate
for funding and specialised equipment beyond the scope of the current process.
Some of the specialised requirements equipment will only become apparent
after such a Centre has been functioning for a while. Much of it will consist of
assorted miniature devices for implantation at various physical places in
adversary networks, but there might also be major support platforms. UAVs
offer extraordinary promise for both enhanced and precisely-targetable COMINT
collection and penetration of networks exposed during microwave transmissions.
The acquisition of a squadron of Global Hawks for SIGINT collection is a serious
possibility within the next decade. There are programs to produce a version of
the Global Hawk with a 3000 lb SIGINT payload, including COMINT capabilities.
It might well be the case that three Global Hawks (with one on a continuous
36-hour station), equipped with various sorts of antenna systems, could provide
comparable COMINT coverage to that of the first Rhyolite geostationary SIGINT
satellites in the 1970s. Other configurations, focused on ‘microwave alleys’,
could provide direct support for interactive cyber-warriors.
The costs of NCW and IO will not be trivial. The bandwidth requirements
of NCW and IO are staggering. Advanced communications satellite systems will
be necessary, using laser transmission and Internet routing to provide
high-bandwidth connectivity.57 The networks and servers used by Defence for
Network-enabled operations have to be completely secured—not only against
terrorists and other non-State actors, but also against the cyber-warfare activities
of notional regional adversaries. Special operations units will have to be formed
for covert activities, such as placement of devices in microwave relay facilities,
optical cable networks, switching centres and air defence systems in particular
countries. The construction of a Cyber-warfare Centre could well cost more than
a billion dollars. However, this would be spread over many years, and could
begin quite modestly, with more robust networking of various current activities
and capabilities, and direction and coordination provided by a small core.
Location of a Cyber-warfare Centre
Location is a factor of organisational, technical and operational considerations.
A Cyber-warfare Centre would be a national asset, serving grand strategy as
much as tactical encounters. It would have to respond to direction from, report
to, and interact with agencies at several levels. Its central role in operations has
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to be reflected in ADF command arrangements. Robust connectivity with the
rest of the NCW infrastructure and the NII is fundamental. The physical
proximity of all its components is not necessary, so long as functional
coordination and cooperation can be organised. Networking enables elements
to be distributed, across agencies and geographically. There will inevitably be
offices in more than one place, as well as out-rider units in high-tech centres
such as the Salisbury/Edinburgh area in north Adelaide.
A Cyber-warfare Centre would have at least two new elements that would
require accommodation. One comprises the executive, coordination, planning
and management functions, which extend across the whole of government. This
is the purview of the National Security Division of the Department of the Prime
Minister and Cabinet (DPM&C), which has a mandate ‘to foster greater
coordination of, and a stronger whole-of-government policy focus on, national
security’ and which has greatly strengthened the whole-of-government approach
to counter-terrorism. There are many aspects of cyber-warfare that require
coordination at a national level. This includes all cyber-activities aimed at
influencing adversary political and strategic agencies and processes. Covert
operations in peacetime must be endorsed at this level because of the risks and
consequences of possible exposure. In time of war, the whole-of-government
approach would be a crucial feature of the simultaneous application and
progressive interaction of kinetic and cognitive effects.
The second element is the operational facility, the place where the
cyber-warriors would work. Technical intelligence collection stations, EW
centres and cyber-warfare capabilities will remain dispersed, but a place devoted
to cyber-operations would promote interaction of the specialist personnel in
these areas, where close cooperation is not only essential to operational success,
but is likely to encourage future technical advances at the interstices.
It is important to have a place where defensive and much-enhanced offensive
activities are co-located. Those working on defensive matters need to keep the
offensive planners apprised of the avenues they are finding most difficult to
protect. Those working on offensive plans should obviously keep the defensive
side informed as they discover potential vulnerabilities in national systems while
exploring avenues to exploit. The symbiosis should enhance the security,
reliability, capacity and endurance of national networks while maximising the
potency and perniciousness of Australia’s cyber-warfare capabilities against
hostile systems.
The question of location is complicated by the decision to locate the
Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) near Bungendore, 29 km east
of Canberra (and about 28 minutes to drive), rather than at HMAS Harman or
somewhere else close to the Defence complex at Russell Hill. An obvious place
would be in or near the DSD building—the main centre for the collection,
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processing and analysis of intercepted telecommunications, the main repository
of certain specialised cyber-skills, the manager of some of the most secure
networks in the world, and the national agency responsible for the defensive
cyber-warfare mission, protecting the Australian Government’s communications
and information systems. However, a component element will now have to be
located at Bungendore to serve the Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS), requiring
some bifurcation of the Cyber-warfare Centre and very difficult decisions about
which capabilities and activities to maintain at Russell Hill and which to repose
at Bungendore.
A component element might also be located at HMAS Harman, 11.4 km
southeast of Russell Hill (and 19 minutes to drive). It hosts the Defence Network
Operations Centre (DNOC), the hub of the third largest communications network
in Australia after Telstra and Optus, which provides network support for military
operations. The operational elements of the DNOC include the Naval
Communications Station Canberra (NAVCOMMSTA), which provides UHF
satellite services in support of the RAN and other ADF users; the Naval
Communications Area Master Station Australia (NAVCAMSAUS) which supports
RAN fleet communications; and the Defence Information Systems Communications
Element (DISCE), which provides a secure and survivable communications
network to support strategic and tactical operations of the ADF and selected
Government departments. Under Project JP 2008 (Phase 3F), a new ground
station is to be constructed at HMAS Harman, together with two new terminals
at the Defence communications station at Geraldton, to upgrade ‘the entire
Australian Defence Satellite Communications Capability (ADSCC) Ground
Segment’.58
The HQJOC will have a dedicated fibre-optic cable extending 27 km to the
DNOC at HMAS Harman. Redundancy will be provided by ‘four links into the
local carrier network’. The facility will also have ‘a back-up satellite link’.59
Regional developments
Over the past decade or so, responding to either the Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA) or to the challenges and opportunities of the Internet, many
countries have established cyber-warfare organisations of some sort or another.
Some of them are attached to national intelligence agencies or Defence Ministries,
while others function as part of military command structures. The United States
has a variety, spawned by the National Security Agency (NSA), the CIA, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) in Washington. In 2000, the US Space Command was given responsibility
for both Computer Network Defence (CND) and Computer Network Attack (CNA)
missions. After the Space Command was merged into the US Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM) in June 2002, several new organisations were established for
planning and conducting cyber-warfare, including the Joint Functional
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Component Command for Network Warfare (JFCC-NW), responsible for
‘deliberate planning of network warfare, which includes coordinated planning
of offensive network attack’; the Joint Functional Component Command for
Space and Global Strike (JFCC-SGS), which also houses the Joint Information
Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC), responsible ‘for assisting combatant
commands with an integrated approach to information operations’; and the Joint
Task Force for Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO), which has responsibility
for Department of Defense cyber-security.60 The US Navy established a Naval
Network Warfare Command (NNWC) at Norfolk in Virginia in July 2002. The
US Air Force established a new Cyberspace Command at Barksdale Air Force
Base in Louisiana in June 2007, ‘already home to about 25 000 military personnel
involved in everything from electronic warfare to network defence’.61  IW teams
deploy with combatant commands. Interoperability with the US cyber-warfare
architecture requires appropriate institutional arrangements on the part of US
allies.
Asia has emerged as the ‘early proving ground’ for cyber-warfare’.62 This
is especially the case in Northeast Asia, where cyber-warfare activities have
become commonplace. China has the most extensive and most tested
cyber-warfare capabilities, although the technical expertise is very uneven.
China began to implement an IW plan in 1995, and since 1997 has conducted
several exercises in which computer viruses have been used to interrupt military
communications and public broadcasting systems. In April 1997, a 100-member
elite corps was established by the Central Military Commission to devise ‘ways
of planting disabling computer viruses into American and other Western C2
defence systems’.63  In 2000, China established a strategic IW unit (which US
observers have called ‘Net Force’) designed to ‘wage combat through computer
networks to manipulate enemy information systems spanning spare parts
deliveries to fire control and guidance systems’.64
Chinese cyber-warfare units have been very active, although it is often very
difficult to attribute activities originating in China to official agencies or private
‘netizens’. Since 1999, there have been periodic rounds of attacks against official
websites in Taiwan, Japan and the United States. These have typically involved
fairly basic penetrations, allowing websites to be defaced or servers to be crashed
by DS programs. More sophisticated ‘Trojan horse’ programs were used in 2002
to penetrate and steal information from the Dalai Lama’s computer network.65
‘Trojan horse’ programs camouflaged as Word and PowerPoint documents have
been inserted in computers in government offices in several countries around
the world.66  Portable, large-capacity hard disks, often used by government
agencies, have been found to carry ‘Trojan horses’ which automatically upload
to Beijing websites everything that the computer user saves on the hard disk.67
Since the late 1990s, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has conducted more
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than 100 military exercises involving some aspect of IW, although the practice
has generally exposed substantial shortfalls.68
It has recently been reported that Chinese ‘cyber-espionage’ activities have
been conducted against ‘key Australian Government agencies’. According to
media reports in February 2008, ‘Chinese computer hackers have launched
targeted attacks on classified Australian Government computer networks’, and
that China is ‘believed to be seeking information on subjects such as military
secrets and the prices Australian companies will seek for resources such as coal
and iron ore’. The Chinese activities have reportedly prompted an official review
of IT security’.69
In August 1999, following a spate of cross-Strait attacks against computer
networks and official websites in Taiwan, the Minister for National Defense
(MND) in Taipei announced that the MND had established a Military Information
Warfare Strategy Policy Committee and noted that ‘we are able to defend
ourselves in an information war’.70  In January 2000, the Director of the MND’s
Communication Electronics and Information Bureau announced that the Military
Information Warfare Strategy Policy Committee had ‘the ability to attack the
PRC with 1,000 different computer viruses’.71  In August 2000, Taiwan’s
Hankuang 16 defence exercise included training in cyber-warfare, in which more
than 2000 computer viruses were tested. Two teams of cyber-warriors used the
viruses in simulated attacks on Taiwan’s computer networks.72  In December
2000, the MND’s Military Information Warfare Strategy Policy Committee was
expanded and converted into a battalion-size centre under the direct command
of the General Staff Headquarters, and with responsibilities for network
surveillance, defence, and countermeasures.73  In its 2002 National Defense
Report, released in July 2002, the MND for the first time included discussion of
‘electronic and information warfare units’. It proclaimed Taiwan’s commitment
to the achievement of ‘superiority [over the PRC] in information and electronic
warfare’, and it ranked EW and IW ahead of air and sea defence in terms of
current MND focus. It specifically cited such threatening developments by the
PRC as ‘Internet viruses, killer satellites, [and] electromagnetic pulses that could
fry computer networks vital to Taiwan’s defence and economy’.74
Japan was surprisingly laggard about developing cyber-warfare capabilities.
In April 1999, faced with a growing problem of cyber-crime (involving offences
such as computer-based fraud, on-line sales of illegal drugs, and transmission
of pornography), the National Police Agency set up a ‘special unit of
cyber-sleuths … who specialise in investigating computer-related crimes and
cyber-terrorism’.75  A ‘specialised anti-hacker task force’ was set up on 21
January 2000, but it was quickly shown to be impotent. Two days later there
began an intense spate of attacks on Japanese government websites, probably
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triggered by denials by right-wing Japanese that Japanese troops had massacred
Chinese civilians when they seized Nanjing in 1937.76
In May 2000, Japan announced plans to establish a Research Institute and
an operational unit for fighting cyber-terrorism. The announcement was
prompted by further sporadic hacking attacks. Some of these involved a ‘cyber
war between netizens of South Korea and Japan’ over Japanese claims to the
disputed Tok-do islets.77  It also followed revelations in March 2000 that the
Aum Shinri Kyo (Supreme Truth) sect (responsible for the sarin gas attack in the
Tokyo subway in March 1995) had written computer software used by police
agencies, which had enabled cult members to obtain secret data on police patrol
cars, as well as other software which allowed them access to data on the repairs
and inspections of several nuclear power plants.78
In July 2000, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA)’s79 Defense of Japan 2000
acknowledged, for the first time, the threat posed by IW. It noted that ‘there is
a greater possibility that invasion and tampering with computer systems by
hackers will affect our life immensely’, that ‘a new computer security base will
be established’, that facilities would be developed for operational evaluation of
computer security systems and techniques, and that JDA personnel would be
dispatched to the United States to develop computer security expertise. It also
noted that JDA officials contribute to the ‘Action Plan for Building Foundations
of Information Systems Protection from Hackers and Other Cyberthreats’ by
‘studying measures against hackers and cyber-terrorism’.80  It was reported in
October 2000 that the JDA’s ‘cyber-squad’ was developing software capable of
launching anti-hacking and anti-virus attacks and of destroying the computers
of hackers trying to penetrate Japan’s defence networks.81
South Korea has evidently also moved to establish a cyber-warfare capability.
The number of attacks on South Korean commercial and government websites
increased markedly during 2000 (partly reflecting the ‘cyber-war’ with Japanese
‘netizens’). The South Korean MND and the National Intelligence Service (NIS)
both reported during 2000 that the South Korean armed forces should ‘prepare
for cyber-warfare in the future from enemy countries’ and that they should
consider establishing ‘specialist units for cyber-warfare’.82  A National Cyber
Security Center attached to the NIS was functioning by 2004.83
Even North Korea, the most backward country in East Asia in IT terms,
reportedly set up a cyber-warfare unit in the late 1980s. Media reports actually
refer to two different places, but these may be different elements of the one
agency. An electronic communications monitoring and computer hacking group
from the State Security Agency is reportedly located at the Korea Computer
Centre in Pyongyang.84 The North Korean Army created a dedicated
cyber-warfare unit, called Unit 121, in 1998. Its staff is estimated to include from
500 to more than 1000 ‘hackers’. Its capabilities include ‘moderately advanced
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Distributed Denial of Service (DDS) capability’ and ‘moderate virus and malicious
code capabilities’. In October 2007, North Korea tested a ‘logic bomb’ containing
malicious code designed to be executed should certain events occur or at some
pre-determined time; the test led to a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution
banning sales of mainframe computers and lap-top personal computers (PCs) to
North Korea.85  North Korea also uses cyber-space extensively for its propaganda
or psychological warfare campaigns.86
In Southeast Asia, Singapore has both the leading IT industries and the most
advanced cyber-warfare capabilities. Singapore’s defence hierarchy ‘is committed
to the development of an offensive cyber-warfare capability’.87 The Ministry
of Defence and the Singapore Armed Forces initiated a Cyberspace Security
Project in the mid-1990s to develop ‘countermeasures which respond
automatically to attacks on their computer systems’.88  A dedicated cyber-warfare
unit is thought to have been established within the Ministry of Defence, and
methods for inserting computer viruses into other countries’ computer networks
have been developed.89
This is not the place to evaluate these regional agencies. They include many
different sorts or organisations with wide-ranging responsibilities, not all of
them necessarily relevant to Australia’s circumstances. They operate in secret.
Little is publicly known about them, and this is suffused with misinformation
and disinformation. However, they have each accumulated experiences of one
sort or another, developed practical and forensic skills, acquired equipment,
and undertaken operations with counterpart civilian or military authorities to
a greater or lesser extent. This accrual derives from bureaucratic
institutionalisation and provides a basis from which ‘asymmetric’ surprises can
be launched. They can only be systematically monitored and countered in
institutionalised fashion.
Conclusion
The lack of a Net-war or Cyber-warfare Centre is becoming a critical deficiency
in Australia’s evolving architecture for achieving and exploiting Information
Superiority and Support (IS&S) beyond around 2020. Australia has a plethora
of organisations, within and outside Defence, concerned with some aspect of
cyber-warfare (including network security), but they are poorly coordinated
and are not committed to the full exploitation of cyber-space for either military
operations or IW more generally. A dedicated Cyber-warfare Centre is
fundamental to the planning and conduct of both defensive and offensive IO.
It would be responsible for exploring the full possibilities of future cyber-warfare,
and developing the doctrine and operational concepts for IO. It would study all
viruses, DS programs, ‘Trojan horses’ and ‘trap-door’ systems, not only for
defensive purposes but also to discern offensive applications. It would study
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the firewalls around computer systems in military high commands and
headquarters in the region, in avionics and other weapons systems, and in
telecommunications centres, banks and stock exchanges, ready to penetrate a
command centre, a flight deck or a ship’s bridge, a telephone or data exchange
node, or a central bank at a moment’s notice, and able to insert confounding
orders and to manipulate data without the adversary’s knowledge. It would
identify new capability requirements, including new systems and support
platforms for accessing adversary IPs and computer-to-computer pro formas. It
would task special operations units both for covert preparatory missions in
peacetime and during the conduct of offensive IO in conflict situations.
The 2007 NCW Roadmap reflected substantial progress with the
institutionalisation of NCW perspectives within Defence; however, it also showed,
at least implicitly, that vitally important activities are inadequately attended by
current structures and processes, and that some sort of Cyber-warfare Centre is
best able to address these potentially debilitating deficiencies. Networked
databases are useless if the data can be corrupted, providing confusing or
misleading information, or if decision-makers lose confidence in them. Expansive
networking, incorporating more databases, involving more carriers, and
connecting with many more customers, can increase network vulnerabilities;
there are more access points for hostile intruders, and more data-links that can
be disrupted. Shared and enhanced situational awareness is a superlative ‘force
multiplier’, but it can be disastrous if it is subject to surreptitious manipulation.
The current capability development process ensures that key NCW criteria
are examined with respect to all prospective acquisitions, including the levels
of connectivity and security, and their contribution to ISR missions, thus
increasing the potency of new acquisitions. However, there is no endorsed vision
of any notional ADF IW architecture for the period beyond 2020 which can
ensure that the sorts of capabilities currently being acquired or being proposed
for acquisition are the optimal components of that architecture; there is no agency
committed to ensuring that all the requisites for effective cyber-warfare
(including equipment) will be in place (which will only become apparent through
the plans and activities of some Cyber-warfare Centre).
Furthermore, the 2007 NCW Roadmap portrays a severely delimited concept
of offensive cyber-operations. It alluded to the central place of the ‘offensive
support system’ in the ADF’s NCW architecture. However, its scope is essentially
confined to enablement of increases in the combat power of ADF units (through
enhanced situational awareness, speedier decision-making, and more precise
and more tailored application of force). There is no evident appreciation of the
role of offensive cyber-warfare in influencing conflict outcomes quite apart from
(but carefully coordinated with) enhanced combat power.
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The establishment of an Australian Cyber-warfare Centre has now become a
matter of considerable urgency. It is essential for it to be established soon to
ensure that Australia will have the necessary capabilities for conducting
technically and strategically sophisticated cyber-warfare activities by about
2020.
Several basic issues require considerable further debate, including the best
location for a Centre, its organisation and staffing arrangements, its core functions
and initial terms of reference, and its ADF command relationships. Some matters
will only be resolved once the Centre has been functioning for several years,
including some of the command relationships and some of the specialised
equipment requirements. Assuming a decision to establish an Australian
Cyber-warfare Centre was to be made by 2010, an initial operational capability
could be assembled within a couple of years; however, it would not be able to
perform all of its ascribed functions, especially those that require the development
or acquisition of new capabilities and/or the placement of assorted devices
overseas, much before about 2018. This means that an informed and vigorous
debate on these issues should be encouraged as soon as possible.
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